Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLI, Global Issues II

48. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 18, 1981

PARTICIPANTS

• Robert L. Bernstein, Chairman, Helsinki Watch
• Orville H. Schell, Vice-Chairman, Helsinki Watch
• Aryeh Neier, Executive Committee member, Helsinki Watch
• Jeri Laber, Executive Director, Helsinki Watch
• Dr. Ernest Lefever, Assistant Secretary-Designate, HA
• Stephen Palmer, Acting Assistant Secretary, HA
• Theresa Tull, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, HA
• Hugh Simon, HA/HR

SUBJECT

• Human Rights Policy

SUMMARY

Mr. Bernstein explained that the Helsinki Watch had not taken a position on Dr. Lefever’s nomination, but is concerned about the perception that the new administration is less mindful of human rights than the former. He pointed out that use of the authoritarian/totalitarian dichotomy and the terrorism/human rights concept, and the failure to condemn the attempted Spanish coup² early on were signals of diminished interest in human rights. Mr. Schell and Mr. Neier questioned the wisdom of using quiet diplomacy with Argentina.

Dr. Lefever outlined U.S. human rights policy. He said that we oppose torture everywhere. We will operate mainly with quiet diplomacy, although gross and consistent violations may require condemnation in a public forum. The Soviet Union, the world’s worst violator of human rights at home and abroad, will be condemned publicly.

In describing his intention to deepen and broaden the concept of human rights, Dr. Lefever called for more attention to the possible results of an intended punitive move on human rights: would human rights conditions only worsen if the government were replaced by one more oppressive? Other U.S. interests, such as security, are overriding in Argentina, but improved results on human rights are expected from quiet diplomacy there.

Mr. Bernstein asked that the U.S. try to assist the Helsinki Monitors as we wind up the Madrid conference and offered to help in publicizing human rights violations when it would be useful. Dr. Lefever welcomed the critical support of NGOs and asked for patience should there be disagreement on the means of promoting human rights. End Summary.

Mr. Bernstein explained that the Helsinki Watch had not taken a position on Dr. Lefever’s nomination. They had called on him because of their interest in human rights.

Dr. Lefever said he had a longstanding personal interest in human rights. He is against torture everywhere. He might differ with some people on methods for supporting human rights; one should not go about bashing one’s friends for human rights violations. We should oppose gross violations wherever they occur; sometimes this would call for public condemnation.

This administration is committed not only to quiet diplomacy; already it has used public fora, such as the U.N. Human Rights Commission.

Speaking from a cleared statement, Dr. Lefever said that he could assure the group that this administration will seek to deepen and broaden the concept of human rights, applying the policy as equally as possible. It is important to keep in mind that expectations of United States omnipotence are illusory. Nevertheless, the commitment to human rights is there, as the Secretary has said repeatedly. We will pursue human rights in a more effective manner, quietly, but with vigorous private arm twisting, if necessary.

Mr. Schell said that the Helsinki Watch tries not to be strident and to be informed. He hoped that Dr. Lefever believes in human rights; he should not head HA if he didn’t.

Dr. Lefever replied that he should not be an American if he didn’t believe in human rights.

Mr. Schell responded that that is what we are all about. He referred to his recent trip to Geneva and Madrid, observing that a great contrast exists between approaches to human rights in the two cities. In Geneva, it seemed that we had chosen to go easy on some human rights violators. Despite Max Kampelman’s³ strong commitment to human rights, this perception seemed to have gained currency in Madrid. Romanian Ambassador Dactu had told him that the next session of the CSCE conference should be held in Bucharest, saying that he could give him all the assurances he wanted for the same access by organizations and press that were enjoyed in Madrid. When Mr. Schell reminded Dactu that the USG is dedicated to human rights, underlining the importance of an improvement in the Romanian record, Dactu had replied, “You know perfectly well your government is easing up on human rights.”

On the perceptual level, this is a problem. In Argentina, General Viola gave the same assurances of improvement one and a half years ago that he is giving in now to us in Washington.

Dr. Lefever said that the successes of quiet diplomacy are difficult to communicate. Progress might well have been better in Argentina with quiet diplomacy. We have security interests in Argentina. We have informed Argentina and Chile that we want improvement in relations⁴ but that they have to help us on human rights.

Mr. Neier asked about the six thousand missing persons for whom the Argentines refuse to be held accountable.

Mr. Bernstein pointed out that the public perception of U.S. human rights policy has been hurt by Ambassador Kirkpatrick’s dichotomy between authoritarians and totalitarian regimes,⁵ by the Secretary’s statements on terrorism replacing human rights,⁶ and by the Secretary’s failure to back democracy in Spain until it seemed certain that democracy had survived the coup attempt.

Dr. Lefever replied that the Secretary had been emphasizing USG opposition to terrorism. He had gone on to explain that terrorism was a serious abuse of human rights. There is now an agreed statement on human rights policy.

Normally quiet diplomacy can accomplish more with it one can be more effective—twist arms if necessary—than in an atmosphere of confrontation. The U.S. ambassadors with whom he has spoken say that they prefer quiet diplomacy.

There are exceptions to the rule of quiet diplomacy, Dr. Lefever added. If violations are gross and consistent, the situation may cry out for condemnation in a public forum. Private groups such as the Helsinki Watch should speak out regularly; governments are more restrained, carrying the burden of diplomacy. When you cannot have naval maneuvers or arms cooperation with certain countries, it is not good for the cause of freedom in the world.

Mr. Schell said he believed that Dr. Lefever and Helsinki Watch views are much closer together than one might realize. We are building up our arms, as the Soviets know well. He observed that Dr. Lefever has a difficult problem with which to contend. The Reagan administration is not well-known for its support of human rights. Dr. Lefever’s personal dedication is to human rights, but Viola and Dactu don’t know it.

