Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLI, Global Issues II

250. Telegram From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State¹

Addis Ababa, April 10, 1986, 1145Z

1999. Subject: Charge’s Policy Analysis, Assessment and Recommendation Concerning USG Food Assistance to Ethiopia in 1987.

1. S—Entire text.

2. Summary: This message contains my analysis and assessment of the situation in Ethiopia and our position here following eighteen months of massive USG emergency relief assistance and recommends what our policy should be concerning USG food assistance in 1987. It requests that a high level interdepartmental group composed of all involved and affected agencies be convened to consider the question of continuing a significant USG food assistance program in Ethiopia in 1987, taking fully into account the important, highly revelant considerations set forth herein. End summary.

3. Since its inception in late 1984 our large aid program in Ethiopia has had a single, consistent purpose drought relief, which we have done most effectively, bringing great credit to our country and people. Our current aid strategy assumes this purpose will be fulfilled by the end of 1986 and we will withdraw; presumably reverting back to the small, “regular” feeding program we have maintained in Ethiopia since terminating our aid development program in 1974.² If there is a need owing to drought for relief aid beyond CY 86 we are prepared to consider it. This strategy is fully consistent with our original, very limited objective of joining with other friendly donor governments, international organizations and NGOs in a purely humanitarian effort to meet the needs of millions of Ethiopians whose lives were threatened by the drought induced famine of the past two years.

4. In reality, though, our massive involvement and substantial aid presence here over the past two years has also served other important USG goals and objectives and interests, not just in Ethiopia but throughout the Horn of Africa. Thus a decision to terminate the program almost entirely has broader policy implications which should be addressed by the USG before we take definitive action. This message assesses these implications to provide a basis for interagency deliberations and decision making on the future of our aid program in Ethiopia.

5. To properly appreciate where we are now and where our relief aid has brought us in Ethiopia we need to first look back to where we were. From 1977 to 1984 the U.S. was virtually isolated from Ethiopia. Our presence here was confined essentially to limited [less than 1 line not declassified] information gathering under very difficult conditions and to occasional, pro forma diplomatic protest making. Our small official Mission, unable to travel outside of Addis Ababa (except for tours and recreational visits to Lake Langano), was out of touch with the people of this country and with what was happening in its vast, complex countryside. Despite the very friendly, almost affectionate, regard of most Ethiopians for our country we did not maintain with them the informational, educational and cultural ties that we have sustained even with the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and other communist countries. Instead, we contented ourselves with condemning their brutal, totalitarian government, while living with our frustrations at being unable to influence or change it and striving to limit the damage it might inflict on our interests in this strategically important region of the world. Meanwhile, the Soviets and their allies greatly expanded their presence and activities here, especially in the military field. Some of our allies and friends (notably Italy and Sweden) contested the territory but with only our encouragement and not our assistance their modest efforts were no match for the Soviets. Not surprisingly, as we became isolated from Ethiopia the country and its people became increasingly isolated from us. In sum, we came to not account for very much in Ethiopia. To compensate for this we greatly increased our involvement in neighboring Sudan and Somalia trying to make these nations our new bastions in the Horn despite difficulties in insuring our presence and position in them over the longer term. This is where the USG stood in Ethiopia when the disastrous drought peaked in mid 1984.

6. Over the past two years our situation in Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa has altered significantly. Our massive assistance program has enabled us to not only touch the lives of millions of Ethiopians but literally to save them. We responded quickly when they needed us with what they most needed and they know that: The Soviets did not and they also know that. To the chagrin of the Politburo hardliners, scores of official and NGO Americans are moving all over the country, not only observing relief programs but also gathering information on a variety of important subjects (such as resettlement, villagization, local government, the military, etc) and making valuable contacts with individuals and institutions, both governmental and non-governmental. (In eight months I myself have officially visited 28 cities and towns in all geographic areas.) Riding in the expansive wake of our relief program we have in a short time re-established the full range of USIA programs and begun to reforge solid cultural and educational links with key sectors of this emerging society. [less than 4 lines not declassified] Taking advantage of our position as the leading donor, we have been the driving force behind an alliance of more than a score of other friendly donors under UN/IO leadership which has influenced this government, not only on behalf of the relief effort (e.g. IBNET, port improvements, northern feeding) but also on other important issues such as resettlement, refugees and agricultural policies. Western donor reps in Addis are already expressing dismay at the prospect of our withdrawing from this alliance, which would disintegrate without us. In sum, we are no longer “isolated” from Ethiopia but are once again actively involved, on the ground, with the people in many important areas. While our enhanced presence and impact here falls far short of our past overwhelming prominence, it is nevertheless significant and productive in terms of our larger political, strategic and security interests, particularly over the longer run.

