Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

223. Information Memorandum From the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, November 4, 1987

SUBJECT

• START/Defense and Space Discussion at JCS

Allen Holmes and I had lunch November 2 with General Herres, General Riscassi, and Admiral Howe. During the luncheon we discussed a number of issues, most of them regarding START and Defense and Space.

With respect to START, I described the discussion some of us had had on Friday² morning with Karpov. On the subject of the 4800 ceiling, Karpov had said the only flexibility in the Soviet proposal was within the limits they had suggested for each of the three legs. I had pointed out that their suggested limits demonstrated that they would have no difficulty living within our 4800 ceiling. Karpov had said that that was not so. Such a ceiling would force them to have 1200 long-range ALCMs and bomber weapons as counted by the agreed counting rule. They had no need for more than 800–900 and would wish neither to build up to 1200 or forego part of the 6000 limit.

I suggested at the luncheon that there might be a way around this difficulty. The most general approach to a solution would be to insist on only the ICBM limit of 3300 with sublimits within the 3300 for heavy missile RVs and for RVs on mobile missiles, if permitted. Such a solution would permit full freedom to mix amongst bomber weapons and SLBMs with respect to any excess over the number of permitted ICBM RVs either side desired to deploy. Herres took a negative view of such an option because it would permit the Soviets to have up to 2700 SLBMs if they gave up their heavy bomber force. He did, however, believe that a ceiling of 5000 on SLBM plus ICBM RVs would be acceptable to the Chiefs. Riscassi agreed.

We also discussed the question of the list and thresholds. Riscassi confirmed that he had undertaken a study of this subject within the Joint Staff. Herres was doubtful as to the wisdom of getting into this subject. He repeated his position that he would favor a 10-year commitment not to withdraw from the Treaty without any clarification of the Treaty’s limits on testing provided one could thereby buy the START reductions. I asked whether it would not be better if we could find limits on testing in space with which we could live. He thought this problem could be handled by defining what one meant by deployment. He suggested three criteria governing deployment in space. One was the number of test objects one could have in orbit simultaneously. The second was the angle of the orbital plane with reference to a plane running through the equator. Any angle below 35 degrees would make it impossible for the orbiting object to pass over the USSR. However, the USSR was so far north that such a plane could not be directly entered from a launching base within the USSR. We agreed, however, that with some expenditure of fuel, the Soviets could place satellites within the prescribed orbit. Herres and I also agreed, however, that having a test vehicle orbit over one’s country was not really a serious problem if the number of such devices was limited, say, to no more than six. The third criterion he mentioned was the length of time any such device could be left in orbit.

My final impression was that Herres, Riscassi and Howe were interested in a serious exploration of the list and threshold idea as being potentially better for the SDI research program than leaving the determination of what tests are to be funded up to the Congress.

Subsequent to this meeting, I have given some more thought to how we might move forward on START sublimits. I believe we should pick up on Herres’ idea of raising our 4800 sublimit to 5000. This approach has the advantage of partially accommodating the Soviet concern while keeping the basic structure of our position intact and using the original number proposed by the President in 1982. It would be supported by JCS and Ron Lehman. A paper addressing next steps in START in more detail is attached.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State³

Washington, November 4, 1987

NEXT STEPS ON START

During the October 30 Ministerial in Washington, Karpov indicated that we would be mistaken to infer from Gorbachev’s recent START sublimits proposal that the Soviet Union could live within our proposed ballistic missile warhead sublimit of 4800. He maintained that the Soviets have no need for more than 800–900 bomber weapons and would not agree to a sublimit that would force them to deploy 1200, as the 4800 limit would do.

Shevardnadze did not put the Soviet position forward as clearly and forcefully as Karpov. But if one assumes for analysis purposes that Karpov correctly reports the viewpoint of Marshal Akhromeyev and the military and that the General Secretary is unwilling to overrule them, is there any way around the problem which could be satisfactory to the US?

There are two considerations that bear on this matter. First, we can assume that 200 additional SLBM RVs are not that much more threatening than 200 additional long-range cruise missiles. Second, it is important to us in a treaty of indefinite duration to have maximum flexibility to adjust to unforeseeable developments in technology and in Congressional support for the various legs of the triad. Given these considerations, a solution along the following lines might be acceptable as a final outcome. The tactics as how best to arrive at this, or a better, outcome should be the subject of a different analysis.

The central limitation would continue to be a ceiling of 6000 on warheads. Within this ceiling, the ballistic missile warhead sublimit would be set at 5000. This adjustment would accommodate the Soviet-desired deployment somewhat; they would have to deploy 1000 bomber weapons. It would also increase our flexibility; we could deploy additional SLBM RVs if we so desired. It would continue to assure that the reductions contribute to greater stability; in fact, 5000 ballistic missile warheads is the limit the President originally proposed in 1982. And it would maintain our principle of treating ballistic missiles differentially because of their destabilizing characteristics.

We would retain the ICBM sublimit of 3300 warheads; Gorbachev’s proposal clearly indicates the Soviets could live with that number. And we would propose two additional sublimits. The first would limit RVs on heavy missiles to no more than 1540; the second would limit RVs on ground mobile ballistic missiles, if permitted, to no more than, say, 1000.

In making an effort to settle this issue, we should also push for resolution of the other major START issues—throwweight and SLCMs—as well as a primary irritant, Backfire.

With regard to throwweight, the Soviets have agreed that their throwweight would go down by 50% and not increase thereafter. Our differences are on the means of recording this commitment; we want it codified in the START Treaty and the Soviets want to incorporate it in a separate written statement. The US interest is in ensuring that the Soviet commitment is a clear and binding obligation. Beyond that, we should not place too much importance on the exact form it takes. Both we and the Soviets have considered the written Soviet Backfire statement of June 1979 to be binding. Given this precedent, we should be willing to consider the Soviet proposal if they will clearly acknowledge that the commitment incorporated in the statement is binding.

With regard to SLCMs, it appears the best we can do is the unilateral statements on planned deployments that we suggested at Reykjavik. We should be prepared to reiterate this proposal.

On Backfire, we should be willing to settle our concerns through an exchange of letters that would incorporate an agreed understanding that Backfire bombers would not be given refueling capability and that no more would be produced.

1. Source: Department of State, Department of State, S/S-I Files: Lot 92D52, Super-Sensitive Nov. 1–16 (1987). Secret; Sensitive.
2. See Document 221.
3. Secret.