99. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Schifter) to Secretary of State Shultz1
SUBJECT
- Human Rights Developments in the Soviet Union
Summary. In the weeks ahead we shall have to define the irreducible minimum conditions to our agreeing that a Moscow Humanitarian Affairs Conference be held. Before we do so, we need to take inventory on Soviet progress and lack thereof in the field of human rights. What a review of developments in Soviet domestic affairs discloses is that the workings of the hitherto sacrosanct bureaucracy have now been opened for discussion and criticism, for most Soviet citizens a very exciting change. To be acceptable under these new conditions, however, all such discussion must take place within a framework of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Those that dissent from the system continue to be harassed, but punishment is now more proportionate to the seriousness of the threat posed by these dissenters than was the case heretofore. End Summary.
Overview
The willingness of the Soviets during the last year or so to listen when we discuss human rights—and occasionally to respond meaningfully—their significantly more friendly demeanor, and the modest steps they have taken to improve their human rights record may very well have left the general American public with an unrealistically complacent view of the current state of Soviet human rights conditions. What is critically important now, after our human rights policy has registered some modest successes in the Soviet Union, is that we not leave the Soviets with the impression that they have gone far enough, that we will henceforth only mouth phrases about the need for further progress, but no longer mean it. In the process, we will also be able to ensure that the U.S. public, and Congress, have a realistic understanding of what the Soviets have (and have not) done.
The Soviets can no longer complain that the USG has ignored the progress they have made. Your recent public statements have acknowl [Page 292] edged it.2 Warren Zimmermann has expressed himself with great care in Vienna.3
It is conceivable that the dynamics of change in the Soviet Union will cause the process to continue. But as historians have noted, past liberalization efforts were halted and reversed not only under Khrushchev, but also under Alexander II and before that under Alexander I. In those eras, however, before “interdependence,” Russian authorities could act without reference to the concerns of outside powers. What is different now is that the Soviet Union understands it must be concerned about its world image and about relations with the West. It is because of that concern that we have an opportunity to influence the course of events in the Soviet Union. That is why we need to point both to the filled and the empty portion of the glass and try to make sure that the Western general public is aware of both. Our critical decision on the proposed Moscow Humanitarian Affairs Conference will have to be taken with these considerations in mind.
Last January I set forth for you some immediate, intermediate and long-range goals of our Soviet human rights policy.4 Full compliance with the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, our long-range goal, remains well over the horizon. However, in the intervening months there has been significant progress in reaching our immediate goals and slight progress toward the intermediate goals:
A. Progress Toward Our Immediate Goals
• Perhaps as many as 30% of the known prisoners of conscience have been released. Additional releases have been promised. At the same time, we have been told that some of these prisoners, close to 100 of those known to us, will not be released. They are the people serving long prison sentences, some of them as recidivists, for “anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda.”
• A few of the separated-spouse, divided-family, and dual-national cases have been resolved this year. The pace is excruciatingly slow, but additional cases may be resolved in the months ahead.
• VOA is no longer jammed, but jamming of RFE/RL continues.
• Emigration has been stepped up to an annual rate just short of our minimum immediate goal of 10,000, but there is no present indication of an intent to go further.
[Page 293]Progress Toward Our Intermediate Goals
• There has been a loosening of controls on expression in that dissent, speaking or writing within certain clearly defined limits, is no longer punished with imprisonment, although it is otherwise interfered with through harassment, detainment or confiscation.
• There has been talk of some limited changes regarding the practice of religion in the Soviet Union. There have also been hints that persons now imprisoned for religious activism may soon be released. But there is no evident intent to change the scheme of state control of religion.
• There has been some indication that abuses of psychiatry may be brought to an end.
• There has been no appreciable change in controls on the importation of foreign literature.
• There has been some relaxation in controls on foreign travel.
• Steps have been taken toward greater cultural freedom, but the emphasis appears on Russian culture as distinct from that of other ethnic groups.
• There is no present indication of any likely change in the 1986 Emigration Decree (requiring invitations from immediate relatives).
• There has been no change in the intrusive status of the secret police or any indication that the right to privacy will henceforth be respected.
The Limits of Change
The Soviets contend that such changes as have occurred recently in Soviet respect for human rights have occurred for purely domestic reasons. We have not tried to argue that point. In fact, some of the changes have indeed been the result of a new Soviet approach to the administration of its domestic affairs. But others have equally clearly been the response to foreign criticism. Generally speaking, the Soviets have taken steps (a) designed to make the Marxist-Leninist system function more efficiently, and (b) to accommodate some Western concerns, so long as such accommodation does not threaten the system.
The most exciting and for the average Soviet citizen most meaningful changes in Soviet society under Gorbachev come under the heading of Glasnost. Bureaucratic failings may now be freely discussed, both in individual speech and in the press. In fact, such discussion is encouraged, but only if it takes place in the context of acceptance of the basic tenets of the Marxist-Leninist system. Though limited in scope to the day-to-day issues of management of the Soviet administrative system and economy, this new freedom allows for public discussion of almost all the problems of direct concern to the great majority of Soviet citizens. It similarly [Page 294] allows for discussion in books, theatrical plays and films of past failings, and thereby permits some rewriting of official history, although only within a Leninist framework.
Glasnost has not opened up for public discussion such basic policy issues as the war in Afghanistan, other aspects of Soviet foreign policy, the allocation of resources to the defense sector, weapons systems, the composition of the Politburo, or the state’s basic commitment to Marxism-Leninism. But some change has taken place in the Government’s treatment of those who in speaking up or writing act beyond the borders of the permissible. Responding to foreign criticism, the Soviet authorities seem to have recognized that they overreacted in the past, that the punishment meted out against dissent was excessive if measured against the threat they posed. Dissidents whose activities are not deemed to pose a serious danger to the system need not be incarcerated but rather hindered in their work, so that they concentrate on what they are now doing and do not get the notion that they can go further. On the other hand, for dissidents who are deemed a threat, particularly those who advance minority ethnic aspirations, severe punishment remains the order of the day.
The best assurance that the line between the permissible and the impermissible will not be crossed remains the system’s monolithic control of the media and of all other forms of communications through secret police monitoring of the telephones and mails and other methods of spying on the population.
Soviet officials say that when they use the term “demokratisatsia” in describing changes now under way in the Soviet Union they do not mean Western-style democratization. That is absolutely true. They mean by democratization an end to the “cult of personality,” an end to excessive privileges and untouchability of the ruling class, and the notion that government officials ought to pay attention to public attitudes in making administrative decisions. They mean a return to Leninist purity, uncontaminated by Stalinist despotism and Brezhnevist sloth. But Lenin was no Western-style democrat and neither are his disciples in the present Soviet leadership.
- Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P880038–2176. Drafted by Schifter. Copies were sent to Armacost, Solomon, Ridgway, Kampelman, Abramowitz, and Simons. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that Shultz saw it.↩
- For a transcript of Shultz’s September 21 interview on “This Week With David Brinkley,” see Department of State, Bulletin, November 1987, pp. 21–23.↩
- Telegram 11072 from CSCE Vienna, July 31, transmitted the text of a press conference, during which Zimmermann discussed negotiations regarding Soviet human rights issues. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870613–0069)↩
- See Document 88.↩