88. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev to President Reagan1
I am sure that you have already been informed about the negotiations that our foreign ministers had in Moscow and about my rather [Page 490] lengthy talk with Secretary of State George Shultz and your Assistant for National Security Frank Carlucci.2
Let me say frankly that all of us here are of the same view—those discussions were businesslike, constructive and, what is most important, productive. I think you would agree that the Washington and Moscow stages in the dialogue evolving between us have moved us substantially closer to the concluding phase in the preparation of the Treaty on the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles. We are gratified by the fact that together with your emissaries we were able to surmount what seemed to be the major obstacles and to find compromise language and understandings, which, given continued political will on both sides, enable our delegations in Geneva to finalize the treaty text within the next two or three weeks.
You must have noted that on the last day of the talks the Soviet side made an additional effort on, among others, the question of inspections and verification. We hope that the U.S. side will respond with appropriate reciprocal efforts.
As I see it, the Moscow talks give fresh evidence that our relations are in the process of dynamization, for which the meetings at Geneva and Reykjavik provided the point of departure. I am referring not only to the increasing pace of contacts between our countries but also to the fact that we have really come to grips with the question that both of us believe is the key to ending the nuclear arms race and stabilizing Soviet-US relations. The task of a deep, 50 per cent cut in the strategic offensive arms took center stage in our discussions in Moscow.
And this was by no mere chance, since both you and I are now equally attuned to putting the negotiations on strategic offensive arms onto a track of practical solutions. As I have already written to you, it is necessary to speed up the rhythm of the negotiations in order to make it possible within the next few months to reach full-scale agreements in that area.
With this in mind, on the eve of the visit of the U.S. Secretary of State we in the Soviet leadership once again carefully considered the possibility of imparting additional impulses to the strategic offensive arms negotiations. I set forth in detail to Mr. Shultz the concrete conclusions that we had reached.
Specifically, we took into account that the US side, as it had repeatedly stated, including statements at a political level, attached particular importance to setting specific limits for the distribution of warheads between the various legs of the strategic triad. We carefully assessed the various options of the evolution of the situation, as well as the [Page 491] prevailing trends of a technological and military-strategic nature, and concluded that we could accommodate your position. It is easy to see that certain combinations of the numerical parameters that we proposed produce a picture that is close to the one that US officials at various levels have recently been outlining to us.
Let me add that the new formula that we have proposed has inherent flexibility in it, namely, each side would be able to compensate for a lack in the number of delivery vehicles of one kind by increasing the number of delivery vehicles of another kind within the aggregate limit.
I hope that our proposals will be considered with due attention by your experts and that both sides will now have a broader base for reaching a mutually acceptable agreement.
Of course, work on an agreement reducing strategic offensive arms should be accompanied by efforts to assure continued compliance with the ABM Treaty. Here again, we want nothing more than what was said in Washington, namely, for ten years not to use our right to withdraw from the Treaty.
I recall the words that particularly struck me in one of your letters to me, that our negotiators have to “concentrate on measures which prevent the erosion of the ABM Treaty and strengthen the role that treaty can play in preserving stability as we move toward a world without nuclear weapons”. In the same letter you added: “Proceeding in this fashion might avoid a fruitless debate on generalities and open the way to concrete, practical solutions which meet the concerns of both sides”.
In that regard we were also encouraged by the exchange of views in Washington last September, in which your side noted as a point of agreement that in the context of an accord on a 50 per cent reduction in strategic offensive arms a period would emerge in which certain rights, including the right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, would have to be given up, and the obligations under that Treaty strictly observed.
We have therefore a common basis in that matter too. What remains is, in effect, to agree on the period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Is that an unreachable goal? So this is what the matter comes down to right now. It is here that we have to look for a solution. We are ready to do so.
Let me repeat: what is involved here is observance of the ABM Treaty. As to how we view this, we have explained this to you, notably quite recently in Washington.
