Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLI, Global Issues II

42. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Abrams), the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Bushnell), and the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs (Vest) to Secretary of State Haig¹

Washington, February 18, 1981

SUBJECT

• UN Human Rights Commission Vote on Disappeared Persons

SUMMARY: We may face an early test of US human rights policy this week when the UN Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) in Geneva takes up whether the Working Group on “Disappeared Persons”—which has spent most of its time on Argentina—should proceed in public or confidentially. There is a good chance now that the issue will be decided by consensus.² If it is not—and the vote could come as early as February 19—you may wish to refer this policy decision to the President because our vote could signal an important shift in US diplomacy.

ANALYSIS OF ISSUES

The attached Action Memorandum to the President summarizes the background and available options. The Department divides on this issue as follows:

—IO and Ambassador Kirkpatrick favor supporting Argentina’s preference for confidential procedures in the Working Group. They argue that we should (1) break with Carter human rights policy, (2) expedite improved relations with Argentina, and (3) shift focus to totalitarian regimes from authoritarian governments.

—ARA and EUR favor the West European resolution³ for continuing public procedures. They argue that support for Argentina⁴ on this issue runs counter to expressed Administration objectives vis-a-vis the USSR, our major NATO Allies, and Latin America. Most specifically, a pro-West European vote will bolster Allied support for US concerns in El Salvador, avoid isolating us in a losing vote with the Soviet bloc and against the free world, and build on a UN process that could put greater focus on Soviet abuses.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached Action Memorandum to the President.⁵

Attachment

Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan⁶

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

• UN Vote on Disappeared Persons

We may face an early test of US human rights policy this week when the UN Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) takes up how the Working Group on “Disappeared Persons”—which spends most of its time on Argentina—should proceed.

Argentina, supported primarily by the USSR and its allies, wants US support for putting the Working Group under confidential procedures. Our West European allies all support the present public proceedings. Although our delegation worked actively with the West Europeans last year to focus attention on disappearances in Argentina, it has adopted a lower profile this year—thus already improving relations with Argentina and signalling a shift in US human rights policy.

At issue now is whether to vote for or against Argentina on this question and thus indicate a sharper change of direction for this Administration’s human rights policy, with implications for our relations with West Europeans, including their reaction to our position in El Salvador. The options—if no compromise is possible and the issue comes to a vote—are:

OPTION 1: US abstain, with explanation that our policy is under review.

Pro:

—Avoids early clash with allies on human rights

—Defers decision until we complete full interagency review of US human rights policy

—Gives us time to seek support for possible change in US policy

Con:

—Misses opportunity to expedite improved US-Argentine relations

—Hurts campaign against international terrorism

—Does not make clear break with Carter policy

OPTION 2: US vote for French resolution

Pro:

—Helps build West European support for our concerns in El Salvador and elsewhere in Central America

—Avoids clash with key allies on the eve of visits by the French Foreign Minister and UK Prime Minister⁷

—Protects US from charge of “abandoning” human rights

—Wins allied praise for US leadership since key West Europeans (especially FRG Chancellor Schmidt) believe we serve shared Western security interests vis-a-vis the USSR by addressing underlying problems in developing nations that open the door to Soviet aggression

Con:

—Misses opportunity for more definite step to improve relations with Argentina

—Signals continuation of Carter human rights policy, even though in lower key

—Puts more emphasis on criticism of a Western nation, while no UNHRC working groups direct most of their efforts to totalitarian countries (though other UN and CSCE procedures do spotlight Soviet abuses)

OPTION 3: US support Argentina

Pro:

—Signals more strongly Administration’s desire to launch early improvement in US-Argentine relations and wean Argentina away from Soviets

—Breaks dramatically with Carter human rights policy

—Criticizes UNHRC concentration on violations discoverable only because societies in question are partly open, while in closed societies (such as USSR) evidence of violations is harder to obtain

—Criticizes concentration on a form of human rights violation more often found in Latin America, while Soviet violations (e.g., use of insane asylums or labor camps) often go unstudied by UNHRC

Con:

—Aligns us in a losing vote with the Soviet bloc and against most free world nations, without gaining much from Argentina which does not expect US support on this issue

—Undercuts UNHRC process that could focus even more attention on Soviet violations (voting against public procedures this time will weaken our case when we seek public inquiry of Soviet oppression)

—May harm US relations with democratic forces in Latin America and elsewhere in the Third World

—Plays into Soviet hands by suggesting to our West European allies and others that we use human rights primarily as a Cold War gimmick and that we are not really interested in the grievances of those in non-Communist countries

—Leads to highly unfavorable press/media comment in US and elsewhere and possible US Congressional backlash

—Ignores fact that we use other UN mechanisms and the CSCE to spotlight Soviet and East European violations

Decision

OPTION 1: US abstain, with explanation that our policy is under review.⁸

OPTION 2: US vote for French resolution, backed by all West European allies⁹

OPTION 3: US support Argentina, backed by USSR, Cuba, etc. (Recommended by Ambassador Kirkpatrick)¹⁰

1. Source: Department of State, Assistant Secretary Files—Elliott Abrams Subject and CHRON Files, 1981–1987, Lot 89D184, Commission on Human Rights Geneva—Feb. 1981. Confidential. Drafted by Vogelgesang. In the upper right-hand margin, Kelly wrote: “2/18 JHK—The Secretary chose to make the decision himself and chose Option 3. Sec-Pres not forwarded. IO doing cable. JK.”
2. In telegram 2022 from Geneva, February 26, USUN reported that the UNHRC had adopted a consensus resolution extending the term of the working group. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810091–0551)
3. In telegram 1335 from Geneva, February 10, USUN transmitted the text of a French proposal related to the working group. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810064–0740)
4. In telegram 41957 to Geneva, February 19, the Department reiterated its position in support of Argentina in the absence of a consensus, but reported that a compromise between France and Argentina was possible. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810077–0276)
5. There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation. See footnote 1, above. The latest information from the U.S. Mission in Geneva is that France and Argentina are more than likely to compromise on a consensus resolution. In the event this does not occur, however, this paper gives you contingency choices. [Footnote is in the original.]
6. Confidential.
7. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Reagan met with the French Minister of Foreign Affairs François-Poncet on February 25 and with Thatcher on February 26 and 27. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary)
8. There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the decision.
9. There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the decision.
10. Haig initialed the approve option for Reagan. In a March 16 briefing memorandum to Haig regarding the visit of Argentine President-designate Viola, Bushnell wrote: “As we move to improve relations (including lobbying with the Congress for removal or modification of legislative restrictions), Viola should be made aware of the importance of further progress of human rights.” Haig circled part of the underlined phrase (italicized here) and, in the right-hand margin next to the sentence, wrote: “Never! You are wrong, wrong, wrong.” On the proposed schedule for Viola’s visit to the United States, in the right-hand margin next to a tab entitled “Human Rights in Argentina,” Haig wrote, “Bull, leave him alone!” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Alexander Haig Papers, Department of State, Day File, March 16, 1981)