Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989

89. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 30, 1987, 9:05–11:40 a.m.

SUBJECTS

• Washington and Moscow summits; START; Defense and Space; human rights

PARTICIPANTS

• US

  • The Secretary
  • National Security Advisor Carlucci
  • Asst. Sec. Ridgway
  • Ambassador Matlock
  • EUR/SOV Director Parris (Notetaker)
  • Mr. Zarechnak (Interpreter)

• USSR

  • Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
  • Deputy FornMin Bessmertnykh
  • Shevardnadze Aide Stepanov
  • Ambassador Dubinin
  • Shevardnadze Aide Tarasenko (Notetaker)
  • Mr. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

[The meeting opened with an initial restricted session, with Ridgway, Stepanov, Matlock and Dubinin joining later.]

SHEVARDNADZE responded to the Secretary’s invitation to lead off by noting that he had nothing special to pass on “one-on-one.” Rather, he had recalled in preparing for the present meeting how, at the end of the Secretary’s April, 1987 visit to Moscow, the two had met alone for a few minutes.² On that occasion, Shevardnadze had asked the Secretary a simple question: Did the U.S. really want an INF agreement? The Secretary had said yes.

After that, a lot of tough, creative work had gotten underway. That work had produced the results the two ministers could see in their present meeting. So perhaps it was time to ask another simple, perhaps naive question: Was the U.S. really interested in an agreement on strategic arms? Shevardnadze was convinced that one could be concluded in the time available. So this was a simple, but an important question.

THE SECRETARY said he thought that a START agreement was readily possible. He had found General Secretary Gorbachev’s letter,³ a copy of which had been handed over the night before, to be very positive in that respect. He believed that the letter had given the ministers a solid foundation for their discussions. What they should try to do, and what their negotiators should try to do in Geneva, was to give the President and General Secretary what they needed to have a fruitful discussion, a discussion which would enable them, in turn, to give the negotiators instructions which would allow the conclusion of a START agreement by the following spring.

In fact, the Secretary continued, he would go further. Prefacing his remarks by quoting the following passage from Gorbachev’s letter,

“I am referring not only to the increasing pace of contacts between our two countries, but also to the fact that we have really come to grips with the question that both of us believe is the key to ending the arms race and stabilizing U.S.-Soviet relations,”

the Secretary observed that both sides shared the conviction that satisfactory relations were essential. It was necessary to work to make progress, and this was being done.

The Secretary noted that the world was changing. It was no longer the bipolar world of the past, and would be even less so in the future. It would become more complex, and the two superpowers needed a relationship which could develop into a more productive way of interrelating in such a world. The Secretary said he knew that the General Secretary thought in terms of emerging trends; he appreciated as well the significance of Shevardnadze’s having personally met with S/P Director Solomon earlier that week⁴ following Policy Planning staff talks in Moscow. So Shevardnadze had asked a question about strategic arms. The Secretary had given an unequivocal answer. But there were broader trends emerging in the relationship which were also potentially very significant.

SHEVARDNADZE noted that he had asked the question because he had had the impression that, when the General Secretary had outlined new Soviet positions on strategic arms in Moscow, the Secretary had not been responsive. Shevardnadze wanted to be clear on where the U.S. stood. As always, the Soviet side was in favor of achieving breakthroughs in this key area.

THE SECRETARY said that the U.S. very much wanted to do so as well. He believed there was much to say at the moment on strategic arms. The General Secretary’s Moscow proposal and his letter provided the basis for a good discussion. But the most difficult subjects before the two ministers were those relating to activities in strategic defense work during whatever non-withdrawal period was agreed to with respect to the ABM Treaty. As yet, there had been no closure on that issue; the ministers would have to discuss it later.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed that this was a central problem, and asked to make another point. Later the two would have to talk about a program of further high-level contacts, including a summit. As the Washington summit was no longer a remote possibility, the Soviet side attached great importance to getting preparatory work underway. There should be an intense work program to ensure that the two leaders did not have to spend hours or days on things that could be done at a lower level. THE SECRETARY said he agreed.

SHEVARDNADZE said the issue was where the leaders should focus their attention. The Secretary had met with Gorbachev for almost five hours in Moscow.⁵ But the leaders should not hold day after day of lengthy meetings. It would be too much. Rather, there should be good preparations so that the short time available at the summit could produce tangible, significant results.

THE SECRETARY said he could assure Shevardnadze that he and his staff were prepared to devote all their energies to the task. The Secretary was willing to be available for discussions with Ambassador Dubinin, and to interact as necessary with U.S. negotiators in Geneva. It was important that the summit be a success. The Secretary wanted the meeting to give to the U.S. and Soviet people, and to the world, a feeling that positive developments were taking place in the relationship.

SHEVARDNADZE said that this would be well.

THE SECRETARY noted that there were various ways that the ministers could organize their discussion. They could focus on INF and strategic arms; or they could take up questions relating to the dates and program for a summit. The Secretary noted that he also had some points to make on human rights.

