Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLI, Global Issues II

87. Information Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Ledsky) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

• Drawing Up the 1987 U.S. Human Rights Agenda: A Response to INR’s “Has Gorbachev Made a Difference?” Memo

SUMMARY. INR’s memo (copy attached)² objectively summarizes Gorbachev’s 1986 human rights record and serves as a starting point for addressing U.S. objectives in the coming year.

While Gorbachev hasn’t improved human rights in the Soviet Union or resolved his modernization/repression dilemma, he has manipulated Western concerns to serve his own purposes. Under Gorbachev, the traditional Russian inferiority complex has been given modern expression through the pronounced sensitivity to bad publicity and a concerted effort to appear the global “good guy.”

As the Soviets try to put us on the defensive by selectively improving their human rights performance, we must guard against charges that our firm policies are the result of domestic political pressures rather than adherence to principle. While pressing for increased Jewish emigration, we should address the entire range of human rights issues. We also should rebuff Soviet efforts to redefine human rights in economic and social terms by continuing to point out Soviet deficiencies under any definition of human rights. END SUMMARY.

Culture and Human Rights: Drawing a Distinction

We should not confuse a cultural “thaw” with an improvement in human rights. Stymied by an entrenched bureaucracy and the ingrained habits of the Soviet people, Gorbachev has enlisted artists and intellectuals in his campaign to “restructure” Soviet society. Few topics are now off limits and faults can—indeed must—be addressed. In that regard, cultural life has been liberalized. Yet, the stated function of the arts and sciences under Communism has not changed. Gorbachev has re-emphasized that art and scientific inquiry must serve the state and its goals.

As a government, we should neither condemn nor praise developments in the cultural field. We should no more praise Gorbachev for ordering artists to expose faults than we might praise Brezhnev for ordering that they be covered up.

Human Rights: A More Mixed Picture

We agree with INR’s assessment that Gorbachev’s human rights policies are basically repressive, but that he has made changes.³ Gorbachev probably concluded that while the human rights policies he inherited were in the main correct, they were encrusted with the same arbitrariness and bureaucratism that pervades all Soviet society. Recognizing that refusal to clear up divided family cases, to allow sick and old people to seek medical care in the West were often pointless, Gorbachev probably decided that resolving those cases offered public relations benefits in the West without compromising hardline attitudes on dissidence and emigration.

Gorbachev has also streamlined administrative procedures. The changes may speed up resolution of some cases, but imply no real change in Soviet atttiudes toward human rights, and may, as Shcharanskiy and others have argued, actually hinder emigration by erecting more clear-cut legal barriers.⁴

Gorbachev clearly intends to integrate “humanitarian issues” into his overall foreign policy. What we face is not a short-term public relations blitz, but a decision to put the U.S. on the defensive by launching a Soviet campaign of well timed releases, calls for a Moscow human rights conference, attacks on the ills of Western society, and a shift of human rights discussions from political and civil rights to so-called social, economic and cultural rights, e.g., employment, housing, medical care and education.

Drawing up the 1987 U.S. Agenda

The releases of the past year are in part Moscow’s response to the traditional Russian inferiority complex which has grown, fueled by technological backwardness and public bashings over human rights abuses. INR correctly points out the fundamental contradiction between oppressive human rights polices and Gorbachev’s controlled “thaw” designed to advance his modernization goals. It is a point you have made in speeches and private discussions on the Information Age and the relationship between societal openness, human rights and economic vitality. While we should continue pointing out the Information Age conundrum to Gorbachev, ultimately it is up to the Kremlin to resolve that contradiction. Meanwhile we should spotlight what the Soviets themselves see as their own human rights “image” problem.

We should be wary of the Soviet call for a CSCE-sponsored human rights conference in Moscow,⁵ and work to counter Soviet efforts to redefine human rights in ways that emphasize social and economic conditions (as well as “the right to peace”) rather than individual liberties. We need to stress that Soviet performance is seriously deficient under any definition of human rights. We should continue the approach laid out by Ambassador Schifter at Ottawa when he pointed out Soviet economic and social failings.

While some of our allies may accuse us of being confrontational, we can point out to them that we (and to some extent the British) bear the brunt of Soviet attacks on our domestic failings (real or alleged). If we show a readiness to retaliate in kind, in part by pointing out growing Soviet problems such as infant mortality and hidden unemployment, Gorbachev may be put back on the defensive and either moderate his attacks on the U.S. or make additional human rights improvements such as increased emigration.

While continuing to press the Soviets on emigration, we should be careful to lay equal stress on other human rights issues, including abuses of psychiatry, the repression of Russian Orthodox priests, Catholics, Baptists, and Pentecostalist believers, Ukrainian and Tatar nationalists, and members of the Soviet “peace movement.” As the Soviets take the offensive on human rights, we could become vulnerable to charges that we are unwilling to respond positively to Soviet gestures largely because of domestic politcal pressure from Jewish, Baltic nationalist and other groups.

Pressure from these groups is a reality of American politics, and we should not conceal this fact. But we should also demonstrate, by stressing the whole range of human rights issues, that the fundamental basis of our concern for human rights is not domestic political pressure, but our own values as reflected in our human rights legislation and our own insistence that the Soviets adhere to agreements such as the Helsinki Final Act that they themselves have signed.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P8700056–1812. Confidential. Drafted by Galatz and Van Oudenaren and cleared by Schifter on January 6, 1987.
2. Attached but not printed.
3. In telegram 18877 from Moscow, October 31, 1986, the Embassy transmitted the text of the 1986 report on Human Rights in the Soviet Union. The report discussed Soviet emigration policy and the release of Shcharanskiy. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860835–0279)
4. Telegram 389774 to Moscow and Leningrad, December 17, 1986, provided a summary of a December 13 meeting between Shultz and Shcharanskiy, during which they discussed Shcharanskiy’s concerns about Soviet emigration rules. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860958–0351)
5. In telegram 23035 to Shultz’s delegation in Austria, November 7, 1986, the Department reported on a conversation between Vranitzky and Shultz, during which “Vranitzky noted that Shevardnadze had suggested that the Soviet Union host a human rights conference in Moscow, and asked for the Secretary’s comment. The Secretary told Vranitzky that it was a proposal that should be examined carefully, that we must look and see what they have in mind.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860851–0354)