Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

247. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 9, 1987, 8 a.m.–noon

SUBJECT

• Memorandum of Conversation of Nitze/Akhromeyev Working Group Meeting, December 9, 1987

U.S. PARTICIPANTS

• Ambassador Paul Nitze
• Ambassador Max Kampelman
• Ambassador Edward Rowny
• Ambassador Ron Lehman
• Ambassador Henry Cooper
• Ambassador Read Hanmer
• Ken Adelman
• Admiral John Howe
• Robert Linhard
• Dr. William Graham
• Allen Holmes
• Jay Castillo
• James Timbie
• Donald J. McConnell
• Michael Stafford
• Eleanor Sutter
• Dimitri Arensberger (interpreter)

SOVIET PARTICIPANTS

• S.F. Akhromeyev
• V.P. Karpov
• N.F. Chervov
• N.A. Obukhov
• V.I. Medvedev
• K.F. Mikhailov
• L.A. Masterkov
• Iu.A. Nazarkin
• N.B. Shabalin
• F.F. Popov
• A. Lu. Obukhov

INTRODUCTORY DISCUSSION

NITZE opened the meeting by welcoming the Soviet participants to the Arms Control Working Group. AKHROMEYEV commented that he and the Soviet delegation had been subjected to a security examination at the entrance to the State Department. A very thorough examination revealed that the Soviet visitors had no nuclear weapons on their persons. NITZE replied that he hoped the Soviet guests had passed the security examination. AKHROMEYEV said there were no incidents thanks to the discipline of the Soviet delegation. ADELMAN asked jokingly whether the U.S. security officers had a chance to look at the Soviet papers. AKHROMEYEV said no, but this was perhaps because they knew he would not have shown them.

ORDER OF THE DAY FOR WORKING GROUP MEETING

Turning to the business of the day, AKHROMEYEV said the Soviet side had considered the U.S. paper turned over the previous evening on the reduction of strategic offensive arms. The Soviet side was willing to carry out further discussion based on the U.S. paper, with the appropriate clarifications the Soviet side had inserted. To aid this process, the Soviet side had prepared an English text. Since it would not be feasible to work the specific words of this text in this group, AKHROMEYEV suggested that a drafting subgroup be formed to develop a common text after the issues have been discussed substantively in this body. The Soviet participants in the drafting subgroup would be Ambassador Obukhov and General Medvedev. With regard to the schedule for the day, AKHROMEYEV said he assumed this meeting would continue until lunch. NITZE suggested the group break at 10:30 for 30 minutes, resume at 11:00 and then work to lunch. AKHROMEYEV agreed. Noting the official lunch scheduled at the State Department for 1:00, he assumed this meeting should adjourn by approximately 12:30.

AKHROMEYEV suggested the working group ressume for a brief meeting from 1800 to 1900 this evening just before the official dinner at the Soviet Embassy. After dinner the working group could resume to try to reach final agreement. The results of the working group would be reported to our leaders the next morning.

NITZE suggested that when the working group resumes at 11:00 a separate group be convened to discuss conventional weapons and chemical weapons. Charles Thomas is prepared to host such a meeting for the U.S. side in his office. AKHROMEYEV agreed and said the three Soviet participants would be Amb. Nazarkin, General Chervov, and General Mikhailov.

AKHROMEYEV then handed over a revised draft joint text (Tab 1)² which he said reflected the discussions of the previous evening with the U.S. side. AKHROMEYEV suggested the working group consider this text now. NITZE replied that our comments would be preliminary since this was the first time the U.S. side had a chance to look at the text. AKHROMEYEV agreed, adding that in any event this group should discuss the issues in substance and refer working the words of the text to the drafting subgroup.

50% REDUCTION IN THROW WEIGHT

NITZE said his first question was the word “approximately” at the bottom of the first page in the phrase “throw weight for the USSR will be cut by approximately 50%.” NITZE said he thought the sides agreed that the throw weight reduction should be exactly 50%.

AKHROMEYEV said it was agreed that the Soviet side would cut its throw weight by 50%. The word approximately simply reflected the technical reality that the calculations to quantify the throw weight had not yet been done and thus it is difficult to say the reductions will be precisely 50%.

NITZE said his next question was the reference to the Soviet reduction of 50% in throw weight being laid out in a “unilateral statement” of the Soviet side. The U.S. believed the 50% throw weight reduction should be formally recorded. He was not sure a unilateral statement would meet this requirement. AKHROMEYEV asked if the U.S. was recommending that the reduction be recorded in the treaty itself. NITZE said that a unilateral statement could be in the treaty. In the ABM Treaty there are agreed statements and there are also unilateral statements. The Soviet side appears to want to have this commitment in the form of a unilateral statement.

LEHMAN said the U.S. position is that the aggregate ballistic missile throw weight level resulting from Soviet reductions by 50% would become a ceiling which would be binding on both sides and which would be codified in the treaty. AKHROMEYEV said he understood the U.S. to be suggesting that the 50% reduction of throw weight should apply to both the U.S. and the Soviet Union and should be recorded in the treaty. Was this the U.S. position?

LEHMAN said no. The USSR should reduce its throw weight by 50%. The resulting level becomes a ceiling which applies equally to both sides.

AKHROMEYEV said it could, therefore, be possible that one side would have a throw weight level higher than the other side. NITZE replied the actual U.S. level, or Soviet level, could be lower than the ceiling permitted. LEHMAN added that there would, however, be only one ceiling which applies to both sides and which is codified in the treaty.

AKHROMEYEV said he understood the U.S. position now to be that the USSR would reduce its throw weight by approximately 50% and not build above that level later. Both sides would not go above that ceiling. LEHMAN said this was correct. AKHROMEYEV said he had no objections to this position. NITZE added that the sides will need to set the throw weight level resulting from 50% reductions on the Soviet side. The Geneva negotiators can work on the task of spelling out the language. AKHROMEYEV agreed and suggested that this issue now be referred to the drafting group to develop joint statement language. NITZE said that Ambassador Read Hanmer would chair the drafting group for the U.S. side. They could begin with page one of the joint text now. AKHROMEYEV asked again whether the U.S. side objected to the commitment of the Soviet side on 50% reduction of throw weight being in the form of a unilateral statement. LEHMAN said yes, this should be codified in the treaty. The working group could work out language. AKHROMEYEV said the Soviet unilateral statement would have the force of a treaty commitment. NITZE said it is not a unilateral statement any longer if both sides are bound by it. AKHROMEYEV said okay. The drafting group should draft such a provision for inclusion in the treaty to apply to both sides.

SUBLIMITS ON BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS

NITZE called attention to subparagraph A³ of the draft text, concerning ballistic missile ceilings. The United States would prefer a ceiling of 4800, rather than 5100. But the main problem concerned the subceiling: The United States would like the phrase “or SLBM warheads” to be deleted, so that there would be freedom to mix.