SHEVARDNADZE suggested that the discussion initially focus on summit preparations. Once there was agreement on a concept for Gorbachev’s visit, it would be possible to work out an agenda. The leaders could not be constrained in what they would discuss, but it would be important for them to have some plan of action, some sense as to how they might best organize their own work. Shevardnadze was prepared to discuss INF and strategic arms questions in detail, but that conversation might best await settling of summit-related questions.

THE SECRETARY agreed to this approach, and, while other participants were being summoned, made a few points on human rights. He noted that Shevardnadze had said in Moscow that exit permission had been granted to 12,000–13,000 Soviet Jews. The Secretary expressed the hope that this meant that numbers actually leaving would rise sharply in the near future. That would be a highly positive sign. The Secretary noted that we remained concerned about the grounds being used to deny applications to emigrate, and particularly about the use of security as grounds for denial.

Briefly running through the categories covered by the U.S. representation lists, the Secretary urged that remaining cases on the list be resolved by the time of the Washington summit. The Secretary particularly called attention to four names which had been raised in the past at the highest level (Abe Stolar, Naum Meiman, Leyla Gordiyevskaya, and Aleksander Lerner), and noted the particularly poignant case of Anatoliy Michelson, who had been separated from his spouse for thirty-one years. The Secretary noted that, in the Gordiyevskaya case, Gordiyevskaya had recently agreed to the confrontation meeting requested by the Soviet Union. We therefore felt it appropriate that his wife should be allowed to visit him, as Mrs. Howard had been allowed to be with her husband in the Soviet Union.

SHEVARDNADZE said he would comment in a moment on Soviet views of how to deal with such problems in advance of a summit.

[At this point Ridgway, Matlock, Bessmertnykh and Stepanov joined the group, and there were brief, separate discussions by both delegations of the text of a possible joint statement which had been worked out earlier in the morning by Ridgway and Bessmertnykh.]

The SECRETARY brought the meeting back to order by noting that the President would be leaving Washington for his mother-in-law’s funeral early that afternoon. He would nonetheless be able to meet with Shevardnadze for about an hour. The Secretary suggested that the ministers should wrap up their own meeting by noon to enable the Secretary to brief the President, and to allow the Foreign Minister to prepare for the White House session.

SHEVARDNADZE said he was aware of the scheduling considerations and appreciated the President’s finding time to meet with him under the circumstances.

As to the ministers’ own meeting, Shevardnadze noted that it seemed they had just said goodbye in Moscow. In a sense, the current exchange could be seen as a conclusion of the Moscow meetings. The sequence was perhaps unusual, but there was a logic to it. The issues under discussion in Moscow were important, and the two sides had a responsibility to their people and the world to deal with them correctly. Thus, Shevardnadze had not been able to share the view of some who had spoken of the Moscow meetings as a disappointment, as a failure.

Rather, in Moscow it had been possible to make important strides in consolidating the work done at the Geneva and Reykjavik summits. Many obstacles to an INF agreement had been removed in Moscow. There had been a good working environment. Important proposals had been made in the area of strategic offensive arms and there had been an in-depth discussion of the full range of issues in U.S.-Soviet relations. So, as the General Secretary had written to the President, the Moscow talks had been meaningful and productive; they reflected a new stage in the relationship.

THE SECRETARY said he, too, had thought the Moscow meetings worthwhile. He had said so in his press conference,⁶ where, he noted, he had not used the word “disappointment.” That was a word the press had used. For his part, the Secretary was glad that Shevardnadze was in Washington. The Foreign Minister had mentioned that he wanted to open with a discussion of issues related to a summit. The Secretary invited him to share his views.

SHEVARDNADZE stated that, even before the Washington summit, the two sides needed to consider long-term plans for future high-level contacts. If the two ministers’ talks were successful, there would be a Washington summit. But what of the next stage? Shevardnadze pointed out that at their meeting in Geneva, the President and General Secretary had envisioned a return visit by the President to the Soviet Union. The question was when. During the spring? Later?

As to the objectives of future summit meetings, Shevardnadze proposed to start with the President’s return visit. What should the goal of a Moscow summit be? It seemed to Shevardnadze that the Secretary would agree that the result of a Moscow summit should be the signing of a treaty on strategic offensive arms and the complex of questions related to a treaty. There was, Shevardnadze observed, little time—a matter of months—to accomplish the “gigantic” amount of work necessary to achieve that objective. But given the importance that both leaders attached to this key problem, Shevardnadze felt that accelerated efforts by the ministers, by experts and scientists in both countries, could be successful. The key, he felt, was to lay a sound foundation at the Washington summit.

What did Moscow envision for a Washington summit? No doubt an INF agreement would be ready for signing. In the car from Andrews AFB the night before, Shevardnadze recalled, Deputy Secretary Whitehead had said some of the signals from Geneva since the Moscow meeting had not been encouraging. Shevardnadze had had different reports as late as that morning: he had the impression that what had been agreed to in Moscow was being put into effect; progress was being made in resolving remaining issues. Perhaps the U.S. delegates had not had a chance to study what their Soviet counterparts were saying, but Shevardnadze was certain that ultimately it would prove possible to resolve outstanding differences. So the first item on the Washington summit agenda would be the signing of an INF agreement. Shevardnadze urged that delegations be given instructions to enable them to complete work in two to three weeks; more time was not available.

