Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLI, Global Issues II

102. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs (Ridgway) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

• Human Rights Between Summits: Some Thoughts

1. Secret/Sensitive—Entire text.

Summary

2. Soviet human rights policy and practice is in a fluid, in some ways paradoxical state. Overall Soviet human rights performance has improved over last year, yet progress seems to have hit a plateau and in some areas even rolled back. Soviet officials are demonstrating an unprecedented willingness to discuss the full range of human rights with us in bilateral meetings. Yet they may become victims of their own success: Western expectations raised by Soviet actions and promises to date are so high it will be hard to meet them.

3. This paper outlines where we have come so far in our human rights dialogue with the Soviet leadership and suggests a strategy for maximizing our gains in this inter-summit period.

Background

4. Since the Reykjavik summit,² the Soviet Union has made undeniable strides in the area of human rights. Early this year, the Soviets:

—Increased the Jewish emigration rate, which now has reached a plateau of 700–900 per month, and significantly increased the emigration rates for Armenians and ethnic Germans;

—Permitted greater general freedom of movement in allowing more Soviet citizens to travel to the West as tourists and more former Soviet citizens to return to the Soviet Union for a visit;

—Released more than 250 political prisoners;

—Showed some tolerance of political dissent, including demonstrations by environmentalists, historical preservationists, Jewish refuseniks and Russian, Latvian and Crimean nationalists;

—Permitted increased freedom of expression in official media, including mention of formerly taboo societal problems and inclusion of articles and broadcasts from Western sources;

—Ceased jamming BBC and Voice of America broadcasts;

—Tolerated the formation of thousands of informal and unofficial literary, cultural and political discussion groups;

—Sharply reduced the number of arrests and convictions on political and religious grounds.

5. In general, however, the Soviets have failed to give permanency to the steps they have taken by making appropriate changes in their laws or procedures. They have repeatedly promised institutional reforms, such as changes in the criminal code or in the way “State Security” refusals are handled. But what they have delivered is relatively little: An end to the use of “internal exile” as a punishment, the transfer of “special psychiatric hospitals” from the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of Health, and, in the last few weeks, a slightly more flexible attitude toward the requirement that applicants for emigration have their relatives’ permission.

6. Indeed, the Soviets almost appear to be engaged in a program of experimentation to test the parameters of reform. In some cases the Soviet leadership seems to have defined the limits of these freedoms by cracking down when they advance too far. The Soviets have slowed their progress, or even retreated from previous gains, in the following areas:

—They have failed to release the remaining political and religious prisoners, known to be in the hundreds and estimated to be in the thousands;

—This fall they harshly repressed demonstrations similar to those tolerated in the summer, arresting and beating demonstrators and in one case detaining a Western news correspondent;

—They have recently stepped up harassment of leaders of informal groups.

7. To forestall further retreats and to ensure that the change is long-lasting, we have urged the Soviets in bilateral meetings and in the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting to institutionalize their human rights progress. We specifically have urged the following steps:

—A significant increase in emigration, involving a repeal of the requirement of all applicants to receive permission of all relatives, and a liberalization and codification of the laws and regulations governing refusals on grounds of secrecy;

—Release of all remaining political and religious prisoners, including those in psychiatric institutions, and repeal of the political and religious criminal code articles on which many of them were convicted;

—Resolution of all remaining cases on the U.S. Government’s representation list;

—Continued unjamming of foreign radio broadcasts;

—Expanded freedoms for religious believers.

8. These suggested reforms were intended to end the most egregious of Soviet violations, without requiring fundamental change to the Soviet system. In this connection, many of the suggestions are based on Soviet trends and promises.