AKHROMEYEV suggested removing the last one-and-a-half lines of subparagraph A, so that the sentence would read: “that will include a ceiling of (5100)2 (4800)1 in the aggregate number of ICBM plus SLBM warheads within the 6,000 total.” NITZE said that both sides would be subject to the subceiling at 3,300; both Soviet and U.S. ICBMs would be limited. Why not keep it for ICBMs and just remove the last phrase?

AKHROMEYEV sought to confirm that the U.S. side did not want a sublimit on SLBMs. NITZE replied that SLBMs would be subject to the 4800 ceiling, but not to a separate subceiling. AKHROMEYEV objected that this was not a matter of substance, but of the rights of the sides. Why should the Soviet side accept a sublimit on ICBMs (1540 warheads on 154 heavy missiles)?

AKHROMEYEV said the Soviet side had agreed to translate the reduction to 154 heavy missiles into a limit at 1540 warheads on such missiles to meet U.S. concerns. With respect to the 3300 sublimit, the USSR will not in any event exceed 3300 ICBM warheads. However, the Soviet side was concerned about the principle of equality. If the U.S. side would not accept SLBM sublimits, why should the Soviet side accept the sublimits the U.S. side was proposing? NITZE said there was no inequality; the United States would also be subject to the 3300 sublimit. LEHMAN said if the Soviet side does not intend to deploy more than 3300 ICBM warheads then it should have no difficulty in agreeing to the U.S. proposed sublimits. The concept of sublimits within an aggregate limit of ballistic missile warheads follows the approach taken by the U.S. and Soviet sides in the previous SALT I and SALT II negotiations and thus is not a new idea.

ADELMAN asked Akhromeyev for clarification.

AKHROMEYEV said Soviet agreement for an ICBM sublimit without an SLBM sublimit, taking into account the actual structure of the Soviet forces, would be a concession to the U.S. side. In formal legal terms the U.S. may be right in saying these are ceilings applicable to both sides, but practically speaking it would be a Soviet concession given the differing structure of the two sides’ forces. NITZE said the limits would require changes in U.S. forces as well. The U.S. would have to make many changes in the way it operates and in its forces as a result of the treaty; neither side would get everything with which it had started. AKHROMEYEV said of course this was true for both sides.

600 KM. RANGE CRITERION FOR ALCMS

NITZE suggested the two sides move on to discuss subparagraph B of the text.⁴ There the problem is with the Soviet language referring to a range of over 600 kilometers as a counting rule for ALCMs.

HOWE said that, as Nitze had noted the previous day, there are a number of reasons why a range criterion of 1500 kilometers is better than the 600-kilometer range discussed in the early 1970s. The Soviet side has expanded its air defense and made many improvements in recent years since SALT II incorporated the 600 kilometer range. From a military point of view, having longer-range ALCMs makes sense. But the 1500 criterion is still well below the range of ALCMs the sides are actually producing. Fifteen hundred kilometers provides a clear line between short range and longer range ALCMs. For military reasons the actual range of strategic ALCMs for both sides will be much greater than 1500 kilometers. Therefore, it is difficult to understand why the Soviet side wants to set the counting rule so low at 600 kilometers.

AKHROMEYEV said if we put the counting rule at 1500 kilometers this would make it a medium range system rather than a strategic system. Yesterday our leaders signed an INF Treaty eliminating medium range (500–5500 km.) nuclear missiles. Moreover, AKHROMEYEV said, ALCMs are strategic systems because they depend on the range of their carrier vehicles, strategic bombers. The U.S. side knows the combat range of the strategic bombers of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Strategic bomber range is above 5000 kilometers, even above 7000 kilometers. If one adds to the 7000 kilometer range of a strategic bomber an additional 600 kilometers for cruise missiles, the total is a range of 7600 kilometers or even more. This is, therefore, a strategic weapon. This is a long held premise felt by both sides in the 1970’s, dating from the SALT negotiations. The range for an ALCM was 600 kilometers. AKHROMEYEV said he could not see why this should be changed today. On the contrary, new heavy bombers of both sides have even greater ranges than those of the 1970s. Thus the 600 kilometer range is a valid limit.

HOWE replied that geographic considerations presented the two sides with different situations. The reason why ALCMs are more important to the United States is because Soviet air defenses have been greatly improved over the years and are much better than those of the U.S. They risk making heavy bombers obsolete in terms of coming in close to their targets. The only way they could survive would be to remain farther away—not penetrate so far into Soviet territory. The agreement we are discussing is not just for 1987 but for years to come, and Soviet air defenses are likely to improve even further.

LEHMAN said that, as Admiral Howe noted, the strategic situation is such that 600 kilometers is not a proper dividing line between tactical and strategic ALCMs. The Soviet side said 600 kilometers is good because it derives from SALT II. Admiral Howe had already explained in detail why this was not so. The U.S. side is ready to agree on the aggregate number of ALCMs. But for all the reasons outlined by Admiral Howe we think the counting rule for range should be set at 1500 kilometers.

NITZE said this issue would need further discussion with military people before a final conclusion could be reached. He suggested that the discussion move on.

AKHROMEYEV agreed to leave the question for now and return to it later. For the present, the range would be put in brackets for the drafting group text.

NUMBER OF ALCMS DETERMINED THROUGH FLIGHT TESTING

NITZE suggested that the sides move on to discuss the next paragraph, concerning the attribution of a number of long-range ALCMs to each heavy bomber based on flight texting. LEHMAN said the U.S. had examined this question carefully and discussed it thoroughly with the Soviet negotiators in Geneva. He had concluded that aircraft are fundamentally different from ICBMs or SLBMs. AKHROMEYEV said that is the U.S. conclusion. LEHMAN said aircraft could be loaded with varying amounts of weapons, electronic equipment, supplies, or fuel. The mix could change their capability. Trying to determine the number of ALCMs which a particular bomber carries on a particular day would be impossible. Counting rules based on total theoretical capability would be unrealistic and lead to contention. Therefore, we are looking for a straightforward solution to reflect the operational realities of heavy bombers, a solution which is fair to both sides and simple enough that it would not create compliance questions or problems. The easiest solution, therefore, would be for the treaty to include the number of long range nuclear-armed ALCMs to be attributed to each type of heavy bomber.

AKHROMEYEV said we will not convince each other on the point. Instead we should seek common language in the drafting group to cover the point. AKHROMEYEV said the Soviet side believes its proposal is correct and valid. The geographic differences which Admiral Howe referred to affecting the U.S./USSR with respect to the combat applications of heavy bombers adversely affects the Soviet Union more than the U.S. The Soviet side bases its bombers only on Soviet territory. If we are to make progress in these talks we must speak bitter truths frankly and without embarrassment. If the terrible circumstance would arrive—God forbid—when these heavy bombers would have to be used, they would have to fly from the USSR to U.S. territory and back. Therefore, the number of missiles they could carry in light of the fuel requirements would be very limited. Older bombers might carry six ALCMs. For new bombers the number might be somewhat greater, but only negligibly so. The U.S., on the other hand, has forward bases in Spain, Guam, and other places around the world from which the distance to the USSR is shorter. Therefore, U.S. bombers can carry many more ALCMs since they require less fuel. AKHROMEYEV added he would not dispute that many, even the majority, of U.S. bombers would still fly from U.S. territory. But there is nonetheless an inequality of the geographic situation, given U.S. forward bases. The Soviet side was concerned about this, just as the U.S. side was worried about Soviet heavy ICBMs.