The next item the leaders ought to address in Washington was strategic offensive arms. Shevardnadze felt that the proposals the General Secretary had made in Moscow should largely take care of the major obstacles to a START agreement. The Soviet side had made important steps toward the U.S. position in these proposals; they should largely have solved the problem of sub-limits. Shevardnadze did not want to get into details, but he assumed that the implications of the Soviet proposal’s provision for diverse options in the distribution of warheads on the various elements of the triad would not be lost on the U.S. There were, he emphasized, solid foundations for exploring mutually acceptable solutions.

Next on the Washington summit agenda as seen from Moscow was the question of strengthening strategic stability in the context of 50% reductions in strategic offensive weapons. Reductions of such a magnitude, together with the elimination of INF missiles and projected agreements on tactical missiles and conventional weapons would create a totally new environment. So it was logical to address the question of strategic stability between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., because so much depended on this factor. Reductions should take place in a manner which strengthened stability.

What, Shevardnadze asked, were current foundations of strategic stability? A key mechanism was the ABM Treaty. This was a fundamental point. In making that point, the Soviet side was not asking the U.S. to agree to anything new or extraordinary. Shevardnadze wanted to emphasize this. Rather, it wished to reinforce a notion the President had expressed in one of his letters to the General Secretary that “negotiators should strengthen the role the Treaty can play in preserving stability as we move toward a world without nuclear weapons.” Shevardnadze recalled that the Secretary had spoken in the same vein during their September meeting in Washington⁷ in stating that “in the context of an accord on 50% reductions in strategic offensive arms, a period would emerge in which certain rights, including the right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, would have to be given up, and the obligations under that Treaty strictly observed.”

Shevardnadze pointed out that the Soviet side had made a number of suggestions as to how the ABM Treaty should operate in the context of the environment he had described. What were the key elements of those suggestions? Nothing, he stressed, that was new.

—First, obligations with respect to non-withdrawal would go into effect simultaneously with the entry into force of provisions for 50% reductions in strategic offensive arms.

Shevardnadze noted that the two sides differed on how long this period should be, but felt that it would be possible to resolve this question.

—Second, after the 50% reductions had been completed, the two sides would during a 2–3 year period prior to the termination of the non-withdrawal period negotiate future obligations in the ABM area.

Shevardnadze said he wanted to address the question of violations of any future agreement. The issue was as serious for the Soviet side as for the American. There should be complete confidence that treaty provisions were being observed. The Standing Consultative Committee in Geneva (SCC) was a proven mechanism for ensuring such confidence, but it needed to be reinvigorated. To this end, it should be given the power to inspect sites of suspected violations. Shevardnadze noted that if a violation were not corrected by the offending party, the other side would of course be free of any obligations with respect to reducing strategic offensive arms. This would provide an additional, effective guarantee against violations.

Shevardnadze said he also wanted to focus on a point which had come up in Moscow, but which the ministers had not been able to discuss at length—the Soviet proposal for negotiated parameters, below which there would be no restrictions on activities by either side. That proposal remained in effect. Shevardnadze had not been able to determine why there was confusion on this point in Geneva, but he wanted to make clear that below agreed thresholds all activities—including testing—would be permitted. Moreover, he emphasized, any thresholds would be the result of mutual agreement. So, the Foreign Minister felt that this was an important attempt to accommodate U.S. concerns in this sensitive area.

As to the duration of the non-withdrawal period, Shevardnadze recalled that the ABM Treaty was a document of unlimited duration; thus, there was a presumption that, at the end of any non-withdrawal period, it would remain in force. President Reagan and the General Secretary had of course reached agreement in Reykjavik on the duration of the non-withdrawal period itself. Shevardnadze mused that on the plane from Prague he had given some thought to the discussion in Reykjavik. The main issue there had not been the duration of the withdrawal period, but the question of laboratory research. That issue had subsequently been removed from the agenda. The Soviet position now was that not only laboratory work, but production and test range activities were permissible. And certain activities in space would also be permitted by Moscow’s “parameters” proposal. So the concept of a non-withdrawal period had been agreed in Reykjavik; any agreement on 50% reductions in strategic arms would have to be on the basis of the Reykjavik understanding.

Shevardnadze reminded the Secretary in that context of the need to remove certain artificial barriers to a START agreement erected by the U.S. Geneva delegation since Reykjavik. The Soviet side was ready to discuss legitimate new concerns, but the sooner that it was possible to eliminate elements that had been introduced essentially for bargaining purposes, the better. There was no time for such games.

Shevardnadze recalled that the Secretary had emphasized in Moscow the importance of focusing on verification as part of intensified efforts to achieve a START agreement. He agreed with the Secretary’s suggestion that preparations should be made to enable leaders to address the problem in Washington. The two sides’ experience in INF had demonstrated the difficulty of the problems involved; they would be more difficult yet with respect to strategic arms. Perhaps, Shevardnadze suggested, a special group—including scientists and relevant specialists—could be set up to focus on verification problems in advance of the summit.

