Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

148. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, May 9, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Pre-summit Meeting Subjects

PARTICIPANTS

• Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
• Whelm G. Grewe, German Ambassador
• Rolf F. Pauls, Counselor, German Embassy
• Alfred G. Vigderman, Deputy Director, GER

Ambassador Grewe called on Mr. Kohler just before his departure for Bonn and Paris in connection with the forthcoming Summit meeting.

Mr. Kohler handed the Ambassador a copy of the State Department release of May 9 on the shooting down of an unarmed American aircraft over the Soviet Union.¹

At Ambassador Grebe’s request, Mr. Kohler elaborated on some of the facts involved in the incident. He said that the United States had reason to know that the plane had been losing altitude. The plane could have had an engine flame-out. The builders of the plane have looked at the Soviet photographs of the wreckage. They are convinced that these photographs are not photographs of the plane they built. Finally, the Soviet Union has decorated five aviators in connection with the plane incident. All these facts suggest that the plane was not brought down by a Soviet rocket and that the Soviets have evolved this dramatic story to lessen the fear of the Soviet people of penetration of Soviet air space by foreign aircraft. We do not think the plane was shot down at 60, 000 feet. At that altitude the pilot could only have saved himself by use of the ejection seat. The Soviets acknowledge that the pilot came down by parachute.

Turning to the release, Mr. Kohler explained it as an effort to turn the incident to positive advantage by pointing out that it was intolerable to us that means should be developed in secret which could later present us with a military ultimatum. As far as Khrushchev’s handling of the incident is concerned, while we are not quite sure of his intention he seems to be preparing his people for something less than a success at the Summit. If he does not gain ground at the Summit Khrushchev will, no doubt, rebel against the agreement to hold intimate meetings and insist on large ones so that he can extract the maximum propaganda advantage.

On a different subject, Mr. Kohler said that it had been agreed at Istanbul that the Working Group on Germany and Berlin will meet in Paris on May 13, although there did not seem to be anything to do except to review the existing work. Ambassador Grewe expressed himself as satisfied with the comprehensive quality of the work the group had already done. Mr. Kohler said it had been likewise agreed at Istanbul that the French would be responsible for briefing the Germans in Paris. To Ambassador Grewe’s question whether there would be any meetings of the Western Foreign Ministers in Paris, Mr. Kohler said that none had been planned, but such meetings could not be ruled out.

Ambassador Grewe asked whether we saw any connection between the plane incident and the recent shift in the Soviet hierarchy. The Germans and the French think that Khrushchev reinforced his position by bringing his own people into positions of more prominence. But the Neue Zurcher Zeitung had a different view, considering that the new people were not loyal to Khrushchev. Mr. Kohler said that we could not agree with the view of the Swiss newspaper and agreed rather with the French and German assessment.

[1 paragraph (5 lines of source text) not declassified]

Mr. Pauls asked whether the Stalinists in the Soviet Union had forced Khrushchev to handle the plane incident sternly as a means of retreating from the policy of detente. Mr. Kohler replied that many factors were at play. Khrushchev is clearly having internal trouble. [5-2/2 lines of source text not declassified]

On contingency planning, Ambassador Grewe asked whether there was anything to the rumor that there is something less than complete agreement among the three powers. Mr. Kohler assured the Ambassador that the April 1959 three-power paper² was completely agreed. There were, of course, further steps to be taken in elaboration of these papers. We should be prepared for the possibility of having to put this planning into effect. We may well face a crisis after the Summit, particularly as Khrushchev was pretty well committed to certain courses of action. In this connection, Mr. Kohler hoped the Germans were working on their alert problem.

Mr. Kohler then adverted to the Norstad plan, saying that for the time being we were deferring further steps, because of the German assessment of the political questions involved. We continue to believe, however, that when a military advisor says that military security will be enhanced by certain actions, it is the job of the diplomat to find a way to accomplish them. We have always considered that we should start any plan of mutual inspection with a large area. [5-2/2 lines of source text not declassified]

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–PA/5–960. Secret. Drafted by Vigderman and initialed by Kohler.
1. For text of this release, see Department of State Bulletin, May 23, 1960, pp. 816-817.
2. See vol. VIII, Document 279.