AKHROMEYEV said on a number of points the Soviet side took steps to meet U.S. concerns. Examples of this were the reduction of 50% in throw weight and counting rules on heavy bombers with respect to SRAMs and bombs. But, in contrast, the Soviet side sees no counterpart U.S. steps to meet Soviet concerns. There can be “no one way traffic” in concessions. The delegations need to work on this issue.

AKHROMEYEV suggested page two of the draft joint text be remanded to the drafting group to try to find general language to cover the differences between the sides.

LEHMAN said that with respect to the discussion on ALCM counting rules, the U.S. distinguishes between the issue of the range criterion (600 kilometers vice 1500 kilometers), where the differing numbers should be bracketed, and the issue of attributing a certain number of ALCMs to each type of heavy bomber. The U.S. side agrees with the Soviet side that there should be an agreed number; we are searching for a rule for doing this. The U.S. side believes a number should be attributed. The Soviet side says the number of ALCMs is to be determined through observation of flight testing. This is impractical as the U.S. side has explained. Instead, a number should be attributed.

AKHROMEYEV said the drafting group should find general language to cover differences between the sides. During the negotiations in Geneva the sides could address further the questions of numbers attached to sublimits, the range criterion for ALCMS if we fail to agree here, and also the heavy bomber counting rules with respect to attributing ALCMs or visually observing them. Let the drafting group work on this problem.

NITZE said before remanding the issue to the drafting group he wondered if a general formula along the following lines could be agreed upon: “the negotiators should agree on the number of ALCMs to be attributed to each type of heavy bomber.” LINHARD noted that the sides agreed that there should be an agreed number, but only disagreed on how to arrive at that number. KARPOV asked whether, if we agree to attribute a number of ALCMs to each heavy bomber, this means that it would be a number not to be exceeded on any particular bomber. NITZE said no. A number would be attributed to each bomber for counting purposes but this does not mean that it could not be exceeded in individual cases. KARPOV asked if a bomber actually carries 12 ALCMs could it still be attributed with only 6? NITZE replied the B–1 is capable of carrying 6 ALCMs and the B–52 may carry up to 20 ALCMs. But this heavy load of ALCMs would not be present on every aircraft of that type. The U.S. side preferred not to use carrying capacity as an indication of capability. Thus our solution is to attribute to each bomber a certain number which it would be counted as carrying. This is a realistic approach. LEHMAN added the U.S. side is prepared to set a maximum limit of 20 for the number of ALCMs any one bomber can carry. To respond to Karpov’s question, certain bombers might be theoretically capable of carrying a maximum of 12 ALCMs although we would attribute it with carrying only 6 for treaty counting purposes since that reflects more realistic operational considerations.

AKHROMEYEV asked if the U.S. was proposing the number 6 to attribute to every heavy bomber, irrespective of how many it had carried before, was carrying now, or might carry in the future. NITZE said we can discuss the number. It is the principle of attributing a number on which we seek agreement at this point. AKHROMEYEV asked if this would be regardless of how many ALCMs were on board. LEHMAN replied the U.S. is offering a maximum limit of 20 ALCMs actually on board any heavy bomber plus an attributed number of 6 per heavy bomber. AKHROMEYEV said all this could be clarified in the negotiations, but at present he wanted to clarify the essence of the U.S. position, the U.S. wants to attribute in the treaty 6 ALCMs to each heavy bomber regardless of what the actual ALCM load is. NITZE replied this is correct. We want to attribute a number rather than attempt to verify an actual number through demonstration flights as the Soviet Union proposes. The Soviet proposal is impractical since actual numbers could vary from day to day.

AKHROMEYEV said the positions are clear. The sides are unable to agree on specific language. Therefore, the drafting group should seek a general formulation to cover the positions of both sides.

LEHMAN said Akhromeyev was a military man and would recognize that an individual airplane can always carry more in theory than the actual load which is assigned to it in practice. Thus, would Akhromeyev not agree that the attributed number could be lower than actual capacity?

AKHROMEYEV said no. The sides should refer the issue to the drafting group. This issue cannot be agreed here. It is a major issue between the sides, requiring further study. We should seek generalized wording at this stage.

DETERMINING BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEAD NUMBERS THROUGH FLIGHT TESTING

NITZE suggested the sides turn now to subparagraph C⁵ dealing with counting rules for warheads on existing ballistic missiles. The U.S. has difficulty with the Soviet language which provides that “these numbers shall be determined through flight testing.” The U.S. side believes we should attribute a number of warheads for each existing missile type in the treaty. This could be verified through on-site inspection. He asked Admiral Howe to elaborate.

HOWE said the United States believes that the treaty should list the number of warheads for existing types of ballistic missiles for both sides. Those numbers would be declared or attributed in the treaty, thus stepping back from using testing as a criterion. We could rely on OSI to inspect. In Geneva the Soviet side had requested on-site inspection on board ships. The U.S. side would be willing to work with the Soviet side on a system where the Soviet inspector could pick a particular U.S. SSBN and say he wished to inspect the missile in tube number 8. The U.S. would remove the missile, take it to a facility and the Soviet inspector could verify that the number of warheads in that missile did not exceed the number permitted. This would demonstrate to the Soviet inspector that the U.S. is not deploying more than the number of RVs permitted on any specific missile. The system would be reciprocal, of course. The same system could apply to ICBMs. The U.S. would remove the missile selected by the Soviet side and there could be on-site inspection of the number of warheads on that particular missile. Such a system would give us both greater confidence in the treaty limits.

AKHROMEYEV said this is excellent “but,” and the “but” is important. If the U.S. says it has tested an MX missile, for example, with 10 or 12 or even 14 warheads, and afterwards the U.S. makes it operational and declares it with 10 warheads, and with strict OSI, while there is peace between the sides no problems would arise. But if, unfortunately there was no confidence between the sides—President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev said yesterday we must proceed step by step in the relationship and there is a need to verify at each step of the way—if tensions were to arise, then the proposal outlined by Admiral Howe would lead to serious consequences. The side which had tested a missile with more warheads than it actually declared and deployed at, could have a breakout capability. That side could rapidly increase the number of warheads on such missiles from 10 to 16. Why did the U.S. side want this added complication? There are many in the U.S. who believe the Soviet side will cheat on any agreement. We should devise a regime which would rule this out. If a side wants to deploy an ICBM with 10 warheads, why test it at 12 or 14? Test it at the number you actually want to deploy it at. Count it at that in the treaty and leave it at that. That would remove the problem.