Shevardnadze felt that the elimination of chemical weapons should also be addressed at a Washington summit. He noted that the two sides had discussed the possibility of a joint statement to be issued by leaders. Perhaps this could be considered further.

On nuclear testing, Shevardnadze felt that the recent agreement to initiate full-scale negotiations made extensive discussion of this issue in Washington unnecessary.

Shevardnadze did feel that there would be a need to discuss regional conflicts and means of reducing tensions. It would be up to experts to make such an exchange productive. The leaders themselves should be able to reach some conclusions on such areas as the Middle East and the Iran-Iraq war, not just exchange views. So there was a need for thorough preparations.

Humanitarian questions should also be discussed, Shevardnadze believed. Exchanges on such issues had become a standard element of high-level meetings, including at the summit level. Responding to the Secretary’s earlier remarks on human rights, Shevardnadze suggested that deputy ministers be tasked with meeting on the subject in advance of a summit. They might: review bilateral discussions to date; look at what could be done to take care of cases which still needed solutions; and develop a work program for the future. This was an issue, Shevardnadze concluded, which would not go away.

Returning to his point of departure, Shevardnadze repeated the Soviet view that a Washington summit should lay the groundwork for the signing of a treaty on strategic arms at a Moscow summit. If that premise was correct, the logical next question was: how should a Washington summit be concluded? How should it be “crowned.” The General Secretary had spoken in Moscow of an agreement on “key provisions.” If the U.S. was uncomfortable with that phrase, perhaps the expression, “key elements,” which the President had used on a number of occasions, was more acceptable. Shevardnadze recalled that the Secretary had referred in Moscow to “instructions for delegations.” In Reykjavik, there had been a discussion of “directives to ministers.” The important thing was not the format, but whether or not the results of the Washington summit gave negotiators in Geneva what they needed to work. The leaders needed to define the tasks on which negotiators should focus.

Shevardnadze called the Secretary’s attention to the Gorbachev letter’s recommendation that some mechanism be established to ensure against any slow-down in the Geneva negotiations in advance of a Washington summit.⁸ The key element was the involvement of the ministers themselves, communicating through their respective ambassadors, since they (the ministers) would be able to ensure coordination of the many agencies involved on both sides in the conduct of the negotiations. The ministers’ task would be to keep abreast of developments in Geneva, to provide their leaders with periodic reports, and to get the necessary decisions at the highest level.

Shevardnadze said that under such circumstances he saw no need for any new channels. The necessary channels were in place and well tested. Shevardnadze was glad that Carlucci had now joined the process. Shevardnadze did not know if an additional meeting would be necessary at their level before a Washington summit, but he certainly foresaw the need for one or more meetings thereafter to prepare for Moscow.

Shevardnadze noted with satisfaction that both sides had apparently felt it would be appropriate to conclude the present visit with the release of a joint statement of some sort. If it were possible to agree on language, such a statement could be the vehicle for announcing the General Secretary’s visit to Washington.

In that context, Shevardnadze added, he would like to comment a bit on scheduling considerations. Given the process underway in the Soviet Union, the demands on Gorbachev’s time were enormous. It would, in fact, be impossible for him to be outside the country for more than two or three days. This would make it necessary for him to limit himself to meetings and such protocolary events as could be held in Washington itself. Of course, the focus of the visit would be meetings with the President—probably several rounds. The General Secretary would also be prepared to meet with members of Congress. Two to three days would be ample time for such a program.

Shevardnadze hastened to add that the limits on Gorbachev’s time in the U.S. did not mean that the Soviet side would expect the President’s return visit to be similarly limited. Nor did it exclude the possibility that the General Secretary would be prepared to travel outside Washington on future visits. But on this occasion, what was required was a businesslike series of meetings between him and the President, and with other American political leaders.

Shevardnadze said in concluding his remarks that he had tried to address the main considerations to be taken into account in planning for a Washington summit. It might be possible to get into a more detailed discussion of specific issues of substance later in the day. But he wanted to emphasize that the important thing for the moment was to remove any obstacles which might get in the way of a visit. And here the key point was whether it would be possible to find mutually acceptable language to record the two sides’ views on the ABM Treaty.

Shevardnadze stressed that there was no need in such an effort to refer to the SDI program. The U.S. program existed. The U.S. believed in SDI; the Soviets did not, and had said they would respond if it became a reality. There was no need for further discussion of the issue. What did need to be addressed was the status of an existing treaty to which both countries were a party. There was no reason to amend the Treaty. But there appeared to be agreement that it should be preserved, even if only for a certain period of time. This was the important thing. Moscow had no interest in getting into a discussion of the SDI program.

Shevardnadze informed the Secretary that the General Secretary had been very pleased with the discussion he had had with the Secretary and Carlucci in Moscow. The task now was to complete the business at hand, without a lot of noise, but with respect for the interests of both sides. Shevardnadze said that he had outlined to his Warsaw Pact colleagues in Prague the day before the approach he had taken with the Secretary. He had received their mandate, with which he felt even America’s NATO allies could agree.

