Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLI, Global Issues II

88. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Schifter) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, January 23, 1987

SUBJECT

• Our Approach to the Soviet Union Concerning Human Rights

Summary

The purpose of this memorandum is to set forth HA’s thoughts as to the goals and objectives of our Soviet human rights policies, on which an action program can be based. Goals can be divided among those that are (a) immediate, basically humanitarian in nature, and requiring no significant change in the Soviet system, (b) intermediate, which would call for a shift to a somewhat more open society, and (c) long-range, involving genuine adherence to the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act.² Our objectives are both to help persons in the Soviet Union who suffer from the deprivation of their rights and to gain support for our own foreign policy. To reach our goals we need to develop a consistent program directed at the highest level of Soviet decisionmaking. End Summary.

Dick Solomon has made the very wise suggestion that the in-house dialogue on Soviet human rights could be helped if the Human Rights Bureau were to spell out, for your consideration, its ideas on goals, objectives and other relevant policy concerns regarding that subject. This memorandum seeks to do that.

Goals

As to goals, we distinguish between those which are:

(a) immediate:

(i) The release from imprisonment, internal exile or mental hospitals of persons imprisoned, exiled or committed for no reason other than the exercise of a human right (freedom of expression or religion), even though such exercise may have violated the laws of the Soviet Union; this should include persons convicted on trumped-up charges; (ii) a resolution of all our divided spouses and dual nationality cases; (iii) an end to jamming; (iv) a modest step-up in emigration, to perhaps 10,000 to 12,000 annually (which would not require an immediate change in the 1986 Emigration Law);³

(b) intermediate:

(i) a general loosening of controls on freedom of expression so as to allow a return to at least those standards which were applied in the USSR in the period 1958–65 or prior to Stalin’s rise to preeminence (basically, no punishment for mere speaking and writing, if not accompanied by organizational activity); (ii) substantial loosening of controls on the exercise of religious belief (allowing congregations to engage in religious activities such as bible study and charitable work), permitting the importation of bibles, prayerbooks, and other objects of religious significance; (iii) an end to the abuse of psychiatry; (iv) relaxation of controls on the importation of books, periodicals, newspapers, and films; (v) people-to-people exchanges of a magnitude that makes KGB control practically impossible (perhaps in excess of 15,000 persons annually); (vi) allowing greater cultural freedom, including the teaching and use of non-Russian languages; (vii) modification of the 1986 Emigration Law to allow annual emigration in excess of 25,000 (possibly by expanding the circle of relatives who may extend an invitation for emigration); (viii) respect for the right of privacy and a reduction of the status and powers of the secret police to, at least, the role it played in the early Sixties;⁴

(c) long range:

full compliance with the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act.

Objectives

In pursuing our human-rights goals, we are motivated by the following considerations:

(a) Our Government’s commitment to human rights reflects the truly idealistic sentiment of the American people that we are our brothers’ keepers. We engage in human rights activities first and foremost to help individual human beings.

(b) A more open and democratic Soviet Union is less likely to pursue expansionist goals. Our advocacy of respect for human rights in the Soviet Union is, therefore, in harmony with our interest in the genuine relaxation of tension between us and in mutual arms reduction.

(c) As long as our relations with the Soviet Union continue to be adversarial, our public emphasis on human rights helps advance our cause in the court of world public opinion and strengthen domestic support for our foreign policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

(d) Also, for that period our statements serve to give psychological support to Soviet citizens who are subjected to persecution for their political or religious beliefs.

Possibilities of Attaining Goals

The “immediate goals” identified above are basically humanitarian and can be achieved by the Soviet leadership without any significant tinkering with its totalitarian system. It is for that reason that they may very well be within reach.

The “intermediate goals” would involve willingness to make some truly meaningful changes in present practices without necessarily changing the basic structure of the state. They will undoubtedly be difficult to attain.

The “long-range goal” would indeed require basic change in the state’s structure. Although this goal may appear quixotic, it provides us with a framework within which we can pursue our immediate and intermediate goals and aligns our Soviet human rights policy in a logically consistent manner with our overall approach to human rights as an element of our foreign policy.

Targets

To reach the third and fourth of the above-listed four objectives we would, of course, need to concentrate on the general public, both at home and abroad. To realize the first two objectives, however, namely to effect significant change in Soviet human rights performance, we need to zero in on the highest level of leadership, the Politburo. This is so because of the highly centralized character of the decisionmaking process in the Soviet Union’s totalitarian system. Given the present system of tight police control, it is highly unlikely that change can be brought about through pressure from the general public. Nor, given the subservience and careerism built into the bureaucratic system, can it be expected that significant changes in policy will be effected on the basis of recommendations from the Soviet Union’s lower-ranking officialdom. For our goals to be attained, we must persuade the Politburo, most importantly the General Secretary, that taking such a course is in the Soviet Union’s best interest.