HOWE replied that Akhromeyev was theoretically correct. But if we foresee an era of growing confidence, built in part through OSI, the U.S. would not want to be in a position where it could not modernize its missiles and test, if necessary, at numbers greater than those actually deployed. If the U.S. deployed a new missile with a greater number of warheads we would declare it and attribute the new number to it in the treaty. Conversely, if the Soviet side tested a new SS–18 with more warheads than they presently declared, the new number would have to be included in the treaty. There would be consultations about this and OSI to inspect that the regime was not being exceeded. But the U.S. side did not think flight testing should be the rule; rather, the sides should rely on OSI to ensure that declared numbers were being observed. HOWE said we all know that missiles have capability greater than those tested when they are deployed. But if one increases the number of warheads on a single missile, the increased throw weight lends to increased costs. Thus, even in a more hostile world, if a side wanted more than the 6000 aggregate, it would not necessarily be militarily advantageous to put more RVs on a missile.

AKHROMEYEV said the U.S. has not convinced him with its arguments. But if this was of interest to the U.S. side, he proposed a text saying the following: “If a side wants to increase the number of warheads on its missiles it will inform the other side.” This would of course increase the number of RVs attributable and increase the total of a side under its aggregate.

LEHMAN said the Soviet side says the SS–18 has 10 RVs, that it always has had and always will have. This had led the U.S. to consider the idea of declaring the number of warheads attributable to each type of missile, coupled with challenge inspections. For example, an inspection might uncover a Minuteman–3 with only two warheads, but never more than three. The sides would declare the numbers of existing types. The Soviet proposal might be useful for new types, but for existing types the sides should be able to agree on a number. The sides would agree to deal with future missile types as a separate question. AKHROMEYEV said he still did not understand why the U.S. needed this system, or why the U.S. needed the right to test with a greater number of warheads than had been declared. The SS–18, for example, had been tested at 10 and was deployed at 10. It was clear that it would not be tested with more than 10. If it had been tested with 10, it could not be made operational with more than 10.

NITZE suggested that the sides postpone their attempt to resolve this issue until after the break.

NITZE then raised another issue with respect to subparagraph C in the Soviet draft text: it included no references to Soviet submarines, and no numbers of warheads to be attributed to submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

AKHROMEYEV acknowledged the omission, and undertook to fill in the Soviet numbers.

SLCM VERIFICATION

NITZE then turned to the issue of SLCMs in subparagraph D,⁶ a difficult issue for the United States.

HOWE said the U.S. had looked long and hard at how to verify SLCMs. Though we had looked at some of the innovative proposals raised by the Soviet side, we were having trouble finding a regime to verify SLCMs in which both sides could have confidence. Five years ago the task might have been easier, but it is a hard problem to overcome given the capability of a side to defeat technical instruments through, for example, shielding. HOWE said he was pessimistic this problem would be solved.

NITZE asked Ambassador Lehman to elaborate further on SLCM verification.

LEHMAN said the U.S. has examined the possibility of determining whether a ship has nuclear warheads on board, whether it can determine the number of nuclear weapons on ships and whether a determination can be made concerning adherence to treaty limits on SLCMs. Our study included methods such as the ones mentioned by the Soviet side. However, on the basis of Soviet statements yesterday, the U.S. will again reexamine the relevant technologies. Nevertheless, LEHMAN said, he must emphasize that the U.S. remains highly dubious that such approaches could be used to verify treaty limitations.

AKHROMEYEV replied that the Soviet view is that SLCMs are a fundamental issue which would determine whether the sides could agree on a START treaty. If the treaty does not limit SLCMs, and if there is no strict verification of the limits on SLCMs, it is pointless to sign a START agreement. One could otherwise easily circumvent the START limits. The Soviet side knew of U.S. plans for several thousand SLCMs (though, admittedly, not all would have nuclear warheads). This would have to be verified. AKHROMEYEV emphasized this is a major, fundamental issue. We must resolve it if we want a START treaty. Otherwise the SLCM question will stay in brackets and there will be no START treaty. The U.S. side should understand this.

AKHROMEYEV added that he failed to understand why it is possible to verify ICBMs with on-site inspection and not to verify SLCMs on ships through OSI. Is the problem one of OSI on ships? A Navy issue? In the future we will have to do this. Otherwise we cannot proceed forward. Why reduce land troops and ICBMs and verify the limits through OSI and leave out a similar regime for SLCMs with OSI for navies? AKHROMEYEV said he knew why, and would like to discuss this issue with Admiral Crowe in the future. The sides would have to search for a means of verification.

For the present, AKHROMEYEV suggested that the sides record the following in the joint statement: “SLCMs must be limited to a certain number, which would be apart from the 6000 aggregate. The sides must limit the number of warships on which SLCMs could be deployed and provide for a strict inspection regime which would assure compliance with the treaty.” That is what the Soviet side suggests.

NITZE said there is a deep difference of opinion on SLCMs. What we can put in the joint statement on this subject, therefore, is problematic. NITZE said he had no good ideas. LEHMAN suggested the sides return to this issue later.

HOWE said he knew Admiral Crowe would like to discuss the SLCM concern of the Soviets with Akhromeyev in the future. At present, he wished to raise one point, however: An ICBM base is exclusively dedicated to strategic defense. Ships, however, combine many interchangeable missions, both nuclear and non-nuclear. We don’t rule out anything regarding a sensible verification regime. Navies are not off limits for verification. The problem is how to do it.

AKHROMEYEV asked, with an apology, whether this was a matter of Naval military egoism. He noted that last September the U.S. had inspected a Soviet motorized infantry division in Germany. During a 48-hour period the U.S. inspectors went everywhere, took photographs, talked to whom they wished, collected lots of information. The Soviet side inspected the U.S. First Armored Division in the Federal Republic of Germany. The Soviet side had access to anything it had a right to inspect under the Stockholm agreement. If it is possible to do this with respect to U.S. ground forces, which include 155 mm howitzer which is known to be nuclear capable, as well as inspecting, for example, the Abrams tank which is conventional only, then why is it impossible to do similar inspections with respect to navies?

HOWE said there were many reasons why the Stockholm agreement had omitted navies. That was something that might come later. In defense of navies, HOWE noted that in 1972 the U.S. and the USSR signed the agreement on the high seas. Despite opposition, this was a good agreement which had reduced tensions; it was discussed every year. It is something we can build on.

AKHROMEYEV said all honor and praise were due to the U.S. side for that agreement. But he had raised the issue not of inspecting navies in their entirety, but limiting SLCMs to one or two types of submarines and surface ships with respect to long range SLCMS on board which would be subject to verification. Only this would be monitored. He repeated he could not understand why this could not be done. This has been discussed many times between the sides but the U.S. has not convinced him. HOWE said the Soviet proposal to limit the numbers of SLCMs on certain classes of ships and submarines was something the sides could discuss; it might be possible to agree on flexible deployment of forces.

AKHROMEYEV repeated that the sides would have to find some formula to address this issue, because without SLCM there could be no treaty. Without SLCM there could be no joint statement from this summit. It was obvious we would need to discuss this issue further.