Noting that Shevardnadze had made a very full presentation, THE SECRETARY said he would like to comment. He cautioned that, in view of the breadth of the Foreign Minister’s remarks, he might not address each point. The Minister should not read anything into such an omission.

As to the “pacing” of the summit process, the Secretary said that we would also like to see events unfold satisfactorily. An INF agreement was in sight. We were anxious for the kind of progress toward a START treaty which would allow a Moscow summit to take place sometime before autumn of 1988. Two such events, together with the kind of progress Shevardnadze had described in other areas, would represent an important advance in the relationship.

In more specific terms, the Secretary continued, there was agreement that the INF Treaty should be completed promptly. If the two ministers could not make this happen, they should resign. Early agreement was possible. But the reports the Secretary was receiving from Geneva made him uneasy. The negotiators would have to be pushed. The Secretary was prepared to get into the various outstanding issues with Shevardnadze, but it was not for the ministers to negotiate every detail. The agreement could and should be completed in two to three weeks. But so far there had not been a lot of progress.

On strategic arms, the Secretary hoped it would be possible for the ministers to get into a more detailed discussion. The Secretary had the sense that a START agreement was doable, but he wanted to follow up on the General Secretary’s statements in Moscow and his letter to confirm his understanding of the Soviet position.

The Secretary expressed the view that it was always important to keep an eye on issues affecting strategic stability. As the number of nuclear missiles was reduced, the issue became particularly important. Shevardnadze had outlined some ideas for dealing with the problem. We could agree with some of them; others were less convincing. That was why we had suggested some time before that a discussion of the offense-defense relationship would be useful—the issue was really one of strategic stability.

For its part, the U.S. believed that a pattern of more defense and less offense contributed to stability. We understood that the Soviets disagreed. This showed the need for grappling with the problem on the conceptual and philosophical level, as well as on the level of details in the negotiations themselves. The Secretary thus welcomed the fact that Shevardnadze’s presentation had approached the problem from a somewhat more philosophical tack than in the past. Perhaps the two sides were moving toward some common viewpoints as a result of that process.

Noting that he wanted to come back to the questions of strategic arms and strategic stability, the Secretary said he would first move through the agenda that Shevardnadze had outlined.

The Secretary acknowledged that there had been some good exchanges on chemical weapons. It remained to be seen if the two sides would be in a position to agree on a joint statement by the time of a summit. Progress had certainly been made, but there were still some important differences to deal with.

On nuclear testing, the Secretary agreed that leaders would not need to address the issue themselves. But the Secretary said he thought the negotiations could be referred to in any concluding statement, as could joint work in non-proliferation, where there had continued to be good discussions. Perhaps experts could work on possible formulations in these areas.

The Secretary also agreed that there should be solid preparations for the leaders’ discussion of regional issues. Shevardnadze had mentioned Iran-Iraq and the Middle East. The Secretary thought Afghanistan should also be mentioned, and noted that the two ministers had had an interesting talk in Moscow on Southern Africa.

As for the Persian Gulf, the Secretary said that the key question of how to respond to the situation there in the wake of the UN Secretary General’s forthcoming report would in all likelihood have been worked through by the time of the summit. But the subject was an active one, and one on which the two sides had successfully cooperated to a degree.

The Secretary welcomed the Soviet side’s apparently growing readiness to discuss human rights matters in a businesslike and constructive fashion. He asked whether, in putting forward his proposal for three-pronged discussions at the deputy foreign minister level, Shevardnadze had in mind Deputy Secretary Whitehead. Or perhaps the Foreign Minister was thinking in terms of duplicating working group arrangements at a lower level. Noting that he was willing to go in either direction, the Secretary said that he would welcome it if Shevardnadze really meant that senior Deputies should be involved. SHEVARDNADZE said that was exactly what he meant.

THE SECRETARY said that it would be acceptable from the U.S. standpoint to describe what negotiators should do subsequently as “instructions.” Like Shevardnadze, he was less concerned with the words themselves than with the objective—to get a treaty.

As for channels, the Secretary agreed that those official channels already in place were fine. There was no need for new ones. Both sides were blessed with good ambassadors, and the two ministers should take a personal interest in the course of the Geneva negotiations to intensify the process there. The Secretary was ready to do his part.

Having quickly run through the issues Shevardnadze had raised, the Secretary turned to procedural arrangements for the Washington summit.

As to the length of Gorbachev’s stay, the Secretary observed that a longer visit would obviously be preferable, but if time were a constraint it was for the General Secretary to decide. The Secretary did believe that adequate time should be budgeted for at least two to three good discussions between the leaders. Time would also be needed for the events which would enable the U.S. to show Gorbachev the respect that was due him and to expose him to persons of significance in our system. It would be particularly important for him to meet with members of Congress. A full three days would be necessary for such a visit, and they would have to be carefully planned at that to take full advantage of the time available.

Noting that the General Secretary’s letter had referred to a December visit, the Secretary said that this was generally agreeable to the President. If the visit were to last three days, perhaps the best time would be the first Tuesday through Thursday of December.⁹ This was something which could be discussed at greater length with the President.

