Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLI, Global Issues II

251. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter) and the Assistant to the President for Policy Development (Svahn) to President Reagan¹

Washington, June 11, 1986

SUBJECT

• NSC/OPD Initiative to Help End Hunger in Sub-Saharan Africa

Issue

Whether the U.S. should act to end hunger in Africa by 1) re-orienting U.S. economic policies and programs to help end hunger through growth and private enterprise development; 2) re-invigorating donor coordination to this end; and 3) engaging the American public through a communications campaign and a Private Initiative for Africa.

Background

The United States needs to act more forcefully to help the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa to recover from the famine and the economic stagnation which can cause future famines. Unless African governments adopt growth policies which encourage food production and increase the purchasing power of the poor, the African people will face the threat of starvation, and the world will face festering political unrest which can breed communist insurgencies.

Africa is at a crisis point, with the aftermath of famine exacerbating the economic decline which helped to cause famine. Per capita income fell by about 20 percent since 1980, despite increased assistance beyond emergency relief. Every other region of the world—no matter how poor—has expanded its ability to feed itself. Ironically, most African countries possess the natural resources required to feed their people.

The principal causes of economic decline are policies which overvalue currencies, set low producer prices, support public enterprise and state marketing boards and discourage private sector development. The effects of these policies are exacerbated by the pursuit of privilege and corruption. Some have estimated that the equivalent of all official development assistance to Africa is lost to corruption each year.

The major cause of hunger is poverty. African nations can overcome hunger only if their economic decline is reversed, and the private sector is encouraged to produce and market food and to undertake other income-generating activities. In Africa, agriculture should be an engine of growth, generating income and demand for secondary products among the majority of people. Transportation, retailing, services, education and finance all benefit from and contribute to a viable farm sector.

The American people sense Africa’s need. Spontaneously, millions have responded generously to the African famine. But Americans know that the root causes of famine have not been addressed. The timing of this initiative is appropriate owing to the high degree of public interest, the continuing economic decline in Africa and the reduction of U.S. economic assistance to Africa by 20 percent this year.

Discussion

Why Past Aid Has Not Solved the Problem.

First, donor efforts are fragmented by inadequate coordination and by competing internal economic and political objectives. U.S. foreign aid is under pressure from many sides, including farm groups concerned with the disposition of surplus food stocks, universities for research grants and private voluntary organizations. Politically, the U.S. generally seeks good will and political support with less regard to the long term impact of our assistance. The result is mixed signals and little growth.

Second, many African governments oppose change. Generally socialist, with elite privileges for those in power, preservation of control is their over-riding interest. Many African governments see the private sector as a threat, and as a loss of opportunities for privilege and corruption. These tendencies reenforce the institutional bias of donors to provide aid to governments—not the people.

Third, most aid goes to governments. This aid fosters the growth of bureaucracies, not private enterprise. The government conduit weakens conditionality; when reform fails to occur, aid continues to flow for political reasons. A better balance between aid flows to the African people (for development) and to their governments (for political objectives) is needed.

How to Achieve a Turnaround.

Three areas must be mobilized to achieve a turnaround: federal programs, other donors and U.S. public opinion.

First, focus federal programs. Under the Baker Plan, the U.S. is pressing the IMF and World Bank to coordinate growth policies in Africa as a way to resolve the debt problem.² The U.S. also supports policy reform in Africa through the African Economic Policy Initiative of 1984 and the Food for Progress Act in the farm bill. These add-on programs have not overcome the inertia of “business as usual.”

All U.S. assistance programs and policies, bilateral and multilateral, must be effectively targeted toward growth, with a balance between stabilization and private sector growth, and between medium and long term impact on growth, if economic independence in Africa is to become a reality. Current U.S. and other donor assistance programs are generally oriented projects and investments which favor governments and public enterprises.

We would achieve our objective by establishing a common goal for all federal aid efforts: End hunger in Sub-Saharan Africa through economic growth and private enterprise development by the end of the century. The level of aid provided to individual countries would be affected by their willingness to adopt incentive economic policies and private sector programs, with aid levels reduced for those unwilling to undertake meaningful reform or to support aid flows to the private sector. The implementation of this strategy would be worked out through a NSSD under White House direction.

Second, promote donor coordination on comprehensive structural adjustment and policy reform as well as assistance projects. Other donors provide more than 80 percent of non-emergency aid to Africa. Building on the Bonn and Tokyo summits³ and on the Baker Plan, we would invite other donors to join in a coordinated effort to help Africa achieve the goal of ending hunger through economic growth and private enterprise development by the end of the century.

Third, mobilize U.S. public opinion to diminish the power of special interests and to channel private contributions toward productive ends. Americans are eager to continue to help Africa, but that help needs focus and direction. Publicizing our efforts to end hunger through growth and private enterprise development would channel and expand public interest. The U.S. Private Initiative for Africa, which Private Sector Initiatives and the NSC is preparing, provides a medium for this.

Recommendation

Approve this initiative. A report on how to implement this initiative would be presented to you in 90 days.⁴

1. Source: Reagan Library, Rosenberg Files, Hunger Initiative (05/11/1986–06/18/1986). Secret. Sent for action. Drafted by Soos and Driggs. A copy was sent to Bush.
2. Reference is to the Baker Debt Plan proposed in October 1985 in Seoul.
3. Reference is to the 11th G–7 Summit that took place in Bonn in May 1985 and the 12th G–7 Summit that took place in Tokyo in May 1986.
4. Reagan checked and initialed the “OK” option.