ON-SITE INSPECTION OF DECLARED FACILITIES

NITZE said paragraph 6⁷ of the Soviet text also gave rise to question with respect to the right to short notice on-site inspections at locations given during data exchanges where covert activities could be occurring.

LEHMAN said the U.S. side was not sure it had understood the phrase “given during data exchanges.” This appears to require a side to declare in advance the sites it intended to inspect, before they had been identified as suspect.

KARPOV said this is analogous to the INF Treaty. Inspections in INF are on the basis of declared facilities listed in the MOU on Data. One should apply the same principle to START. This would limit the opportunities of both sides to circumvent an agreement on strategic offensive arms providing for 50% reductions. The Soviets propose that the facilities which were to be subject to inspection be declared.

LEHMAN said it was the U.S. view that the inspection regime for START must be more extensive than that for INF. We need to work out the details in the treaty. LEHMAN recommended dropping the phrase “given during data exchanges” and substitute the phrase “according to agreed procedures.”

AKHROMEYEV said okay. CHERVOV then asked what Lehman meant when he said the START verification regime would have to be wider than that for INF. LEHMAN said that whereas the INF Treaty contained a regime for liquidation of an entire class of weapons, under a START treaty the sides would need to verify a large number of residual systems and quite a variety of constraints. Therefore, the sides must have access to a wider range of facilities and systems. We need to work out agreed procedures. LEHMAN said the revised language he suggested does not prejudice this, but that in the end the sides would have to work out the specifics.

AKHROMEYEV said the INF Treaty verification regime works in principle for START verification as well. The Soviet phrase “locations given during data exchanges” implies all of a side’s strategic offensive arms—ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers, production facilities, training facilities, bases, everything—would be listed in the memorandum. Such a complete data exchange facilitates inspection on the other side’s territory. It will be an exhaustive list, as in the preceding treaty, and there will be no objection to inspect absolutely everything regarding strategic offensive arms. AKHROMEYEV emphasized “absolutely everything,” and to including everything in the memorandum. There still will be general purpose forces not subject to inspection under this nuclear arms control agreement. Maybe in the future this too will come under a conventional treaty and eventually all weapons of all types will be subject to some form of inspection.

LEHMAN said he understood Akhromeyev’s position. He hoped the problem could be resolved in detail.

CHERVOV asked whether the implication of Lehman’s question meant that the U.S. preferred an inspection regime without any limits of any kind; does the U.S. believe there should be some limits?

LEHMAN asked whether Chervov believed there should be some limits to inspection rights. CHERVOV said yes, and that these would be recorded in the memorandum. LEHMAN replied the U.S. also acknowledges the possibility of some limits. The sides would work out agreed procedures. It is not a question to be resolved in generalizations or in principle. It is a question that will be resolved by working with the specifics. LEHMAN said the Soviet language implies that the other side will be limited to suspect site inspection of facilities declared in advance. There was a need to address the problem of suspect sites that might crop up in the future. The heart of the question, therefore, is the suspect site verification regime.

AKHROMEYEV said he could agree to the revised language proposed by Lehman “according to agreed procedures.” AKHROMEYEV suggested the text be sent to the drafting group.

RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ABM TREATY

NITZE suggested that the question of subparagraph 7⁸ (SLCMs) be put off till later. Apart from that, the U.S. had no difficulty with the remaining Soviet text with respect to START language.

AKHROMEYEV said the Soviet side also had no further START language problems. That brings the discussion to the section of the paper dealing with the relationship with the ABM Treaty. This is the most difficult problem. AKHROMEYEV suggested that it may be best before dealing with the text to clarify the positions of the two sides.

NITZE agreed, but said this was also a logical point at which to break the meeting. AKHROMEYEV asked how long, noting that he was willing to work straight through without a break. NITZE suggested 30 minutes and AKHROMEYEV agreed. AKHROMEYEV said after the break the sides must discuss how to record an agreement on the ABM Treaty relationship in the joint statement text. The positions of the two sides as now stated are mutually unacceptable. Therefore, it would be difficult to agree on common language. NITZE said this was true and the sides would have a lot of work to do. AKHROMEYEV repeated that when the meeting resumes the discussion should first be in terms of a statement of position by both sides and then a discussion of the text of the joint statement.

At that point the meeting adjourned for a 30 minute break.

NITZE resumed the meeting by saying that he wanted to give the Soviet side language on Defense and Space that the President had passed to the General Secretary. He then passed over the D&S paragraph (Tab 2).⁹ He noted that it provided for an obligation that would be equally binding on the sides.

Nitze said he wished to summarize the U.S. position with respect to Defense and Space issues. The U.S. was seeking a separate, new treaty of unlimited duration that could go into effect the same time as the START Treaty went into effect. During the first period of this new treaty, both sides would commit not to deploy defensive systems currently prohibited by the ABM Treaty. After that period of time, both sides would be free to deploy such defenses without further reference to the ABM Treaty after giving 6 months’ notice of intent to deploy. During the nondeployment period, both sides would have the right to pursue their strategic defense programs, conducting research, development and testing, including testing in space, as required.

The Soviet side had been saying a lot lately about “strategic stability” and about its desire to ensure predictability. The U.S. side also placed high priority on continuing—indeed on enhancing—stability. It was with this in mind that the U.S. side proposed its predictability package to ensure confidence that prohibited deployments were not being undertaken during the nondeployment period. Specifically, the U.S. side proposed that the sides meet regularly to exchange programmatic data and briefings on each side’s strategic defensive programs, and to facilitate mutual observation of strategic defense tests and visits to strategic defense research facilities. These activities could begin immediately upon the entry into force of the Defense and Space Treaty.

The U.S. side took especial note that the General Secretary had acknowledged recently on NBC the Soviet activities comparable to the U.S. SDI program. The U.S. side believed agreement on its proposed predictability package would serve to build confidence and reduce suspicions between the sides regarding each other’s programs. At this point, Nitze passed over a four-point paper on D&S (Tab 3).¹⁰

AKHROMEYEV said he had some questions. The U.S. side referred to a new treaty. What about the existing ABM Treaty? What relationship would exist between that treaty and the preparation and signing of a treaty on strategic offensive arms? During what period would the Treaty of 1972 be observed? In what cases could a party withdraw from that treaty if the treaty reducing strategic offensive arms had been signed? What should the other side do if one side, after the agreed period expired, began deployment of a nationwide ABM defense?

NITZE said that, regarding the first question, the ABM Treaty would continue in effect just as it was now. A side could withdraw from the Treaty according to its terms as it could today, but it could not deploy even if it withdrew. Regarding the third question, the Treaty the U.S. was proposing would say that the sides could not deploy during the nondeployment period. After the period, it would be permissible for either side to deploy defenses after 6 months’ notice.

COOPER said the U.S. was interested in deploying defenses as soon as possible. The kind it sought to deploy would be those that were effective. The U.S. side believed the strategic regime could be stable with both offense and defense on both sides. It saw this treaty as a vehicle for getting there. He was speaking of a treaty of unlimited duration, just as Lehman spoke of a treaty of unlimited duration in START. Each treaty would be of benefit to both sides and should stand alone.