SHEVARDNADZE said he could say frankly that the best time for the General Secretary was December 7, 8 and 9. The second week in December would be the best.

THE SECRETARY said that he and Carlucci would have to check on that (Carlucci left the room to do so).

Returning to the issues of strategic arms and strategic stability, the Secretary said he wished to ask Shevardnadze a question. The Soviet side was aware of the U.S. view that a 4,800 ballistic missile warhead sublimit was essential. In this context, certain elements of the General Secretary’s Moscow strategic arms reduction proposal and of his letter had caught our attention.

—First, we had noted that the sum of the lower ranges of the ICBM and SLBM sublimits in the Moscow proposals was 4,800.

—Second, we had noted that in his letter the General Secretary had spoken of a willingness to accommodate U.S. positions, and of the “inherent flexibility” of his new proposals with respect to the possibility of making adjustments between different elements of the triad within aggregate warhead limits.

The Secretary’s question, then, was this: should the U.S. take this to mean that, in the context of an agreement on other elements of a START treaty, the Soviet side would be willing to agree to a 4,800 warhead limit?

SHEVARDNADZE said he would answer by repeating the figures which Gorbachev had given the Secretary the week before. He felt that these provided the basis for working out various options without breaking up historically formed force structures.

THE SECRETARY agreed that neither side should try to recast the force structure of the other in the image of its own. That was why the U.S. was interested in maintaining an element of flexibility within aggregate levels.

SHEVARDNADZE proceeded to read the figures which had been proposed by Gorbachev in Moscow. Having done so, he noted that the Secretary had focused on an important point in Gorbachev’s letter with respect to the distribution of warheads among the various elements of the triad. Shevardnadze suggested that the formulation Gorbachev had used provided the flexibility necessary to have a concrete discussion on the correlation of warheads to delivery vehicles, taking into account the historical evolution and geopolitical determinants of force structures on both sides, and the need for each side to respect the other’s interests.

Shevardnadze proposed that experts work on the problem to enable the ministers to address it in more detail at a later date. He noted in passing that Gorbachev’s proposals had been debated in Moscow for months; the discussion had been very difficult. But the Soviet side had felt the need to try to meet U.S. concerns half-way. After receiving a whispered message from Bessmertnykh, Shevardnadze noted that Gorbachev’s proposal provided for “certain combinations . . . (which) produce a picture . . . close to the one that U.S. officials . . . have recently outlined . . .”. Shevardnadze also drew the Secretary’s attention to the sentence in Gorbachev’s letter which the Secretary had cited, and which referred to “inherent flexibility.”

THE SECRETARY said that that was an important sentence. It seemed to say that neither side should force the other side to accept its force structure model. It thus had a certain resonance for us. But if one took that sentence, along with the numbers Shevardnadze had read, it appeared that by adding the lower ends of the SLBM (1,800) and ICBM (3,000) sublimits, one could conclude that the Soviet side could accept a 4,800 sublimit on ballistic missile warheads. If that conclusion were correct, however, it followed, since the force structures of the two sides were different, that the mix between SLBM’s and ICBM’s would be different for each within that overall sublimit. The Secretary asked if these inferences were, in fact, correct.

SHEVARDNADZE did not respond directly. Instead, he reaffirmed that the Soviet proposal had brought the two sides significantly closer together both conceptually and as regarded numbers. He proposed that the specifics of the “correlationships” involved be worked by experts so that by the time of the Washington summit the leaders could be presented with options. At this point, Shevardnadze did not believe there were major differences in the two sides’ approaches.

THE SECRETARY said that the U.S. would like to see instructions emerge from Washington which included the following areas of agreement: a 6,000 warhead aggregate limit; a 1,600 launcher limit; the Reykjavik bomber counting rule; a 4,800 ballistic missile warhead sublimit; and a 1,540 limit on heavy missiles.

There were many other questions to be resolved in connection with such a framework. Each side had its proposals. Specifically, there was the question of mobile missiles. The Secretary welcomed the reference to that problem in the General Secretary’s letter. This was an area where negotiators needed to bear down, because it remained unclear how any agreement on mobiles could be verified. It would be good if experts could come forth with ideas by the time of the summit, so that this, too, could figure in the instructions to be issued there.

SHEVARDNADZE said that Gorbachev’s letter had limned the main elements of the Soviet approach. “Definitive numerical correlations,” should be refined by experts before the Washington summit so that they could be incorporated in instructions to ministers and negotiators. As for mobile missiles, this was a complicated question. At present, the development and deployment of such missiles was not banned. The U.S. would understand that the Soviet concern, given the composition of its deterrent and the capabilities of U.S. counterforce systems, was survivability.

Another, related Soviet concern was long range SLCM’s based on submarines and surface ships. Shevardnadze reaffirmed the Soviet view that agreement had been reached at Reykjavik that numerical limitations on SCLM’s would be developed. So there was plenty for experts to do, but the latest Soviet proposal had created a qualitatively different framework for their work. As long as each side was prepared to take into account the interests of the other, it would be possible to develop options with respect to the distribution of warheads on the various legs of the triad.

