Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

141. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

US/MC/7

Istanbul, May 1, 1960.

NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING

Istanbul, May 2–4, 1960

PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS

• United States:
  • The Secretary
  • Mr. Merchant
  • Mr. Kohler
• German:
  • Mr. Enrich Von Brentano
  • Mr. Karl Carstens
  • Mr. Rudolf Fechter
• Great Britain:
  • The Art. Hon. Selwyn Lloyd, M.P.
  • H.E. Sir Frank Roberts
  • Sir Anthony Rumbold, At.
• French:
  • S.E.M. Couve de Murville
  • M. Lucet
  • M. de Leusse

SUBJECT

• Preparations for Discussion of Berlin at the Summit

As Chairman, Von Brentano began by observing that the principal task of the Foreign Ministers at today’s meeting was to discuss a supplementary report of the Four-Power Working Group on Germany, including Berlin.¹ He said that he had a few initial observations to make. As to paragraph (c) of the July 28 Western proposals at Geneva dealing with access,² he wished to suggest new language which would get away from the idea that, under present practices, access to Berlin was completely free and unrestricted. He suggested wording as follows: “Free and unrestricted access to West Berlin by land, water and air shall be established (’:restored’: in German Embassy, Washington version) and guaranteed for all persons, goods and means of communication, including those of the Armed Forces of the Western Powers stationed in Western Berlin. The procedures effective May 1, 1960, shall be improved, with a view to facilitating communications”. Von Brentano said he did not wish to reach agreement on precise wording among the Ministers; this could be discussed further by the Working Group. He also suggested that paragraph (d) of the Geneva proposals might be modified to avoid inclusion of the words “seriously affect the rights and interests of others”. He felt that this would give the Soviets a pretext for continuous attempts to intervene in West Berlin.

The Secretary commented that the present suggested language was better than that in the original bracketed portions of the Working Group report. However, the use of “restored” or “established” with reference to Allied traffic, which was moving better now than it had some time ago, had to be questioned. Lloyd said he agreed with this point. Von Brentano cited statistics relating to harassment of German travelers, but did not comment on the aspects of Allied travel.

Couve observed that details of this sort were obviously not going to be discussed at the Summit. The Heads of Government would have to designate some other body to implement in detail the decisions on principle which might be taken by them. Von Brentano said he knew that all of these details could not be considered at the Summit. The object was to obtain agreement on the goals for post-Summit discussion.

The Secretary raised the possibility that the Soviets might utilize the provisions for limitation of force levels, non-stationing of nuclear weapons, and the ban on certain activities, in order to make claims to a right of inspection. Lloyd said that he thought the Western position on this would be absolutely clear. We would not admit such a claim as having any relevance to an agreement between Governments. Couve noted that the Western proposal had envisaged a quadripartite commission to serve as a disputes mechanism. Von Brentano stated that the Western refusal at Geneva to put the question of troop levels in Berlin on a contractual basis had been intended precisely to avoid giving the Soviets any pretense for asserting inspection claims.

With reference to “negotiating” at the Summit, the Secretary noted that the memorandum written by the President³ recalled his conversation with Khrushchev emphasizing that the Summit should be used for purposes of discussion rather than negotiation. In response to the Secretary’s query, Couve said that the French had not thought of putting this point into the communication to go from DeGaulle to Khrushchev regarding procedural arrangements. Lloyd said he hoped it had not been included, since he could not understand the real difference between discussion and negotiation. The Secretary pointed out the essential difference is whether or not the details of agreements are worked out. Couve observed that, in any event, no treaty was going to be made at the Summit. At most there might be agreement on general principles. Lloyd said that he concurred in the view that the heads of Government could only arrive at “heads of agreement”.

Von Brentano asked the other Ministers how they felt the Summit preparations on Germany including Berlin were to be handled in the NATO meeting. The Secretary said that his impression was that the proposed Western tactics would not be given to the North Atlantic Council. The only new thing which had apparently been raised in the NATO discussion was the Dutch question as to the implications of the Western plebiscite proposal. He noted that he had been designated to speak on behalf of the four on the general subject. Actually, there was very little to talk about.

Referring to the specific points raised by Von Brentano, Couve said he took note of them with sympathy and agreed they would have to be referred to the Working Group for further consideration. What could be done in that body would probably not be the last word, and even if the drafts were not completed before the Summit it would not matter.

