Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

150. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower⁰

Washington, May 10, 1960.

OTHERS PRESENT

• The Vice President, Secretary Herter, Secretary Merchant, Assistant Secretary Foy Kohler, General Goodpaster

Mr. Herter noted that there had as yet been no request by Adenauer to see the President, but that such a request is always a possibility. The President said he would see Adenauer if he so requests, but only on his request, since the time on Sunday when he and Adenauer will both be in Paris is so limited. The President next asked whether Mr. Herter thought the President should make a courtesy call on De Gaulle on arrival. The Secretary said he would look into this with the French. He also referred to an idea of calling on Khrushchev which he had apparently earlier talked to the Secretary about. Mr. Herter said his first instinct had been that it was a good idea but now he had second thoughts along the lines of a reservation expressed by the President—that it might be taken as a gesture of weakness on the President’s part.

Turning next to the question of procedure at the summit meeting, Mr. Herter suggested that at the first meeting Mr. Bohlen be used as the note-taker. The President approved this, saying he would like this inasmuch as he valued Mr. Bohlen’s judgment on the matters that would be under discussion. The President then wondered whether it might be a good idea to have Khrushchev come around to the American Embassy residence after the first day’s meeting—say at about 4 PM. Mr. Herter thought this would be a good thing to do and the President asked him to arrange it. I noted that the plan for the first meeting suggested that for the initial hour, when the Chiefs of State are meeting alone, they should deal with procedures for their meeting rather than substantive questions. Mr. Herter said that in fact he understands that de Gaulle thinks the first thing to do is to put squarely to Khrushchev whether he wants a détente in East-West relations. After further discussion, the President said it would be most helpful to the conference if the Foreign Ministers could somehow make enough progress to put specific documents, including issues and disagreements, before the main meetings.

Mr. Herter next stated that the most important paper in the material prepared by the President was a draft key-note statement. The President read through the statement, suggesting changes and additions.¹ In particular, he wanted to say that the use of force or the threat of force would lead to such serious consequences in the Berlin situation that none of the participants should even think of it. He thought the statement was excellent, although a little long. He would like to see it held to about ten minutes, considering the amount of time that will be needed for consecutive translations. Mr. Kohler commented that De Gaulle wants to avoid a series of set-piece speeches, but since Khrushchev is likely to make one anyhow, there would be value in the President’s making one. Mr. Merchant pointed out that the order of seating would probably be such that, with De Gaulle as Chairman for the first meeting, the President will speak last and would have a chance to adjust his remarks to those of Khrushchev. Mr. Herter said that there had been prepared good detail papers for the conference, for example on Berlin and Germany. He was not clear as to how these could best be used, however. The President said that he thought a good course would be to start from the beginning of the meeting on drafting the communiqué. The Heads of State would have this draft before them each day, and could gradually resolve issues and add to it. Without such a document, they would talk aimlessly and get nowhere. The Foreign Minister should, each day, add whatever area of agreement had been achieved to the communiqué. Mr. Herter said it would also be necessary to bring in stated disagreements reached among the Foreign Ministers. He added that he did not know if Khrushchev would follow the procedure proposed by the President.

Mr. Kohler commented that there would have to be some mention of a subject in the meeting with Heads of State or Gromyko would not even be willing to talk about it in the Foreign Ministers sessions.

The President next commented on a discussion he had had the previous night with Speaker Rayburn,² who had said he was sorry the President had announced he should leave the summit and have the Vice President take over, inasmuch as this seemed to be a purely political move. The President said he had told Speaker Rayburn that the purpose of this was to avoid the necessity for recessing the summit meeting if he should have to return to the United States, and that if the summit went on for a few days after his visit to Lisbon and (if necessary) brief return to the United States, he (the President) would go right back. Mr. Rayburn said he had entirely missed this point in the press reporting of the President’s decision. The President said he would try to clear this up at his press conference the following day.³

Mr. Herter next referred to a procedural point. Nuclear test suspension is an area in which the Soviets are interested. The French will not participate in this, and a meeting on this would have to be held in the British, Soviet or American Embassy. [10 lines of source text not declassified]

In reading through more of the papers, the President asked as to whether we have a good definition of peaceful co-existence. Mr. Herter said he doubted the efficacy of trying to reach an agreed definition because the words will be misinterpreted by the Soviets, and instead favored a Western statement of the principles by which we seek to live in international affairs.

With regard to disarmament, Mr. Herter said that his group is working on a proposal for laying down a specific number of atomic weapons—perhaps stated in terms of the number of Hiroshima-size weapons—to be removed from stockpiles.

The President noted, with regard to the subject of trade, that the proposal was not to discuss this matter. Mr. Herter thought it should be avoided to the extent possible, but noted that the French will probably want to mention it.

The President said he thought Mr. Khrushchev would probably try by his deportment to force the conference along the lines he wants. He thought the Western leaders should all quietly say that they cannot and will not negotiate on such a basis. With regard to the plane, he thought that perhaps the best course is to chuckle about it and turn the subject off.

Mr. Nixon said he anticipated that Khrushchev will try to keep the President talking about the plane and concurred in the idea of finessing the subject. He thought it would be useful to leave some air of mystery about it and to imply that we know a good deal more than he thinks we know in relation to the whole U–2 project. The President said he thought he would perhaps let Khrushchev talk as much as he wanted to about the plane, and then quietly suggest that he should come around and talk privately to the President about it.

Mr. Herter asked if he might brief General de Gaulle on the material obtained from this project and the President approved his doing so. Mr. Nixon suggested it might be wise to let De Gaulle know of this plan right away and Mr. Herter said he would tell Alphand the same afternoon.

Mr. Herter reported that we are still in some disagreement with the French on their proposal to inspect “means of delivery.” He does not think that this is a vital question threatening the conference. The President recalled that he had suggested inspection of designated areas as a means of testing the technique but that De Gaulle had come back to “means of delivery” without hesitation. The President thought that the real point is that the nub of the question of peace is to prepare for open societies. When he is in Russia he is thinking of stressing this point, through explaining our own system, and why we like it.

The President concluded by saying that he was having prepared, and thought he might throw at Mr. Khrushchev, a memorandum giving clear evidence of their spying in our country, the volume of this and many specific instances, etc.⁴ Mr. Herter agreed that this could be quite useful.

G.
Brigadier General, USA

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster.
1. On May 9, Herter transmitted to the President a briefing book and a book containing papers for the summit. In a covering memorandum, Herter explained that these papers would form the basis of discussion on May 10. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–PA/5–960) The second item in each was a draft keynote statement. Copies of the papers in both books are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1675 and 1674, respectively.
2. The President met with Rayburn at 5:30 p.m. on May 9. No other record of this meeting has been found.
3. For a transcript of President Eisenhower’s press conference on May 11, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: DWight D. Eisenhower, 1960–61, pp. 403-414.
4. Presumably reference is to an undated paper entitled “Espionage Activities Within the US.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File)