Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

246. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 8, 1987, 4–5:35 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • Amb. Nitze
  • Amb. Kampelman
  • Amb. Lehman
  • Amb. Cooper
  • Amb. Rowny
  • AS Holmes
  • Dir. Adelman
  • Adm. Howe
  • Mr. Castillo
  • Dr. Graham
  • Amb. Hanmer
  • DAS Thomas
  • Col. Linhard
  • Dr. Timbie
  • Mr. Stafford (notetaker)
  • Mrs. Moon (notetaker)
  • Ms. Sutter (notetaker)

• U.S.S.R.

  • Marshall Akhromeev
  • Amb. Karpov
  • Amb. Obukhov (part-time)
  • Amb. Masterkov
  • Gen. Medvedev
  • Gen. Chervov
  • Mr. Mikhailov
  • Mr. Popov
  • Mr. Shebalin

SUBJECT

• Instructions to Delegations and Joint Statement

NITZE suggested that the meeting begin by setting out what the sides wanted to achieve in the Arms Control Working Group and how the sides would try to get there. It seemed in Geneva that the sides shared the same general sense of goals—to reach agreement where possible on outstanding issues in the START and Defense and Space areas. Nitze said that the U.S. envisioned recording new areas of agreement in the joint statement resulting from the Summit in order to permit the negotiators in Geneva to move forward. He stated that Bessmertnykh and Amb. Ridgway had exchanged drafts² on the arms control issues. He believed they achieved ad referendum agreement on the non-NST language.

NITZE continued that the NST portion of the joint statement would permit each side to instruct its negotiators to build on the work they had already done and complete treaties in each of the two areas. Subsequently, in response to that joint document and to further instructions that each side would give its own delegation, the negotiators would address remaining issues and attempt to produce agreed treaty texts. Nitze suggested that the group attempt to resolve differences in the context of specific language. He proposed to begin with START and handed over proposed language on START for the joint statement (the same language the President had given Gorbachev that day).³

AKHROMEEV said that he thought that a result of the first and second meetings between General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan, four matters could be discussed: reductions in strategic offensive arms; compliance with the ABM Treaty, including the interrelationship between the ABM Treaty and reductions of strategic offensive arms; the reduction of forces and arms in Europe; and the elimination of chemical weapons. Akhromeev asked whether Nitze agreed in principle to discussing these matters.

NITZE agreed to the proposed four issues, but also suggested that the sides break the discussions on conventional arms into a subgroup, which might even meet the following day. Nitze thought the same could be done with chemical weapons.

AKHROMEEV agreed. He suggested that positions of principle be outlined first in the main group; then subgroups could deal with the details. He suggested that if there were no objections, he would like to begin with setting forth the Soviet side’s view on the main issues, such as the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and the ABM Treaty. Akhromeev then provided the text of the proposal which had been earlier provided to the President in its English translation. He observed that the Soviet side had also prepared some other issues which the Soviet side believed relevant. Akhromeev said that if there was time, these issues could be discussed today or at the next meeting. Akhromeev suggested that the discussion begin with the START issues in the U.S. draft after the Soviet side had a chance to read the document.

After the U.S. document was read aloud in Russian, AKHROMEEV asked whether that was all (note: the Defense and Space portion was not read). Nitze confirmed that it was and Akhromeev said he had two questions pertaining to two matters which had been omitted. The first concerned the interrelationship between reductions in strategic offensive arms and compliance with the ABM Treaty as it had been signed in 1972. The second was that the U.S. document contained nothing on the reduction or limitation of long-range sea-launched cruise missiles. Akhromeev emphasized that he was speaking only of two omissions, rather than on the overall content of the U.S. proposal, but the two problems which he had outlined would have to be dealt with in some way.

NITZE responded that the U.S. side took a different approach to the relationship between the ABM Treaty and the START Treaty. The U.S. side thought the sides could agree on a separate Defense and Space Treaty. This would be dealt with in a package in one place.

AKHROMEEV said that the U.S. was aware of the Soviet side’s position, which was fundamental and was the basis on which reductions in strategic offensive arms could be made. He said that the START Treaty should be connected to compliance with the ABM Treaty as it had been signed in 1972, and further, that the START Treaty should explicitly state that compliance would continue for at least ten years. A Treaty on this issue could be worked out separately, but a provision should be included in the START Treaty. Akhromeev recalled that Shultz had said that if either side begins a nationwide deployment after that time, then the other side could be excused from its obligations under a START Treaty and could act as it saw fit. Further, the General Secretary had told the President that in such a case, the other side would have the right to deploy anti-satellite weapons. Akhromeev said that this issue could not be sidestepped in the Treaty on strategic offensive arms.