THE SECRETARY acknowledged that SLCM’s were a real problem. The verification difficulties were immense. We had made a proposal at Reykjavik and were willing to return to it.

As for mobile missiles, the Secretary agreed that mobile missiles were more survivable, and to that extent contributed to strategic stability. The U.S. was not opposed to them in principle; we simply did not know how to verify them. If verification were possible, there would be a lot to be said for mobiles. But the verification problem was baffling, and we were anxious to hear Soviet ideas for solving it.

The Secretary said the discussion on strategic arms had been a good one. He felt confident that, with good will, it would be possible to provide leaders with well-prepared options which would enable them to provide the instructions necessary to bring a START treaty within reach.

SHEVARDNADZE said he agreed fully. That was why the Soviet side had been talking in terms of a key provisions agreement, or whatever it might be called, at a Washington summit. Two or three options could be prepared for the leaders consideration, and they could decide how to instruct ministers and delegations.

THE SECRETARY said he had tried to describe quite explicitly where the U.S. felt the discussion should come out. He believed the U.S. approach fully respected the Soviet desire to preserve its traditional force structure. SHEVARDNADZE said that the key thing was that the two sides’ positions had drawn closer together.

BESSMERTNYKH said he wanted to emphasize the importance of the Soviet decision to accept sublimits for each of the three elements of the triad. In the past, they had tried to make one suit fit a tall and a short man; now a single piece of cloth could be tailored to the specifications of each. The figures and ranges given implied it would be possible to find combinations, within the ranges described in the Soviet position, which met the interests of both sides.

THE SECRETARY pointed out that there was no number between 1,800 and 2,000 which would meet U.S. SLBM needs. If there were to be agreement on a 4,800 ballistic missiles ceiling—and there had to be such agreement—there would have to be greater freedom to mix than the Soviet proposal appeared to allow for.

BESSMERTNYKH said that the 4,800 figure could be seen as the optimal U.S. figure; the Soviet side might have an alternative figure. SHEVARDNADZE repeated that there might be different figures, and expressed confidence that mutually acceptable solutions could be found.

THE SECRETARY agreed that the matter should be discussed further. The key point for the U.S., however, was the 4,800 sublimit; it was hard to envision that we could accept an agreement which did not contain such a provision. That was why the Secretary had been so intrigued by the language of the General Secretary’s letter.

Moving to the question of strategic stability, the Secretary asked to reveiw areas of agreement and differences.

The Secretary said that he could agree on the need for reinvigorating the SCC. Frank Carlucci had suggested one possibility in Moscow (an ad hoc senior level group akin to that provided for in the INF Treaty draft) which the Soviet side had seemed to find acceptable. Shevardnadze had nominated Bessmertnykh to look into the problem for the Soviet side; we were prepared as well.

On the ABM Treaty, both sides agreed on the concept of a non-withdrawal period. There was not yet agreement on the duration of such a period, but there was on the concept. The Secretary noted that the U.S. proposal for a seven-year period was couched in terms of the period ending in a given year—1994. Thus, the longer the two sides talked, the more important it was to keep that in mind.

As for the Soviet proposals on observance of the ABM Treaty, we had had some difficulty extracting them from the Soviet delegation in Geneva. The Secretary had heard what Shevardnadze and Gorbachev had said in Moscow, but when our delegation sought to firm up these statements in Geneva, they had seemed to disappear. This was frustrating.

Thus, the Secretary proposed to restate his understanding of the Soviet position. That position envisioned, first of all, a ten-year non-withdrawal period. During the course of that period, various things happened. Strategic arms were reduced over either a five to seven year period, depending upon the outcome of the START negotiations. But the reduction period would be completed before the end of the non-withdrawal period. At some point before the end of the non-withdrawal period, e.g. three years, discussion would be held on the implications for strategic stability of reduced strategic arms.

The Secretary stated that the U.S. was prepared to discuss such issues, both during and before the entry into effect of a non-withdrawal pledge. He noted that the two sides had already exchanged papers on strategic stability which had looked at the problem not only from the standpoint of fewer strategic arms, but of emerging research in defensive systems. We had welcomed this exchange and some of the suggestions made by the Soviet side in this regard.

Moving on to the question of what should occur at the conclusion of the non-withdrawal period, the Secretary asked Shevardnadze to confirm his understanding that the Soviet position was that the ABM Treaty would remain in force. This, of course, implied that the Treaty’s option to withdraw on six months’ notification would also become operative.

There was also the question of the kinds of activity which would be permitted during the non-withdrawal period. This was perhaps the toughest complex of questions. The Secretary understood the Soviet position to be that there was a level of activity—generally described in the U.S. as within the “narrow interpretation” outlined in the March, 1985 Department of Defense statement—which was permitted. As an alternative or supplement to this regime, the Soviet side had articulated a list of activities and a concept that, within certain thresholds, either side could undertake whatever it wished in space. Was this understanding correct? If so, it would be well to have it spelled out in Geneva.