7. Although our return to Ethiopia has not yet led to tangible returns on the big issues that concern us, the picture is not totally bleak. Ethiopia remains in the grip of a small band of ruthless, Marxist ideologues, though this grip has been perforce loosened somewhat. Ethiopia is still solidly allied with the Soviet Union, though the past year has seen this alliance subjected to both internal and external pressures; and, the alliance with Libya, which troubled us so much in the past, is now a shambles. Although the Mengistu regime still threatens our Somali and Sudanese friends, these threats have been contained and some initiatives toward negotiations with them have been taken by Mengistu. Even internally there are some stirrings which give rise to hope for the future of this troubled land. Foremost among these is the agreement recently concluded between the EEC and PMGSE on agricultural policy reform which, if implemented, can have profound implications for economic, social and possibly political change.³

8. We and our allies have had a limited but significant effect on these favorable developments by virtue of our greater presence and involvement in Ethiopia since late 1984. Even though we clearly are not running the show here, we are now more a part of it. Although the PMGSE does not respond as fully as we would wish, even on some relief related issues, it usually listens and seems increasingly to take us into account. Moreover, as the conflict in the PDRY demonstrated, the Soviets do not always call the tune here, especially when they encounter Ethiopian nationalism and plain stubborness. In sum, while we certainly cannot be swept away by hope for the future, the situation is not hopeless. There is in Ethiopia room for maneuver, especially for those willing to be actively involved and to be flexible, pragmatic and imaginative.

9. Taking the foregoing fully into account, I believe it would be a mistake for us, at this juncture, to throw out the baby with the bath water, abruptly withdrawing from the food assistance field in Ethiopia and again isolating ourselves from this country and its people. I am not suggesting that we extend development assistance to Ethiopia, which clearly remains beyond the pale, nor that we continue a hugh feeding program, unless such is required by drought conditions. But I do believe that a significant U.S. food aid presence here beyond CY1986 would be opportune in terms of the present and future situation in Ethiopia and would serve important USG political, security and strategic objectives as well as continuing to satisfy legitimate humanitarian needs. Fortunately, the ways and means for maintaining a food aid presence here sufficient to serve our broader interests are at hand.

10. To continue to further our strategic, political and security interests and advance our goals and objectives in Ethiopia and the Horn, I recommend that we undertake in 1987 a Food Aid Program which combines a moderately increased “regular” feeding program and a “residual relief” program. Briefly, these would consist of:

(A) Regular Program: We anticipate receiving from CRS, CARE, Save the Children, the Missionaries of Charity (MC) and the Ethiopian Orothodox Church (EOC) requests for a total of about 35 to 40 thousand metric tons of food for regular feeding. Funding these would allow us to support in Ethiopia three very capable American PVOs (one of whom, CRS, is linked with a superb local network), one of the world’s most prestigious humanitarian organizations (the MC of Mother Theresa, who has clout even with Mengistu) and Ethiopia’s most important NGO (the EOC, whom we wish to see strengthened as a counter to Mengistu’s Marxists.) It would also give us a widespread presence in nine of Ethiopia’s fourteen provinces (Eritrea, Tigre, Gondar, Wollo, Showa, Hararghe, Bale, Wollega and Kaffa) and, we would be serving legitimate humanitarian needs. AID/Addis views on regular programs will be submitted shortly, by septel.⁴

(B) Residual Relief: There are an estimated 900 thousand “pastoralists” (mostly around the fringe of Ethiopia’s borders in Eritrea and Hararghe) who will remain drought victims even if the rains are good because little has been done to help restore the lost and debilitated herds on which they depend for their livelihood. As indicated in Addis Ababa 1978,⁵ we also anticipate continued drought and conflict related relief needs in the provinces of Eritrea and Tigre currently being served by the USG’s food for the north (FFN) and cross border initiatives, for which we have assumed a special responsibility. Finally, even if the Meher rains are very good, we can expect that there will remain drought affected pockets because (1) there will be some places where the rains will not be good and (2) other factors, especially inadequate and untimely availability of seeds, will prevent some areas from being able to fully recover from the drought. These “pockets” could involve up to one million people still in need of relief food. I believe we can count on other Western donors to help meet these residual relief needs which could total as much as 150 thousand MT. But there is no reason why we should not also continue to participate roughly providing the one-third share we have to date. This would not only serve our broader interests but also meet needs that are within our original drought relief mandate. Moreover, by continuing to work with other Western donors we will retain our membership and leadership role within their various coordinating groups, which have proved useful to us to date on a variety of issues, including resettlement.

11. Action requested: That a high level interdepartmental group composed of all agencies (including intelligence) be convened to consider the question of continuing a significant USG Food Assistance Program in Ethiopia in 1987, taking fully into account the important, highly relevant considerations set forth in this message. My strong recommendation is that we should continue such a regular/residual relief program in 1987 in the 90 thousand MT range and re-examine the question on an annual basis thereafter.

Cheek

1. Source: Reagan Library, African Affairs Directorate, NSC: Records, Ethiopia [1986]. Secret. Sent for information to Djibouti. Sent to Khartoum, Mogadishu, and Rome.
2. An unknown hand highlighted this sentence and wrote the word “Yes” to the right of it.
3. In telegram 1580 from Addis Ababa, March 21, the Embassy reported on the agricultural agreement between the EEC and the PMGSE. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860220–0156)
4. In telegram 113861 to Addis Ababa, April 11, the Department summarized a meeting between McPherson and AID officials in which “McPherson opted to plan for continuing feeding in Ethiopia, albeit on a smaller scale.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860282–0532) In telegram 2110 from Addis Ababa, April 16, the Embassy expressed concern about McPherson’s strategy, stating: “If AID were to adopt a more pragmatic approach and ease up on its active implementation of its phase out strategy, then the need for an IG at this time might not be necessary. I hope that is the case. As I understood the situation, though, the purpose of the April 10 meeting [involving McPherson] was not ‘to discuss how to proceed with AID program in Ethiopia over the coming twelve months’ but rather was to consider tactics for keeping the phase out [of emergency feeding] strategy ‘on track.’” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860291–0255)
5. Not found.