AKHROMEYEV asked if it was not agreed that the treaties were interrelated. COOPER replied that it was agreed that they would enter into force at the same time. The U.S. saw its proposal as meeting the General Secretary’s concern about a rapid movement to deployment.

CHERVOV asked if the U.S. side made provision for the relationship of the ABM Treaty to reductions in strategic offensive arms. NITZE responded that the U.S. side did take seriously the interrelationship between offense and defense, but this did not mean there was a specific relationship between START and the D&S Treaty.

CHERVOV asked how the relationship could be recorded. NITZE said there would be two treaties of an equally binding nature, entered into concurrently.

KAMPELMAN added that the interrelationship was recognized when the ABM Treaty was signed in 1972. The assumption was that, after the Treaty was signed, there would be offensive reductions. Now the sides were arriving at those reductions. Much had happened since then; the U.S. objective was to get the reductions completed.

There was a difference of opinion between the sides on what the ABM Treaty meant. The sides had never had to face the question of new technologies until recently. The current effort was to see if they could find a formulation not pregnant with further argument between the sides. The question of what the ABM Treaty meant was only a formula for further argument. The theme the U.S. side was hearing from the General Secretary was predictability and no deployment. That was what the U.S. side was trying to address, some predictability for both sides without either deploying.

The U.S. side did not believe defensive programs should interfere with offensive reductions from either a logical or a military point of view. The sides were talking about reductions in offensive systems to a level higher than in 1972. To respond to Soviet concerns, the U.S. side was saying that the Defense and Space Treaty could enter into force at the same time as START reductions.

As for the question of what would happen if one side decided to deploy, if that side were in violation of its commitment not to deploy, there would be lots of remedies. If the deployment occurred after the agreed period expired, it should not impact on keeping reductions going. But the sides would be talking to each other during the intervening period of time. The START Treaty would have a provision that, if either side believed its supreme national interests were in jeopardy, it could respond. But, if one considered that the START reductions were not that great compared to 1972 levels, it should not be a matter of tremendous concern.

KARPOV said he thought the discussion was going in the wrong direction. He had the joint statement from the Shevardnadze visit to Washington on October 30.¹¹ It stated clearly that the two sides should determine the agenda of future negotiations and work out instructions to delegations to reach agreement on complying with the ABM Treaty and nonwithdrawal from the Treaty for an agreed period of time. The Ministers had not been talking about a new treaty to supplement the ABM Treaty, but rather an agreement not to withdraw from the existing ABM Treaty.

AKHROMEYEV, reading from the October 30 joint statement, said that during the meeting in the U.S., the General Secretary and the President would determine the agenda. This was the agenda: Preparation of an agreement on reductions of strategic offensive arms and nonwithdrawal from the ABM Treaty for an agreed period of time.

COOPER replied that, in Geneva, the sides had spoken of the form that the commitment would take. The U.S. side preferred a treaty, while the Soviet side talked about an agreement, but both sides talked about a stand-alone document. He understood that the Soviet side wanted a legally binding commitment that would not be part of the ABM Treaty or the START Treaty. The sides had been talking about what to call it since the Soviet side tabled its draft agreement on July 29.¹² Were the sides talking about a labeling problem here or was there a more fundamental problem?

KARPOV said the problem was that the Ministerial discussion and thorough work by the sides had created a formulation approved by the Ministers. This formulation should now be the guidance for the sides.

COOPER said the U.S. side understood the formulation to call for separate, legally binding documents. KARPOV replied that that was not the problem; the problem was that the accord should be related to compliance with the ABM Treaty for an agreed period of time without the right to withdraw.

AKHROMEYEV asked if the U.S. side was challenging the agreement between Ministers. On the basis of this agreement, the General Secretary had come to Washington. The Soviet side had guidance from the General Secretary on this basis. The agreed task was not to elaborate a new agreement, but to comply with the ABM Treaty.

LINHARD said the U.S. side believed its position was consistent with the Ministerial agreement. Was the issue one treaty or one agreement? KARPOV said this was not the issue; the question was with regard to substance. Would there be a provision on compliance with the ABM Treaty and nonwithdrawal from that Treaty? This provision could be part of the START Treaty, a separate protocol in the START Treaty, or a protocol to the ABM Treaty.

AKHROMEYEV said the Soviet position was that there was an intimate relationship between deliberations on a treaty reducing strategic offensive arms and compliance with the ABM Treaty within a fixed period of time. This relationship could be recorded as the sides deemed necessary and appropriate; the Soviet side had suggested three options.

The ABM Treaty should stay in force for a ten-year period as signed in 1972. If, within that period, either side became concerned about how the other side was complying with the Treaty, the sides should settle their concerns within the framework of the SCC. They should exchange information and allow inspection of the facilities causing concern.

Since the view of the goal of deploying a nationwide defense was different between the sides, the Soviet side was stating that, if either side proceeded with deployment of a nationwide defense, then the Treaty on strategic offensive arms would be invalid. If the Treaty had already been signed, ratified and implemented, the Treaty would not be in force anymore and the sides could act as necessary.

The Soviet side had other proposals which it had made earlier and which it wished to confirm now. This included a list of devices with certain characteristics that could be deployed in space. The U.S. position had been specified, and the Soviet side had outlined its position. How could the sides find mutually acceptable language? This could be done, provided the agreement between the Ministers was complied with. A formula should be recorded in the joint text.

KAMPELMAN suggested it might be necessary to refer this issue to the Ministers. But some clarification was needed. The U.S. side was totally within the spirit of the Ministerial statement. That statement did not refer to several things that had been included in the Soviet position. The Soviet side talked about complying with the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972, but it knew the sides disagreed on that. The U.S. side was trying to avoid disputes.

He had thought the Soviet side had said it was worried about deployment; the Soviet side’s own statement had said that. That aspect the sides agreed on. The sides should take the area on which they agreed and build on it.

On the other question, every party had the right, if it felt its supreme national interests were in danger, to act to protect itself. For the U.S. side to acknowledge at this time in the START Treaty that deployment anytime would threaten supreme national interests and nullify reductions would be to testify to a conclusion that the U.S. side did not share with the Soviet side. The U.S. was still doing research. Both sides knew that over time they could change positions as they saw new developments.

AKHROMEYEV replied that he was not suggesting language, but just trying to understand the U.S. position and outline that of the Soviet side. There appeared to be a very serious issue on which the sides were now agreed, that the ABM Treaty would be observed for a certain period of time. Was it true that the issue was the period of time? The relationship with the treaty on strategic offensive arms should be reflected in the document. The rest of the Soviet position was not agreed to by the U.S., and he understood that. Perhaps the sides could find some joint common language.

LINHARD suggested the sides break the problem down into its parts and go through each. The U.S. side had gone through the Soviet text point-by-point to see how the sides differed. In the first paragraph, the Soviet side was talking about a protocol to the START Treaty. He thought it was agreed that there was an issue of form. This was a minor issue, but it had to be resolved. The U.S. side felt strongly about it.