In order to keep the discussion of those issues within such reasonable bounds and not to allow it to get bogged down in over-complicated [Page 492] technicalities, or, conversely, in generalized concepts, I propose that along with the Geneva negotiations we might use a channel for constantly checking the course of the negotiations and expressing more freely both our concerns and proposed options. Such a channel could be set up through contacts, specially dedicated to this subject, between the Soviet Foreign Minister and the US Ambassador in Moscow and the US Secretary of State and the Soviet Ambassador in Washington. Of course, some other option could also be considered.
In this regard it is important to act taking into account the fact that the time we have for working out a START Treaty is limited and that it would be desirable to complete it in the first half of the next year and to sign the treaty during your return visit to Moscow.
Of course, we have to clear the path toward such a treaty, removing from it both the natural difficulties, such as the questions of verification—and here I agree with the suggestion Secretary Shultz made, on your behalf, to focus even now on that area—and the complications artificially injected into the negotiations, such as the inclusion of our Backfire medium bomber among strategic arms, the demand for a total ban on mobile ICBMs and the unwillingness to resolve the issue of SLCM limitation.
I am convinced that reaching agreement on strategic offensive arms in the context of compliance with the ABM Treaty is a realistic possibility. In addition, the experience gained in the negotiations on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles can to a substantial degree be useful for us in this area too.
We were, after all, able to agree on starting fullscale negotiations on nuclear testing, although just a few months before this had seemed something beyond our reach.
I believe it is necessary to exert a joint, persistent effort to resolve the problem of banning chemical weapons (although let me say honestly that I am profoundly disappointed by your position on binary weapons).3 The same applies to conventional arms reductions, in which not only our two countries but also our allies and other European countries are interested.
As early as last April, in my conversation with Mr. Shultz I set forth my concept of our next meeting with you. I continue to be of the view that in addition to signing the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, we should also seriously discuss the START–ABM Treaty problem. I want our ministers and our Geneva delegations not [Page 493] to stand on the sidelines in this matter, so that they could do everything to facilitate to the utmost the work you and I are to do.
If we are to crown your visit to the USSR with a strategic arms treaty, we cannot avoid the need to reach at least an agreement in principle on that matter at our next meeting. The form in which such an agreement would be couched is after all not too important. It might be key elements of a future treaty, if we follow the suggestion you personally made in the spring of 1985.4 Or, perhaps, instructions or directives that we could give to the delegations to speed up work on such a document.
As I understand, in Moscow the Secretary of State favored working out instructions for the delegations. The important thing is to have a common understanding at the summit level of the goals that we seek to achieve and of the ways of reaching them within the short time available.
If we have a sufficient degree of agreement as to our intentions on that score, we shall be able to enrich our forthcoming discussions in Washington with a meaningful agenda.
I am conveying this letter to you through Eduard Shevardnadze, who is fully aware of my thinking concerning the further evolution of Soviet-U.S. relations and the specific plans for giving it effect. He has all necessary authority to reach agreement with you on all the main aspects of the forthcoming summit meeting, including its agenda, the duration of my stay in the United States and the precise dates of the visit. I would ask you to note, if this coincides with your possibilities, that based on my calendar of activities before the end of this year, the preferable time for my visit to Washington would be in the first ten days of December.
I hope that you will take advantage of our Minister’s visit to discuss and resolve the relevant issues, as they say, on the spot.
Sincerely,
- Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1987 Sept.-Oct. Memos for Pres. R. Reagan. Secret; Sensitive. The letter is an unofficial translation prepared by the Soviet Embassy. Shultz sent the letter to Reagan under a covering memorandum of October 30.↩
- See Document 84.↩
- On October 16, Reagan announced the modernization of 155mm binary chemical artillery projectiles. (Public Papers: Reagan, 1987, Book II, p. 1197)↩
- For documentation on START negotiations, see Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XI, START I, 1981–1991.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