Methods of Persuasion

Steeped as they are in Leninist thought, the Soviet leaders will not be willing to effect changes in their system which would improve human rights conditions unless such changes can be justified in a Marxist-Leninist context. This means that neither Judaeo-Christian concepts of moral behavior toward one’s fellow-human being nor the Enlightenment’s notions of the inalienable rights of the individual will cut any ice with them.⁵ One cannot appeal to their “better nature.”

What one can do with the present Soviet leaders is persuade them that better human rights performance will result in some benefits in which they are interested. This requires that we try to determine what benefits are of interest to them and that we also decide which of these benefits we are willing and able to deliver.

Though Leninist in their political behavior and their ideas about the dominance of the party and the state over the individual, the present Soviet leaders do not share the idealistic objectives of the founders of their faith. Maintaining the rights and privileges of the Nomenklatura, the Communist leadership group, is a most essential piece of their governmental program. That is why our immediate and intermediate goals must be limited to fit this aspect of present-day Soviet reality. That is why, also, we must search for the benefits that we can offer and which would be of interest to the other side by analyzing the frame of mind of the present Soviet leaders.

Gorbachev’s Outlook

Gorbachev is a product of the Soviet Union’s post-Stalin bureaucratic system: a party operative who combined outstanding intelligence and managerial ability with a willingness to work on behalf of the party and to his superiors, which enabled him to climb the promotional ladder to the very top. He is not a closet liberal or anything close to it. On the contrary, our best information suggests that he is a hard-liner, but shrewd and rational. Our notions of human rights simply do not fit into his value system. But he has clearly recognized the Soviet Union’s serious economic shortcomings and is eager to do something about them. In fact, he appears to have staked his leadership role on this issue.

Gorbachev appears to believe that the Soviet Union’s economic performance can be turned around through improved management and motivation of the work force, from top to bottom, but without fundamental changes in the system. He is interested in ending the Soviet malaise. His notions about how to accomplish these results are reasonably enlightened and involve somewhat greater freedom of expression—as long as the system is not being questioned—and an emphasis on the rule of law, including repressive laws, rather than the exercise of broad administrative discretion. Also, punishment for the exercise of human rights is to be meted out more sparingly, only if it clearly serves a state purpose, rather than as an expression of state displeasure.

These efforts at self-improvement appear to go hand-in-hand with Gorbachev’s thoughts about Western help. As distinct from Brezhnev, who expected billions of American dollars for Siberian development, Gorbachev appears to have a far more sophisticated understanding of his country’s needs and is more realistic about what the West is willing to provide. He may very well be interested in Western credits, but he is interested in Western economic development know-how as well. Gorbachev’s interest in practical ways and means to pull the Soviet economy out of its present rut may very well identify for us the benefits we can offer for which the Soviet Union might make human-rights concessions.

Our Leverage

We should not overestimate the leverage with which we are thus provided. Neither should we underestimate it. Arrangements between us and the Soviets can provide immediate practical benefits to them. They can also send a signal to the private sector and to the international community that it is all-right to do business with the Soviet Union, thus providing indirect benefits as well. The challenge to us is to develop a long-term method of operations under which we relate Soviet human rights performance to the benefits we are prepared to offer them. I hope we shall be able to furnish you with an agreed-upon memorandum along these lines.⁶

In addition, it is essential that we keep our goals well in mind, particularly those which have here been labeled “intermediate,” and keep the pressure up. It is critically important that we do not suggest to the Soviets that just because their behavior in the past has been extraordinarily brutal, a lesser order of repression is now acceptable. On this point we ought to go with A.M. Rosenthal, who in his column in The New York Times⁷ had this to say:

Mr. Gorbachev is certainly a smoother chap than most of his predecessors but he has not touched the police nature of the Soviet state and has not even hinted he will. How could he? He is part of it and rules through it. But everytime he says he will let a suppressed book be published or a private citizen own a pushcart or releases one of his ample supply of prisoners the West goes into a mad fandango of appreciation. There are, blessedly, Shcharanskys and some journalists who cry “wait, wait” to the world but they are outnumbered by eager folk who clap hands and sing praise. Myself, I will wait until Mr. Gorbachev arrests and tries the men who sent Mr. Shcharansky to jail and Dr. Sakharov into exile; time enough then to clap and sing.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P870040–1908. Secret. Copies were sent to Ridgway, Solomon, Derwinski, Kampelman, and Abramowitz. In the upper right-hand margin, Shultz wrote: “Dick—An excellent and helpful analysis. We need to identify all the operational handlers and arguments we can G. I am ready for another discussion of all this G.”
2. The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 declared: “Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief.”
3. Reference is to the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.
4. See footnote 5, below.
5. The decision of Khrushchev and his colleagues in 1953 to sideline the secret police is a unique exception. After having lived for years in utter fear of Stalin’s and Beria’s NKVD, they decided not to do to others what they were afraid could have been done to them. The present generation of leaders did not experience the same fear and is, therefore, more inclined to give greater rein to the secret police. [Footnote is in the original.]
6. Not further identified.
7. For text of the full article, see A.M. Rosenthal, “Please Read This Column! Outline for a Pretty Good Job,” New York Times, January 6, 1987, p. A21.