In the second element was a nonwithdrawal period of 10 years. The U.S. side had talked about a period during which it would not take action to deploy. The third element indicated that the Defense and Space agreement would have the same force as START; the U.S. side wanted this outcome as well.

The third paragraph suggested that the sides could refer any concerns to the SCC; the U.S. side agreed that concerns could be referred to the appropriate body. The Soviet side had mentioned an exchange of data; that was common with U.S. language. The Soviet idea for inspection of sites had some commonality with the U.S. open labs proposal.

The fourth paragraph indicated that a side would be free from START if the other side violated the Defense and Space agreement. The U.S. side had nothing like this.

The fifth paragraph called for a 2–3 year discussion period. The U.S. side had nothing about this, but had talked about something like these discussions before.

The sixth paragraph concerned the list proposal, which the U.S. language did not address. The U.S. language had either side free to deploy after 6 months’ notice; he understood the Soviet position to be that the sides would revert to the ABM Treaty. Maybe, by comparing language and finding common areas, the sides could build the basis for a joint statement.

AKHROMEYEV said this was a logical train of thought. This approach could help the sides arrive at mutually acceptable language. LINHARD replied that he was not sure that, without a bit more, the sides could simply take the language of either side and modify it slightly. He was looking for a way to extract elements from the language of both sides.

AKHROMEYEV asked how the sides might proceed in practical terms. LINHARD suggested they use a period of time to continue to explore where they differed. Then they could go to lunch and, before meeting at 6, they could come up with some thoughts on the matter. They might exchange something, either before or at the 6:00 meeting.

AKHROMEYEV said he had tried to find something proper here, and he would read it aloud. Perhaps the sides could work on it before the meeting at 6. He then read the Soviet-proposed language (Tab 4).¹³

NITZE indicated that he had thought the Soviet position was that, after the expiration of the period, the ABM Treaty would resume full force. The Soviet side was now saying that the ABM Treaty would continue forever unless the sides decided otherwise. Would there be no more right of withdrawal upon 6 months’ notice?

KARPOV replied that the Treaty would remain in force as it was now unless the sides agreed otherwise.

COOPER said he thought the Soviet side had included the possibility of a separate agreement. Now he understood that that was not one of the three options being proposed. Did the Soviet side now reject a separate treaty?

KARPOV said that talk about a treaty that could supersede the ABM Treaty was for the next stage. He was saying that, with the entry into force of a START Treaty, one of three options should be implemented. The second stage would be upon completion of 50% reductions; the sides would then discuss what to do after the expiration of the nonwithdrawal period.

LINHARD said he had not heard a reference to 10 years in the language the Soviet side had just read. KARPOV explained that the language took into account the differences of the sides on the length of the period. They could just record that there would be an agreed period, as recorded in the joint statement of October 30.

LINHARD said that, in comparing what had just been read to what the Soviet side had proposed before, it appeared that the Soviet side had deleted the paragraphs on going to the SCC, on being released from START in case of violations of the Defense and Space agreement, and on the list of devices.

KARPOV responded that, if it was understood that the sides could go to the SCC, perhaps they should write it down. The second paragraph had been omitted just to make the text brief. The third paragraph was perhaps advisable if there was a willingness to try the list approach; alternatively, the sides could leave it out for now in the interest of time and consider it later on.

LINHARD said he thought the sides agreed on taking questions that might arise in the future to some forum. He recognized that there was motion in some of the Soviet language, but he was not sure it was a text the sides could draw upon. It was important to find a formulation that focused on the issue of deployment, because that was common to the positions of both sides. The U.S. side would have to look at the Soviet language; he was not sure it would work.

AKHROMEYEV suggested the sides send representatives to the Drafting Group with this text. NITZE proposed that the Group look not only at the Soviet language but also at the first paragraph passed by the U.S. side. AKHROMEYEV agreed.

KAMPELMAN said both sides understood that they differed on what it meant to comply with the ABM Treaty. The U.S. position on that question permitted it theoretically to do all the testing it wanted short of deployment. The U.S. had not acted on that view but had asserted it. Would the Soviet side be satisfied with a statement saying the sides agreed to comply with the ABM Treaty even if it was aware of the significant differences in interpretation?

AKHROMEYEV replied that he had outlined the Soviet position. If the sides were able to arrive at mutually acceptable language here, it would be reported to the leadership. He would also report Kampelman’s rather significant statement.

KAMPELMAN asked if Akhromeyev understood why the U.S. side was hesitant about any phrase referring to “agreement” when there was none. AKHROMEYEV responded that he was fully aware of what Kampelman was saying.

KAMPELMAN asked why the Soviet side hesitated to use nondeployment language. AKHROMEYEV replied that he thought this would be a violation of the ABM Treaty. He had had a lot of discussion with Nitze on this. He had referred to Article V,¹⁴ and Nitze had referred to Agreed Statement D. This disagreement should be taken into account by the two sides.

KAMPELMAN objected that both sides agreed that deployment would violate the ABM Treaty. That was why the U.S. side had proposed a nondeployment commitment. Why was the Soviet side reluctant?

AKHROMEYEV said the Soviet side was convinced that Article V prohibited not only deployment but also testing of space-based ABM systems, while Agreed Statement D concerned the area of deployment which each side was entitled to for systems based on other physical principles. Now he was trying to find new language. Before either side accepted new wording, they should report to the leaders. But first, wording should be formulated. It should be mutually acceptable. The sides could do it ad ref, and report to leaders.

COOPER asked if it would help to include language acknowledging the continuing existence of the ABM Treaty along with the new treaty the U.S. side was proposing. AKHROMEYEV replied that Karpov had put forward the Soviet position quite clearly.

NITZE proposed that the Drafting Group meet between 5 and 6 to work out something on this subject. The Working Group could assemble at 6 and work from 6 to 7 to see if they could agree on final recommendations for Ministers.

AKHROMEYEV agreed, saying the sides should now instruct the Drafting Group to complete work on the text as a whole, especially on the subject of the ABM Treaty and its relationship with START. After dinner at the Soviet Embassy, the sides could meet again and complete work on the text, so they would be able to report by morning to the leaders. He did not know whether there would be a separate document or a portion for the joint statement.

ROWNY said the sides should make clear to the Drafting Group that they were not agreed on what constituted compliance with the ABM Treaty.

AKHROMEYEV noted that the sides now had a certain common understanding that a text could be worked out, and also a common understanding that there was disagreement on their understanding of the ABM Treaty.

NITZE said the U.S. side thought Article V applied only to components defined in Article II. ROWNY suggested that, instead of going back to Article V, the Soviet side take note that the U.S. position was in the four-point paper that Nitze had given them.

AKHROMEYEV said he would have to report this disagreement to the leaders. Differences of principle should be understood by the Ministers.

KAMPELMAN indicated, for the record, that the sides fully understood that they had a difference of opinion on the Krasnoyarsk radar. NITZE added that there were many issues the sides had only touched on; Krasnoyarsk was an example. AKHROMEYEV agreed that there were many issues to deal with in Geneva, and noted that the Soviet side thought the Thule and Fylingdales radars were violations.

