Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

142. Telegram From the Delegation to the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State⁰

Istanbul, May 2, 1960, 1:30 a.m.

Secto 48. Five foaming met 5 p.m. on disarmament. Lloyd in chair called for comments on Geneva Delegations report of April 28.¹ Secretary said he appreciated reasons for declining publish April verbatims May 15 as reported para 7, but felt our refusal might cause us embarrassment and new opportunity for Soviets step up propaganda content their speeches no longer available. Urged release. Agreed UK would advise Soviets in Moscow West now prepared concur release April verbatims May 15 or whenever ready.

Green then made long prepared statement. [11-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

[1 paragraph (13-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

Segni said Soviets have shown no interest in reaching disarmament agreements as contrasted with propaganda. Will continue same line at Summit in effort show West is reluctant disarm. We cannot meet their generalities by general principles of our own, since ours appear weaker than Utopian Soviet plan and we cannot risk getting committed to agreements in principle which would hamper our defensive preparations. By continuing to focus on specific measures, we guard our defense position, offer practical and immediate progress in contrast with vague Utopian Soviet scheme, and continue Soviet scheme, and continue to test Soviet intentions and be ready when they shift and turn to practical agreements.

Segni suggested advantageous table new proposals not already rejected by Soviets but consistent with Western plan² and publicly appealing like 1955 Open Skies proposal, would undercut Soviet shift to Soviet partial measures which are dangerous to NATO. New proposals should be worked out with great secrecy to enhance public impact. Allies with greatest defense burden must decide what can be done. Italians have ideas which might be submitted at appropriate time such as foaming meeting at Washington on eve of Summit.

[1 paragraph (5-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

Secretary said we have double task of considering what is to be done at Summit and what we are to say to NAC tomorrow. Underlying problem in both cases is lack of Western unity. Prime example is Deldi 146³ on which four countries agree and French do not. French split on this problem gave concern particularly because he believed strong possibility reasons involved were related to possibility of French proposal at Summit on control of nuclear delivery systems. He urged Couve to explain precisely French ideas since U.S. was bewildered when it tried to study and understand French ideas. He understood French proposed relying on control of nuclear weapons delivery to deal with nuclear threat. However, U.S. has many delivery systems such as artillery, mortars, ships, and missiles and planes of various ranges. Control of all these delivery methods is extremely complex and difficult and is clearly a measure for the final stage of disarmament. If Western deterrent to be preserved this cannot be advanced as initial proposal. Urged avoidance divisions in Western camp which Soviets can exploit and frank exploration Western positions to talk out and settle differences.

Sec recalled NATO fully informed Western disarmament plan and course of negotiations. If new tack to be taken at Summit we should warn NATO allies and not leave them to learn from newspapers.

Couve said French position not new. After initial differences French finally accepted Western plan on understanding essential idea of nuclear disarmament would be included. Concept of control of delivery systems as way to achieve this also not new and discussed by De Gaulle with Western leaders and in speeches. Since nuclear weapons cannot with assurance be eliminated French turned to possibility controlling systems for delivering nuclear weapons. While recognized many systems of delivery exist essential ones to control are strategic systems which can deliver weapons capable of destroying whole countries or world. These are systems with range of IBM, IRBM, strategic aircraft, ships and submarines. If way could be found to deal with such systems this would accomplish nuclear disarmament as French meant it. Of course measures to achieve East-West balance of conventional armaments and forces would have to accompany. Soviet not necessarily stronger than West in conventional field in view economic and population resources of West. Thus critical question is whether control of means of delivery is still feasible. French did not know answer but thought study should be made and no danger in proposing it provided clearly conditioned on finding satisfactory means of control.

Sec expressed agreement with much of Coupe’s statement but demurred at bringing into first stage something requiring complete inspection. By so doing and jumping over present Western first stage measures we would lose opportunity test Soviet willingness agree and good faith in implementing initial measures before going to radical final stage measures.