Dr. Lefever replied that Viola is starting to know it.

Mr. Schell stated that this office (HA) is the protector of human rights. Dr. Lefever must make clear that he is dedicated to human rights.

Ms. Laber observed that the concept of HA in the previous administration was that it should be the conscience of the State Department.

Dr. Lefever said that this had been discussed. Deepening the concept of human rights is important. People tend to use a two dimensional concept of human rights. Speaking hypothetically, he said that if bad things are happening, if four nuns are killed for example,⁷ and we react against the government, thereby paving the way for a regime which kills 400 nuns, what of our first reaction then? We must consider what may happen later. Abuses cannot be ignored, but we must weigh the alternatives. Would more repression result?

The human rights component was present in all State Department decisions, even before HA existed, and will continue to be. It is present because of the sensitivity of individual officers. We are not going to let up on human rights now but are going to implement our continuing concern in a more effective way.

Mr. Neier pointed out that bringing along the West Europeans had been a tremendous accomplishment during the implementation review phase in Madrid.⁸ Human rights treatment in Madrid differed considerably from that in Belgrade, when our allies were put off by our human rights concerns.⁹ Now the West Europeans are out in front on human rights. In Geneva, even the French took the lead on the Working Group on Disappearances. What have we accomplished in voting against our friends and allies in Europe?¹⁰

Dr. Lefever attributed some of the problems to the haste with which preparations had to be made for the meeting. The dispute concerning the Working Group on Disappearances involved its confidentiality. This government had decided at high levels to move on that track. Men may differ on this point. Our delegation was disturbed at the lack of focus on other violations, equally serious, such as the abuse of psychiatry. The country-specific approach creates difficulties also.

Mr. Neier favored the non-country specific approach, i.e., to focus on all offenders, denounce all, and to vote for all country-specific measures.

Dr. Lefever explained that this administration has a fairly coherent view of human rights methods. U.S. ambassadors do not support more condemnation and more punitive measures announced in public. This administration is more interested in results than rhetoric.

Mr. Neier agreed that results were our objective, and pointed out that Hungary does not list political prisoners. They want MFN treatment; thus, their people are not in jail. Hungary responded to the threat of punitive economic measures, the withholding of MFN.

Dr. Lefever said this is the essence of the Jackson-Vanik amendment,¹¹ which he supports. It operates best with adversary countries where abuses tend to be greater. The Soviets are attempting to export repression; it is more appropriate to go public in criticism of them.

Mr. Neier expressed concern that Cold War rhetoric will weaken East-West policy.

Dr. Lefever replied that the Soviet Union is a vast system of violations of liberty—the worst in the world—and demands a different type of attention than an ally which puts some people in jail. We will just go about it differently in such cases.

Mr. Bernstein pointed out that private organizations can help. The Helsinki Monitors are a key symbol of human rights in the Soviet Union. But private groups need to have trust that quiet diplomacy is not a dodge.

Dr. Lefever said he is against the hobnail boot on the neck of another human being, anywhere in the world. This is the real world where other countries have foreign policies of their own. In Argentina, the dead are dead. We want to improve the behaviour of Argentina, but the government will not admit to the disappearances.

Mr. Neier claimed that the Argentine government operates concentration camps.

Dr. Lefever said we must deal with Argentina, but quietly. The noise level, even in dealing with adversary states, may be reduced.

Mr. Schell asserted that Dr. Lefever should have no illusions about Argentina; the Argentine government uses Hitler-style tactics.

Dr. Lefever answered that diplomacy is not a mutual admiration society. We do not seek to restore normal security ties with Argentina because we like the Argentines. There is a better chance for progress on human rights there if we cooperate on a range of issues.

Mr. Bernstein summed up the purpose of the visit by expressing hope that a solution in Madrid will include something for the Helsinki Monitors. He said that the U.S. can get more for the two Soviet spies in South Africa than Shcharanskiy. The Helsinki Watch hopes some way can be found to help the Monitors; a conference on family reunification would not be sufficient balance in post-Madrid human rights CSCE activities. He urged that HA use NGOs to make noise when it is useful to aid quiet diplomacy. Finally, he said there is a need to redress an imbalance in the public perception of diminished respect for human rights by the new administration.

Dr. Lefever said he will cherish and respect critical support from groups with the same ideals. He asked for understanding if there is disagreement on means. Honest people disagree on means, he said, but warned of the dangers of successor governments to regimes whose methods we may not like in the short run.

1. Source: Department of State, Subject Files, Human Rights Files, 1981–1990, Lot 92D49, HUMAN RIGHTS Admin—Generated. No classification marking. Drafted by Simon on March 24 and cleared by Tull and Palmer. The meeting took place at the Department of State.
2. On February 23, members of the Guardia Civil held the Spanish Parliament hostage for 22 hours in a failed coup attempt.
3. U.S. Chairman to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
4. In telegram 72034 to Buenos Aires and Santiago, March 20, the Department transmitted statements made by Buckley regarding human rights and security assistance to Argentina and Chile. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810133–0590)
5. See Document 46.
6. See Document 40.
7. See footnote 5, Document 44.
8. In telegram 8095 to USNATO, January 12, the Department reported that the implementation review phase of the CSCE was a success and mentioned the support for human rights issues from the Western delegations. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810016–959)
9. Documents regarding the CSCE meeting in Belgrade are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. V, European Security, 1977–1983.
10. See Document 42.
11. The Jackson-Vanik amendment denies “Most Favored Nation” status to non-market states that restrict immigration.