Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

222. Notes of a Meeting¹

Washington, October 30, 1987

Meeting with Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze at the Department of State, October 30, 1987

SCH Basic scheme of further summit contacts. If proceed in good way mtg in D.C. will take place. Have idea of next stage. How envisage visit of P to USSR.—When?

The Goal of Summits. I begin w/visit of P to USSR? We agree it is START and the entire complex related to this question. There are just a few months. Agreement on START & complex is something GS regards as the key objective. Lay groundwork in Washington. We will have INF.

First Agenda Item. Sign INF

Next Question is START

Have good basis for mutually acceptable go between. Next. 50% reduction must be accompanied by strengthening strategic stability. Emphasize. These reductions create new environment. Must address strategic stability. What are methods?: The one mechanism is ABM treaty. This point is the fundamental thought.

Not asking for anything extraordinary. Not submitting new demands. Am mindful of statements of P that erosion of ABM treaty should be prevented.

In Sept you said in context of 50% have to give up certain rights, i.e. withdraw from ABM treaty. Suggestions on how see operation of ABM treaty.

Our obligations on 10 year are simultaneous with coming into effect of START. I remember periods—you 7—we 5. We can agree.

After completion of 50% reduction—2 or 3 years in advance of expiring of nonwithdrawal both sides negotiation on future obligations on ABM. This corresponds w/50% reduction in strategic arms.

So called violations. Significant. Work at SSC. If violation not removed, and one side continues violate other side free of obligations on reducing strategic offensive arms.

Definition of devices. Parameters below which things are ok remains in effect. All is permitted include testing. Thresholds are to be negotiated. To be discussed.

Period for nonwithdrawal and strict observance. After expiring of 10 years treaty may continue to exist. At R GS & P agreed. After R we removed laboratory testing. In space devices can be permitted by setting a list.

If sign 50% we should work on basis of R understanding.

Another matter to discuss w/delegations. Burners should be removed by common efforts. If it is contrived by negotiators we don’t have time.

You made approp point that focus will be on verification. This is reasonable. For START let’s set up special group on verification.

Next: Chemical weapons convention. We need short joint statement. Need for detailed discussion at that level.

Next: Much time for regional contacts. Arrive at conclusions on P. Gulf, ME or other.

Next: Humanitarian. They always present. Let us ask deputy ministers to have meeting before summit to review results of work done. Adopt program of further steps.

At DC lay groundwork for START to be signed in Moscow. How shall we complete Washington Summit? That is why discussed key provisions. Even in Geneva President said key elements. President used word instructions to delegations. Perhaps basic positions to give negotiators basis to work on. In R possibility of instr. to For Min discussed.

Is not a matter of format. Need lines on which delegations can work.

Gorbo suggesting a mechanism. Machinery of consultation For Min & Carlucci. Ministers could work w/respective Embassies for an operative channel. Inventing new channels not useful now. Welcome fact Carlucci involved & helping find solutions. We have a channel.

After DC Summit will have to meet more than once. G. suggestion deserves support.

We preparing joint announcement of agreement on language can say G. come here on visit. We have tight schedule. Things happening in USSR crucial. Maximum GS can be away is 2–3 days. Have to limit to meetings, conv. negotiations in Washington. Central event will be talks w/P. Several rounds. Protocol events. Mtgs w/Congress. 2–3 days should suffice.

Not mean return visit within that tight schedule. Next visit of GS could be trip around country but this trip has to be business-political leaders here.

Scheme of activities and agenda. Tried address points in fundamental way. Discuss fundamental things now to decide on visit.

Central question is language on ABM treaty. Speak about space or SDI is your program. You believe in it. We don’t. No need to discuss now. Thing to speak about is existing treaty. Complicating debate is unnecessary.

All views are that treaty should be preserved, at least for a time. On other hand maybe you can do. I do not want to have for you to see any connection between us and your program. Impt. Take a stand on ABM treaty.

G. pleased with talk w/you and FC. Important thing is to complete this business. Matter of historic importance.

Sublimits—wants instructions to delegations. Expects work out. Mobiles. Complicated but survivable.

SLCM’s are problem for us. You worried about ICBMs. Since R. we have this matter. Our experts have a lot to work on:

Numerical correlation

Complex of matters.

Fundamental approach makes it possible discuss sublimits.

GPS SLCM—Problem. Verification immense. Agree mobility adds to survivability and stability. All questioning is verifability. If can verify there is a lot to be said.

SCH Prepare options for leaders at Summit.

GPS Using Gorb. language I have told you where we think should come out.

SCH I said we have come closer.

B. We accepted concept for levels of distr. on 3 legs. Can work for combinations.

GSP Agree on concept of nonwithdrawal. Haven’t agreed on years. In our case the 7 years starts from this year. End point is 1994.

SCH 10 year nonwithdrawal is one question.

2–3 years before end of period negotiations between US & USSR about what to do after 10 years.

This more or less coincides with term of period of 50% elimination. You said 7 we said 5.

Before expiration of 10 year period then negotiations begin.

2nd aspect—What permitted and what not? Should have had discussions. The latest from us is

Whatever is below agreed parameters that agreed will be permitted. That within ABM or some other thing, call it as you may.²

1. Source: Reagan Library, Carlucci Files, Secretary Shultz (08/14/1987–11/03/1987) [Meetings with President—Notes]. Secret. The meeting took place in Shultz’s office at the Department of State. The memorandum of conversation is printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 89.
2. Following this meeting, Shevardnadze led the Soviet delegation to the White House, where President Reagan hosted them in the Cabinet Room from 1 to 2 p.m. after a brief welcoming session in the Oval Office. The memoranda of conversation is printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 90. Upon the conclusion of that meeting, Shultz and Shevardnadze went to the White House Press Room to release a joint statement that President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev had agreed to meet in the United States beginning on December 7, and that they envisioned “a further meeting between them in the Soviet Union in the first half of 1988, where they would also seek progress across the entire range of U.S.-Soviet relations. Toward this end, both sides will work toward early achievement of a treaty implementing the agreement to reduce strategic offensive arms by 50%, which could be signed during the President’s visit to Moscow.” (Department of State Bulletin, December 1987, p. 70.)