Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLI, Global Issues II

49. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs (Eagleburger) and the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Palmer) to Acting Secretary of State Clark¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

• CSCE—Concrete Human Rights Steps By The Soviets

ISSUE FOR DECISION

Whether to suggest to Ambassador Dobrynin that concrete human rights steps by the Soviets outside the Madrid CSCE meeting would do much to create an atmosphere conducive to progress at the meeting.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

Some tentative agreement on human rights issues has been reached in Madrid² and the Soviets expect the West to press for more. Much of the agreement centers, however, on final document verbiage and more meetings. We should take advantage of this expectation of the Soviets to press them for actual human rights improvements. We would offer to consider these improvements as constituting part of the balance in results between human rights and security in Madrid.

You could suggest to Dobrynin that the Soviets are well aware of the range of Americans’ human rights concerns. These concerns have been indicated, for example, by the Secretary’s recent discussion with Dobrynin³ of the Shcharanskiy and Embassy Pentecostalists’ cases⁴ and by the presentations at Madrid.

ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS

A. That you suggest to Dobrynin that concrete steps on human rights concerns outside the CSCE context can improve CSCE prospects at Madrid.

The Soviets may believe that such steps would improve prospects for agreement on a CDE. This option may provide an early opportunity to show results from the quiet diplomatic approach to human rights in US-Soviet relations. The chances for a demonstrable success are slim. EUR is particularly skeptical, but feels such an approach, in the context of other business, can do little harm and agrees we may have a unique window of opportunity. In any event, such a demarche would strengthen our position at the Madrid meeting. Ambassador Kampelman agrees.

B. That such a suggestion be made by Ambassador Kampelman at Madrid.

This has already been done and would therefore appear to the Soviets to be a less serious approach.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you approve option A, favored by HA, EUR and Ambassador Kampelman.⁵

Alternatively, that you approve Option B.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810098–0755. Confidential. Drafted by Simon and Clyatt on June 8; cleared in EUR/RPM, CSCE, EUR/SOV, and EUR. Haig was in the Philippines attending the ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting.
2. See footnote 8, Document 48.
3. In telegram 129537 to Moscow, May 19, the Department transmitted a brief summary of Haig’s May 15 meeting with Dobrynin. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])
4. Shcharanskiy was a Soviet Refusenik who wished to emigrate to Israel, but Soviet authorities imprisoned him. In 1978, seven Soviet Pentecostals took refuge in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, citing religious persecution.
5. Kelly checked the approve option and wrote: “(Amb. Stoessel will raise at a future lunch with Dobrynin). JHK 6/18/1981.”