Lloyd made familiar point we are conducting both public relations exercise and probe of possibilities real disarmament program. Apropos world opinion expressed regret Western slowness in tabling counterproposal to Soviet principles paper⁴ though he recognized this slowness price of obtaining coalition unity. His personal assessment was our public record will stand examination and not as bad as some had said. We should not go back to further argument on generalities at Geneva. Summit should direct ten-power talks to get down to specific measures. Force levels might be one. This might be linked with something nuclear, perhaps cut-off and reconversion fissionable materials. Might also be combined with French idea of studying control of delivery means. He thought French idea would require degree of control associated with final stage measures but preferred that any turn down for that reason come from Soviets. He stated and Couve agreed that French view was their proposal conditioned on complete control. Lloyd also suggested surprise attack and international control organ as other specific measures.

Sec agreed would be useful if Summit could give directive for concentration on specific measures. Pointed out that this was burden of Deldi 146 to which French had not agreed. Couve said difficulty for French was that early measures included cut-off and some transfers fissionable materials without commitment to nuclear disarmament which for them were directly linked. They had stated in NAC that their acceptance cut-off in second stage is linked to final elimination nuclear weapons in third stage.

Lloyd said that approach in Deldi 146 apparently acceptable if five could agree on which specific measures could be negotiated. Sec emphasized that in U.S. view cut-off and reconversion nuclear stocks constitute most important first step to be taken. Lloyd suggested this be coupled with French proposal as subjects for study of required controls. Sec said U.S. thought cut-off perhaps easiest measure to control. Although some small scale production by centrifuges might be difficult to detect we already know and could monitor major producing plants in U.S., Soviet Union and U.K. Other specific measures identified by U.S. in specific measures paper⁵ discussed but not tabled at Geneva could be also put forward. While control of means of delivery must be studied at some point it is most complicated problem and not suitable for initial stage. By proposing study of such a measure we would run risk of becoming to some extent committed in principle.

Lloyd said he understood French did not propose to ban delivery means initially but only to control them. Sec warned again of feasibility hiding 100 ICBM’s. Couve conceded that if this was result of study then French proposal not feasible.

Lloyd then reviewed list of specific measures in paper prepared for tabling on basis Deldi 69.⁶ Points accepted in substance except nuclear item. International control organ and machinery for maintaining international peace also added as points.

Lloyd repeated suggestion cut-off and conversations be coupled with French proposal. Referring to luncheon conversation he interpreted French position as in first step inspection missile sites and airfields to see whether nuclear weapons being put on board and as second step destruction delivery vehicles if possible. Secretary spoke further of complexities and difficulties controlling delivery systems. Couve emphasized French concept only included long range vehicles not artillery or antiaircraft. Sec urged French to spell out ideas precisely.

Lloyd said that as spokesman for Five before NAC on May 2 he would review situation on 10-Power talks along lines report to NATO.⁷ Continuation this fruitless debate on generalities is not enough and Summit should if possible give directive to turn to specific measures. In reviewing possible specific measures he would gloss over difference of view regarding nuclear item. Green pressed for Summit directive for secret meetings. Lloyd brushed this aside as unsuitable for Summit directive and something which could be worked out among delegations.

Agreement reached that further preparatory work in disarmament for Summit should be completed in Paris by representatives from five delegations, time of meeting to be set after NATO May 2 discussion.

Lloyd suggested line with press should avoid any reference to substance and simply explain Five met in anticipation NATO discussion of disarmament preparations for Summit. [2 lines of source text not declassified]

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1652. Secret. Drafted by Farley. Repeated to Paris.
1. A copy of this 7-page report, which reviewed the discussion of disarmament since the April 5 report (Document 112), is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1676.
2. For text of the March 16 Western general disarmament plan, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, pp. 696-699.
3. Dated April 29, Deldi 146 transmitted a draft paragraph for Western tactics on disarmament at the summit. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.12–GE/4–2960)
4. For text of the Soviet principles proposal, April 8, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, pp. 699–700.
5. Not identified further.
6. Deldi 69, April 6, reported on the seventh session of the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.12–GE/4–660) Presumably the correct reference is to Fidel 69, April 12, which transmitted to the U.S. Delegation a draft statement on the principles for general disarmament. (Ibid., 396.12–GE/4–1360)
7. A summary of Lloyd’s report to the North Atlantic Council was transmitted in Secto 54 from Istanbul, May 2. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1652)