KARPOV said he had heard that the U.S. side was not going to publish the INF MOU. Was this so? Was this a unilateral decision or something the sides should decide together?

KAMPELMAN replied that this was a good point. He had talked to Obukhov about it yesterday. He thought the sides should operate on the assumption that the MOU would be published, but would get back to the Soviet side on this.

KARPOV said the Soviet side was prepared to publish. NITZE said he thought the question was one of timing, and KAMPELMAN repeated that the U.S. side would get back to the Soviet side on this.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Washington Summit. Secret. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s Conference Room at the Department of State. Also on this day, Reagan and Gorbachev held two meetings in the Oval Office, the memoranda of conversations for which are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, volume VI, Soviet Union October 1986–January 1989, Documents 109–110.
2. Attached but not printed is a Soviet draft of the revised joint text. An unknown hand wrote at the top of the draft: “USSR, 0800, 12/09.”
3. Subparagraph A of the Soviet draft text (see footnote 2, above) includes among the priority tasks on which negotiations should focus: “The additional steps necessary to ensure that the reductions enhance strategic stability. These are to include a ceiling of 5100 on the aggregate number of ICBM plus SLBM warheads within the 6000 total, and a further sub-ceiling of 3300 on the number of ICBM and SLBM warheads.” An unknown hand crossed out the final “and” and wrote “or.”
4. Subparagraph B of the Soviet draft text (see footnote 2, above) includes among the “priority tasks” on which negotiations should focus: “The counting rules governing the number of long-range (i.e. with a range over 600 kilometers), nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) to be attributed to each type of heavy bomber. The number of long-range ALCMs that can be carried by the heavy bomber of a given type (for the USSR—‘Tupolev–95’ (‘Bear’) and ‘Tupolev–160’ (‘Blackjack’); for the USA—B–1 and B–52) is to be determined through observation of flight testing. Consultations at the level of experts could be conducted for that purpose, to include joint inspections of the sides’ heavy bombers with the aim of determining the number of long-range ALCM, for which the bombers of a given type could be equipped for flight at intercontinental ranges. Whenever necessary, demonstration flights could be conducted to this end.”
5. Subparagraph C of the Soviet draft text (see footnote 2, above) includes among the “priority tasks” on which negotiators should focus: “The counting rules with respect to existing ballistic missiles. The number of warheads attributable to each type of United States ballistic missile shall be: MX–10, MINUTEMAN III–3, MINUTEMAN II–1, TRIDENT I–1, TRIDENT II–, POSEIDON–. The number of warheads attributable to each type of Soviet ballistic missile shall be: ‘SS–17’—4, ‘SS–19’—6, ‘SS–18’—10, ‘SS–24’—10 and ‘SS–25’—[unclear]. These numbers shall be determined through flight testing. There be agreed rules governing how many warheads shall be attributed to future types of ballistic missiles covered by START.” An unknown hand added the phrase “in addition” between the words “There shall” and “be agreed” in the final sentence.
6. Subparagraph D of the Soviet draft text (see footnote 2, above) includes among the “priority tasks” on which negotiations should focus: “The reduction of the number of SLCMs shall be conducted in a manner as to allow each side to possess not more than 400 units outside the total of 6000 nuclear warheads for strategic offensive arms, with their deployment being limited to an agreed number of submarine (two classes) and surface ship classes (the number of classes is to be agreed upon).”
7. Paragraph 6 of the Soviet draft text (see footnote 2, above) reads: “The right to short notice, on-site inspections at locations given during data exchanges where either side considers covert deployment, production, storage or repair of START systems could be occurring.” An unknown hand circled the phrase “given during data exchanges.”
8. Paragraph 7 of the Soviet draft text (see footnote 2, above) reads: “Measures designed to verify SLCMs by national technical means, cooperative measures for on-site inspections; these inspections could be carried out on any ship, at naval bases, storage and production facilities.”
9. Attached but not printed is an undated paper that reads: “DEFENSE & SPACE. The President and the General Secretary also discussed the status of negotiations relating to Defense and Space issues. They agreed to instruct their negotiators in Geneva to expedite work on a Joint Draft Treaty Text in a new separate treaty which could enter into force at the same time as the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms. They also agreed to instruct their negotiators in Geneva first to identify areas of agreement and disagreement in the Joint Draft Treaty Text and then to accelerate work toward resolution of the areas of disagreement.”
10. Attached but not printed is an undated draft text, suggesting that when negotiating the Joint Draft Treaty Text, “negotiators build upon the following elements: (a) there will be a period of time during which both sides would commit not to deploy defensive systems currently prohibited by the ABM Treaty; (b) after that period of time, both sides would be free to deploy defenses not currently permitted by the Treaty after giving 6 months notice of an intent to deploy and without further reference to the ABM Treaty; (c) during the non-deployment period, both sides have the right to pursue their strategic defense programs, conducting research, development and testing, including testing in space, as required; and (d) to enhance strategic stability, provide predictability, and ensure confidence that prohibited deployments are not being undertaken during the non-deployment period, the two sides meet regularly: (1) to exchange programmatic data and briefings on each side’s strategic defense programs; and, (2) to facilitate mutual observation of strategic defense tests and visits to strategic defense research facilities.” (No classification marking)
11. See Document 222.
12. Attached but not printed is a paper titled “Karpov’s Revised Defense and Space Language Read During Morning Session of Arms Control Working Group, December 9, 1987,” which reads: “The General Secretary and the President also discussed the situation at the negotiations on questions of the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and space. They agreed to instruct their Geneva delegations to work out an agreement on compliance with the ABM Treaty as signed and ratified in 1972 and on nonwithdrawal from that treaty for an agreed period of time. Such an agreement would be recorded in a treaty on strategic offensive arms or in a protocol to that treaty or in a protocol to the ABM Treaty. In any case, the agreement should have the same legal status as the START Treaty itself. The two sides proceed from the premise that the ABM Treaty remains of unlimited duration and will be in force after the agreement on the nonwithdrawal period expires if the sides do not decide otherwise. Upon completion of 50% reductions of strategic offensive arms, 2–3 years before the expiration of the agreed nonwithdrawal period, the two sides will begin negotiations on future commitments in the field of ABM defense having in mind assuring predictability in the development of Soviet-American strategic relationship under conditions of strategic stability and reduced risk of nuclear war. If the sides deem it appropriate such an agreement could as well enter into force even prior to the expiration of the agreed period.” At the bottom of the paper is a note: “Underlining indicates text included in written form given by Masterkov to Linhard at lunch, but not present as read out orally in the morning Working Group.”
13. In telegram 8164 from NST Geneva, July 29, the Department discussed the Soviet draft. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870724–0140)(S)
14. Article V of the ABM Treaty states: “(1) Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based; (2) Each party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, nor to modify deployed launchers to provide them with such a capability, nor to develop, test, or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers.” (“Treaty Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems,” May 26, 1972, Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972, Document 316)