U.S.-Soviet Human Rights Dialogue

9. As Soviet progress on human rights has tapered off, Soviet authorities ironically have demonstrated greater willingness to discuss these issues. As recently as last year, the issue of human rights had to be disguised before it would rate Soviet consideration. For the December summit meeting, the Soviets freely agreed to include human rights on the agenda.³ During the past year, the Soviets have also agreed to consider human rights in the Bilateral Review Commission, in periodic case review sessions in Moscow, and in preparatory sessions before all high-level meetings between U.S. and Soviet officials. In such meetings, the Soviets have recently demonstrated an unprecedented willingness to discuss principles, laws, and practices as well as reviewing in detail specific cases from lists we provide. On the other hand, they have also stepped up their human rights counterpunches, expressing sharp criticism of social and economic conditions in the United States, and they continue to be interested in a CSCE humanitarian conference to be held in Moscow.

10. During his meetings with President Reagan and in public statements, Gorbachev was visibly testy on the subject of human rights, stressing that the U.S. is not the “prosecutor” and the Soviet Union is not the “accused.” Despite such proclamations, Soviet officials in the working groups engaged in extensive review of the Soviet human rights situation, including many individual cases. Like Gorbachev, they attempted to offset our criticism of their system with attacks on ours.

Increased Expectations

11. Soviet statements and actions on human rights over the past year have created expectations in the West that may now prove difficult to fulfill. Non-governmental organizations have carefully documented Soviet statements on proposed reform, such as emigration and criminal code changes, and now expect these changes to be implemented. If progress levels off, as it seems to have already, let alone if there is a retreat, then pressure from these constituents to push the Soviets will increase. Indeed, representatives of several human rights organizations have already indicated that they are disappointed with summit results on human rights.

12. We now face a situation where we can discuss human rights with the Soviets at all levels but where real progress is once again elusive. We need a strategy that allows us to pocket the Soviet willingness to look into cases of interest to us while at the same time taking advantage of their unprecedented willingness to contemplate institutional reforms that would have lasting significance.

Strategy Leading Up to the Next Summit

A. Resist Soviet Attempts to Sidetrack or Trivialize Our Human Rights Dialogue.

13. Not only have the Soviets stepped up their attempts to counterattack, citing alleged U.S. human rights violations, but they have been doing their homework more diligently. During the human rights working group sessions at the summit, they came prepared with voluminous materials on these subjects, and they used them for hours of discussion on, among other things, the plight of the unemployed and homeless in the United States. Several hours were also devoted to the Soviet recital of resolved cases from many different lists.

14. There is no escaping the fact that the human rights dialogue with the Soviet Union, if it is to take place at all, will have to be a two-way street. We should nevertheless concentrate our time and energy at high-level meetings on principles related to civil and political liberties and to emigration. Discussions on the number of square meters in a Soviet apartment or the number of persons who enter the U.S. each year from Mexico should be referred to talks between U.S. and Soviet experts on such subjects, which can be arranged. They are not appropriate to meetings surrounding a summit.

B. Continue to Press on Institutionalization of Reforms.

15. Institutional changes should be our first concern, because they affect large numbers of persons, many of whose names are completely unknown in the West, and because they will help ensure that any progress made will be more difficult to reverse. While the Soviets are now willing to discuss and to resolve individual cases, we should not sacrifice discussion of procedural and legal reform in our effort to bring these cases to the Soviets’ attention.

16. When we ask for procedural reforms, we will be starting from a strong position. The Soviets have been promising us these reforms for several months, even though what they have delivered has been disappointing. They have told us on several occasions that they are considering changes in laws that have been used frequently against political and religious dissidents. They have also said on several occasions that they are considering modifications in the way they deal with “state security” refusals. We therefore have solid grounds to press for action.

C. Coordinate Fora.

17. The recent willingness on the part of the Soviets to discuss human rights has left us with several fora in which to air our concerns. We regularly review human rights issues in the Bilateral Review Commission, in periodic case review meetings held between our diplomats in Moscow and their Soviet counterparts, at the CSCE meeting in Vienna, and in all high-level meetings between U.S. and Soviet officials. We should take advantage of all these frequent opportunities for human rights review, but we should coordinate to ensure that we are conveying the same signals and priorities across the board.

