Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLI, Global Issues II

101. Memorandum From Lisa Jameson of the National Security Council Staff to Fritz W. Ermarth and Dolores Wilson of the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, November 18, 1987

SUBJECT

• Key Issues Glossary

Key Issues: Human Rights

General:

—When it comes to human rights, the Soviets are like a man who beats his wife. He suddenly stops beating her and wants to be accepted as one of the boys, as though it didn’t matter that he beat her in the first place. The Soviets make a few human rights concessions and expect the West to accept them as morally equivalent and democratic. We welcome whatever concessions they make, but, at the same time, we state clearly that this is not enough: there must be structural, institutional changes in the Soviet system that will prevent—or, at least, put the brakes on—an arbitrary reversion to the more stringent repression of individual liberties that has always characterized the regime.

—There is evidence that the pendulum may in fact be swinging back toward more repressive policies. Gorbachev’s chief politburo antagonists—Second Secretary Ligachev and KGB Chairman Chebrikov—took advantage of his absence from Moscow last August² to declare that glasnost (openness) was going too fast and too far. This month, Gorbachev threw Moscow Party chief Yel’tsin to the wolves.³ The removal of Yel’tsin, the man in the leadership most closely identified with more liberal policies, signals Gorbachev’s accommodation with the opposition to limit the rate of reform. And although it had elements of duality, Gorbachev’s major speech on November 2nd⁴ reflected a decidedly conservative tilt.

—Until recently, the Soviets tried to deflect criticism of their human rights abuses by denying that abuses existed, or by charging Western “interference in their domestic affairs.” That the Soviets have now accepted human rights as a regular part of our bilateral agenda is a victory for your unwavering commitment to human rights concerns. In this respect, the Soviets have made a conscious compromise, realizing they will not be able to engage the U.S. on other subjects if they attempt to avoid discussion on human rights.

—Nevertheless, the Soviets are trying to impose their human rights agenda on us. They have made an eight-part proposal to Undersecretary [Deputy Secretary] Whitehead⁵ that includes items we do not classify under human rights—fighting terrorism and alcoholism, for example. They’ve also been focusing attention on alleged U.S. human rights abuses, casting almost all of them in economic terms: homelessness, unemployment, absence of free medical care. In this manner, the Soviets attempt to veer the discussion away from the genuine human rights abuses of which they have been most guilty. We have to make sure the focus stays on target.

—The Soviets want the U.S. to seal its approval of their so-called democratization by agreeing to their holding a human rights conference in Moscow. They are pushing this idea in the CSCE meeting in Vienna, attempting to divide the U.S. and our allies on the issue. There are quite a few people who think that immediate concessions on Moscow’s part might justify our acquiescing on the human rights conference, but we do not agree. You should not permit a government that does not respect Godgiven individual liberties and does not live up to its international commitments to host a conference in the name of human rights.

—Among our many human rights concerns with regard to the USSR are the following:

a. Emigration: The Soviets are trying to use increased emigration as a bargaining chip with us. It is true that this year they have allowed more people to emigrate in one month than in all of 1986, but the rate still falls far short of the banner years under Brezhnev. Projecting current figures, as many as 9,000 to 10,000 Jews will emigrate in 1987; but more than 50,000 emigrated in 1979! There are still an estimated two million Jews in the USSR, and we surmise that if even 10 percent wanted to leave, an additional 200,000 applications would result. We have no guarantees other than Soviet statements that the Kremlin will allow a free and steady flow of emigrants. A new Soviet law, passed last year, actually limits rather than facilitates emigration, for it restricts qualifying family relationships.

b. Divided spouses/blocked marriages: The State Department still lists six divided spouse cases and four blocked marriages. Instead of resolving all of these cases—some which involve years and years of separation—the Soviets have been letting spouses go one by one, like pieces of penny candy. Dr. Galina Vileshina, a neurologist in Florida, has been separated from her husband for eight and a half years.

c. Prisoners of conscience: No one knows exactly how many prisoners of conscience are held in Soviet prisons and labor camps. Estimates range from a low of 400 to a high of 4,000. Even one would be too many. As late as two years ago, Gorbachev publicly stated that there were no political prisoners in the USSR. Many of the prisoners are believers who were sentenced for teaching religion to their children—a crime under current Soviet law. Many are dissidents who tried to circulate letters and petitions, peacefully demonstrate against government policies, or publish unofficial political or literary works. Once in the Gulag, prisoners are treated brutally, are often kept in solitary confinement, are denied visits from their families, and are threatened with additional sentences without trial.

About 150 prisoners of conscience were released over the past year and a half. Again, numbers can indicate a trend toward improvement, but we still have no evidence that there are legal safeguards to protect citizens from arbitrary arrest and punishment in the future.

d. Psychiatric abuse: The Soviets are still committing sane people—religious, nationalist, and political dissenters—to mental hospitals. They are still administering drugs that can affect mental health and personality. The Soviets say they are doing something to correct the situation, and have even proposed a cooperative program to identity standards for committing people to psychiatric institutions. The main problem remains unsolved: the Soviet Minister of Health, Dr. Chazov, used to be responsible for the psychiatric establishment. He apparently will not remove the persons directly responsible for system psychiatric abuse.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Lisa R. Jameson Files, Moscow Human Rights Conference 01/06/1987–09/17/1988. Secret.
2. In telegram 208 from Moscow, September 3, the Embassy reported on a variety of Soviet domestic developments, including Gorbachev’s vacation to Hungary. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870767–0603)
3. In telegram 492 from Moscow, November 12, the Embassy reported on the removal of Yeltsin from his position of Moscow City Party First Secretary. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870932–0385)
4. In telegram 431 from Moscow, November 2, the Embassy provided an analysis of the domestic elements of Gorbachev’s speech. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870901–0609)
5. See Document 100.