The Secretary asked what our major objective should be at the Summit with respect to Berlin. Should the issue be referred to another body on the basis of a general directive with the idea of merely continuing negotiations, or should the aim be more specific, directed at an interim arrangement? Von Brentano commented that this would be difficult to answer now. It would depend on what happened at the Summit. The Secretary conceded that this was correct, but made the point that the West should have a little sense of where it would like to direct the discussion.

Lloyd said that if Khrushchev admitted that the Western status in Berlin would be the same at the termination of a specific period of time and if this period of time were satisfactory, it might be better to have that than merely continuing negotiations over which the Soviet threat would still be hanging. The Secretary commented that, in our discussion of this subject, it would be better to avoid the term “interim”. Couve added that even if Lloyd’s two assumptions were met, a post-Summit meeting would still be required to arrive at a special arrangement. Once the principle were accepted by both sides, there would be no urgency in arriving at the specific arrangement which would have to be discussed with no time limit on the negotiations. The time consumed in the process would be added to the period of the arrangement, and this would give the West more time to “defuse” the Berlin problem. The Secretary said he could not help but think of the last Summit meeting in Geneva. The day after it ended there was disagreement as to what had been agreed. The meeting of Foreign Ministers which followed labored under this disagreement. Von Brentano said that we must take the experience of the first Summit into account, of course, but nothing could be done about that now. It was necessary to proceed as Couve had said and to make the attempt.

In response to the Secretary’s query about the German brackets on the all-Berlin proposal attached to the Supplementary Working Group Report, Dr. Carstens (speaking for Von Brentano) said the Germans thought it would be useful to have the all-Berlin proposal give emphasis to the need to resume negotiations on German reunification. Otherwise the Soviets could say that the West had agreed to something along the lines of their free city proposal. The inclusion of the German language would preserve the Western position that the real Berlin solution must be in the context of German reunification. Lloyd observed that this proposal was essentially a propaganda exercise. The Ministers had not agreed to use it. It was unlikely that it would be put forward at the Summit. He agreed that the Working Group could discuss it further. The Secretary reminded the other Ministers that NATO expected to receive the draft proposal since it knew the Working Group was elaborating one. The Western powers did not want to give NATO a draft with brackets around certain language. Lloyd commented that the Four could say it was still being worked on. In any event, he felt that giving it to NATO might create a false impression. Sir Frank Roberts (the British Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council) said that his impression was that the other NATO countries were not expecting more than they had already received in the form of the Working Group Report. The Secretary said it was agreeable to him to let the matter drop. If the question were raised in NATO, it could be said that the Working Group was still elaborating the text.

Von Brentano said its use or non-use was really a matter of tactics. The Ministers did not need to decide today if it were to be put forward or not. He did not believe there was any substantive difference on paragraph one; the only question was whether there was ample reference to reunification. After an exchange on possible wording between Lloyd and Von Brentano, the latter suggested that if language could be added indicating that the unification of Germany is and remains the Western objective and that the unification of Berlin would provide a first step in that direction, the brackets could be eliminated.

Lloyd said he understood that there was also a point to be made about the “essential conditions” paper. There had been some discussion in the Working Group whether or not this should be put forward at the Summit. Von Brentano said this would depend on developments which could not be decided on today. The Secretary observed that it might prove helpful in clarifying a directive with respect to future negotiations.

Von Brentano asked whether the four Foreign Ministers should plan to meet again before the Summit. He suggested that such a meeting might perhaps take place on the afternoon of Saturday, May 14. After a further exchange, it was tentatively agreed that the four Foreign Ministers would meet in Paris on May 14 at 3 p.m. at the Quai d’Orsay.

The meeting concluded with a brief discussion of the line which the four countries would take in answering press inquiries. It was agreed that they would say that they had discussed the work of the Working Group and were in complete agreement with respect to the continuing proceedings of the Working Group. They would also say that they had reviewed the Report to be made to NATO. As to the internal Turkish situation, the Ministers agreed that, if pressed to make a statement, they would simply say that they had come here for the NATO meeting, and would refrain from comment about the internal situation in the country. The Secretary noted that we might be under somewhat heavier pressure than the others because of what had happened in Korea.

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1650. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand on May 3 and approved by M on May 10 and S on May 11. A summary of the conversation was transmitted in Secto 46 from Istanbul, May 1 at 8 p.m. (Ibid., Central Files, 396.1–IS/5–160) The conversation took place at the German Consulate General immediately after the one reported in Document 140.
1. See footnote 7, Document 140.
2. See vol. VIII, Document 488.
3. Presumably a reference to the President’s letter to Khrushchev transmitted in Document 110.