D. Make Case Review More Systematic.

18. In a departure from past practice, the Soviets have demonstrated a willingness to review carefully all lists we provide them and to respond with status updates. Although the information they provide is frequently out-of-date or simply false, this process does prove useful and has contributed to significant progress on all of our representation lists.

19. We must be careful, however, to control the lists so as not to undermine our own credibility or wear out the new-found Soviet receptivity to them. The increase in dialogue has led to a proliferation of lists that has confused both us and the Soviets. We should keep the number of lists to a minimum, keep them at a manageable size, be sure they are accurate, and establish as our priority those cases which are of particular interest to the U.S. Government.

20. If we should decide to present lists as a statement, such as lists of all known refuseniks or all political prisoners, we should make clear to the Soviets that we do not expect a read-out on each case but are simply seeking the resolution of the entire category.

E. Respond to Soviet Proposals on Cooperation but Make it Clear These Activities are no Substitute for Concrete Progress.

21. During Deputy Secretary Whitehead’s visit to Moscow, Soviet officials proposed a number of areas for potential cooperation in the area of human rights.⁴ Many of the proposals reflect initiatives, such as periodic human rights review, we have already undertaken. Others, such as proposals to exchange laws and to engage in in-depth discussion about emigration/immigration questions, would cover new ground and should be pursued. Still others are either not desirable, such as the creation of a humanitarian cooperation fund, or should be arranged through private channels, such as meetings between writers and legal specialists.

22. We should pursue some of these proposals, because their implementation may serve to dissolve concentrations of opposition to reform in the Soviet bureaucracy. In agreeing to them, however, we should avoid the following pitfalls:

—Creating the perception among the allies that we are cutting a separate deal on human rights. We must emphasize to the allies and the Soviets that we see such bilateral cooperation as establishing a firmer foundation for multilateral work, rather than eliminating the need for that work.

—Producing more documents, such as declarations by writers and lawyers, when in fact it is improved implementation that we seek.

F. Use Public Diplomacy to Dispel False Impressions.

23. We have already heard disappointment from some representatives of human rights organizations with the results of the summit.⁵ As evidence of what they perceive as the diminished role of human rights in the U.S.–Soviet relationship, they cite the scant mention of the issue both in the President’s remarks and in the final communiqué,⁶ and statements by Gorbachev which seem to reflect a hardening of the Soviet position.⁷ We should dispel this notion by making the following points:

—Human rights was at the top of our agenda for the summit.

—We conducted more than 12 hours of talks with the Soviets on human rights issues, including productive case review.

—The brief reference to human rights in the joint statement reflects fundamental differences in how we and the Soviets view our human rights obligations.

—Nevertheless, it is the first time human rights has been acknowledged to form a part of the U.S.–Soviet dialogue in such an authoritative way.

—Our resolve to advance human rights certainly has not diminished.

—On the contrary, we have stressed to the Soviets that human rights issues form an integral part of the bilateral relationship. They will not go away.

1. Source: Department of State, Correspondence of Deputy Secretary John Whitehead, 1982–1989, Lot 89D139, Memos To/From Bureaus—1987. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Grossman and Lang on December 19 and cleared in EUR/SOV/SOVI, EUR/SOV, EUR/RPM, and EUR. A stamped notation, dated December 1987, on the memorandum indicates that Whitehead saw it. In the top margin, Whitehead wrote, “Roz: This is an excellent memo. I’d like to stay involved in the US–USSR human rights area and am ready to be helpful whenever you see the opportunity. J.”
2. Reference is to the Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Reykjavik in October 1986, which is covered in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986.
3. Reference is to the Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Washington December 8–10, 1987. For memoranda of conversation of the meetings, see Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Documents 108–110.
4. See Document 100.
5. See Morris B. Abram, “Gorbachev Can’t Defy Human-Rights279 Tide,” Wall Street Journal, December 16, 1987, p. 26.
6. For text of Reagan’s remarks, see Public Papers: Reagan, 1987, Book II, pp. 1486, 1491–1497.
7. See Document 99.