SHEVARDNADZE said he would repeat the Soviet position. First, there would be a ten-year non-withdrawal period. Two to three years before the expiration of that period, negotiations would begin on the ABM Treaty, i.e., on what would happen after the expiration of the ten-year non-withdrawal period. This would more or less coincide with the termination of the 50% reduction period (the duration of which, Shevardnadze acknowledged, was not yet agreed). As for the Soviet “parameters” proposal, any activity below the agreed parameters (Shevardnadze emphasized that those that the Soviets had proposed were not yet agreed) would be permitted. It was up to the U.S. to debate whether such activities were or were not consistent with one or another interpretation of the ABM Treaty. As to the duration of the non-withdrawal period, the Soviet side felt that the steps it had taken to accommodate U.S. interests should allow the U.S. to agree to ten years.

As for the confusion in Geneva, Shevardnadze could not explain it. He had “interrogated” his negotiators. They had said they had faithfully explained the Soviet position to their American counterparts, who appeared to have misunderstood them. But perhaps there was another problem.

THE SECRETARY asked if he was correct in his understanding that, at the end of the non-withdrawal period, and whatever the status of negotiations on a post-non-withdrawal regime, the right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty would become operative once again. SHEVARDNADZE said, “Without question.” BESSMERTNYKH added, “If the two sides hadn’t agreed otherwise.”

Returning to the question of dates for a Washington summit, THE SECRETARY said Carlucci had determined that December 7, 8 and 9 were convenient for the President, so those dates could be considered agreed.

The Secretary noted that it might be good to turn to the draft joint statement (which Ridgway, Carlucci and Bessmertnykh had worked on periodically throughout the session). The Secretary said that the U.S. could not accept a reference in the statement to something which had not yet been agreed—i.e., a ten-year non-withdrawal period. The concept of a non-withdrawal period was not a problem, but the ten year figure was not agreed. A joint statement was not the vehicle for negotiating the point.

SHEVARDNADZE asked what the Secretary suggested. THE SECRETARY repeated that the issue was being negotiated in Geneva. The concept of a given period was agreed; what was not agreed was the length of the period or what should take place therein. The joint statement should limit itself to describing what had been agreed upon. Ten years was not agreed. This would not, of course, prevent either side from expressing its view of how long the period should be in subsequent discussion with the press.

SHEVARDNADZE said he could see the Secretary had a bias against round figures. THE SECRETARY pointed out that seven was considered a lucky number in the U.S.

SHEVARDNADZE said he would have to consult with Moscow on the point. The rest of the statement was acceptable. As to the timing of the visit, Shevardnadze suggested that the statement should indicate only that Gorbachev would come to the U.S. during the second week in December. The General Secretary’s arrival plans were not yet fixed; it would be best not to use precise dates.

THE SECRETARY cautioned that the President’s schedule became complicated later that week, and briefly described the normal protocol for such important visits. SHEVARDNADZE said it would be best to think in terms of a December 7 arrival for the General Secretary; he doubted he would arrive on a Sunday. Perhaps the statement could refer to the “first half of the second week of December.” THE SECRETARY said that this was agreeable as long as Shevardnadze understood that the President’s schedule would make it difficult for the visit to extend past Wednesday. SHEVARDNADZE indicated this was understood. THE SECRETARY suggested that the statement say the visit would take place December 7, 8 and 9 to avoid speculation. SHEVARDNADZE said it would be better to say “beginning December 7,” but added that he would have to clear that with Moscow.

THE SECRETARY suggested that the meeting adjourn to allow Shevardnadze to make his phone call. He added that, with respect to the statement’s language on the ABM Treaty, he could report to Moscow that there was agreement on the concept of a non-withdrawal period, but that the U.S. could not accept a reference to ten years. SHEVARDNADZE said he understood this, but had to get instructions.

Changing the subject, THE SECRETARY recalled that during Shevardnadze’s September visit, the Foreign Minister had raised the case of a Soviet defector, Bogatiy, whose wife had expressed an interest in returning to the Soviet Union. We had subsequently sought to facilitate a meeting between Bogatiy and the Soviet Embassy, but Bogatiy had refused. The Secretary had just been informed that Bogatiy was now ready to meet with Shevardnadze, by which the Secretary assumed he meant with a member of the Foreign Minister’s staff. The Department was prepared to help organize a meeting. SHEVARDNADZE thanked the Secretary for the information. BESSMERTNYKH said that the meeting should include Mrs. Bogatiy as well.

The meeting concluded after a brief discussion of the timing and modalities for the release of the joint statement (copy of final version attached).¹⁰

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow/Washington Oct. 1987. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Parris. The meeting took place in Shultz’s outer office at the Department of State. All brackets are in the original.
2. See Document 46.
3. See Document 88.
4. See footnote 3, Document 87.
5. See Document 84.
6. Reference is to Shultz’s October 23 Moscow press conference. (Department of State Bulletin, December 1987, pp. 22–25)
7. See Document 68.
8. See Document 88.
9. December 8–10.
10. Not found attached; see Department of State Bulletin, December 1987, p. 70.