KAMPELMAN stated that the U.S. side was aware of the Soviet position and was making no effort to avoid confronting it. He thought that there was a logical way to proceed, however. Kampelman said that if the sides could not agree on strategic offensive arms issues then there would be no Treaty in which to reflect a relationship. Kampelman suggested that the sides address themselves to whether the sides could agree on strategic reductions and the questions that remain. He stressed that he understood that the final agreement would be contingent on ABM Treaty issues, but suggested that the sides address the specifics of numbers and how to count those numbers and not let theological questions get in the way. Kampelman emphasized that he was not trying to denegrate the position of the Soviet side, but was merely suggesting that the sides first see what they could do on START and resolve other questions later.

AKHROMEEV noted that the interrelationship between START and ABM Treaty compliance was acknowledged not only by the Soviets but also by the U.S. side. Working out ideal wording for the joint communique was another matter and might not be possible in three days. But the relationship was not just a matter of wording, but of principles; it should be recognized and recorded in the U.S. document at a minimum, though it would be good if the sides could achieve something more specific. He then said he would like to hear the U.S. side’s considerations on sea-launched cruise missiles.

NITZE said that SLCMs had been discussed at great length at Reykjavik where the U.S. said that it did not see how limitations could be verified. Further, the U.S. had not seen anything since then that would permit verification in any acceptable manner. This was why the U.S. side had not included them in the Geneva discussions. However, the U.S. side was interested in the Soviet side’s ideas. Nitze suggested that it might be more orderly if the group started with counting rules, sublimits, and verification—points that were already laid out and on which there was not much division between the sides. The U.S. side was not attempting to avoid other issues, but merely to do things in order.

AKHROMEEV said the group could pursue that objective, but that he could not fail to point out this fundamental difference between the positions of the two sides and that there could not be a joint document which did not address an issue that was so important to the Soviet side. The two questions which had been raised should be reflected in the document being worked out. The Soviet side had studied verification of SLCMs and he had some remarks on the issue before the group proceeded. Akhromeev stated that verification could first be carried out with NTM. The Soviet Union possessed radiotechnological means which could detect the presence of nuclear weapons on board ships, and could also determine whether they are in the bow or stern or other parts of the ship. These means could also determine approximate yield. Akhromeev stated that both sides have such systems, and the systems could detect whether or not cruise missiles were on ships. After their discovery, the sides would have the right to inspect sites where their presence had been discovered. Akhromeev observed that the U.S. document contained a program for verification of ICBMs and SLBMs, which could be inspected, to which the Soviet side did not object in principle. If ground-launched cruise missiles could be verified, then why not SLCMs? Akhromeev said that these were just some of the arguments. Akhromeev concluded that the systems to which he referred could be on helicopters, aircraft, or on ships, and asked whether the U.S. side wished to go down the issues enumerated in its draft.

GRAHAM said that with respect to radiological means, the U.S. side’s experience was that material could be shielded easily and effectively by light masses. Furthermore, the radiological background of nuclear-propelled ships would make discrimination even more difficult, so in the U.S. view, radiological means would be subject to practical problems: suppressing the signal, and mixing it with the signal generated by the nuclear means of propulsion.

AKHROMEEV disagreed. He stated that it was possible to discriminate sufficiently between the signals generated by warheads engines. Further, shielding of systems would be prohibited. The U.S. side was proposing a ban on telemetry encryption, so why not also ban shielding? Thus everything would be verifiable. The objective was to assist NTM and not to interfere with it; there should not be a double-standard, with strict verification some systems but not for others. Akhromeev suggested that the sides take a positive approach and resolve a problem of mutual concern. Akhromeev asked whether Nitze had studied the Soviet proposal.

NITZE said that he had only glanced through the Soviet side’s proposal. GRAHAM continued that nuclear propulsion systems used the same fissile material as nuclear explosives and caused a higher radiological background. Graham explained that he was not talking about such measures as non-encryption of telemetry as a means of detection but rather as a means of understanding the characteristics of missiles. But as he understood it, the Soviet side was proposing radiological methods as a means of detection—a different situation. Shielding was a way to protect the missiles and which could conceal the missiles. The U.S. side believed that these difficulties were insurmountable.

AKHROMEEV offered to share more information with the U.S. on how the distinction could be made between propulsion plants and nuclear charges. But with respect to telemetry encryption, this was not in question—this pertained to relevant data on missile characteristics while shielding concerned relevant data concerning missiles on-board ships. Akhromeev suggested that the U.S. side read the Soviet-proposal, so the sides could discuss individual issues.

NITZE suggested there could perhaps be a separate subgroup the following day on SLCM verification. Mr. Sagdeev might join.

AKHROMEEV stressed that the problem pertained to strategic offensive arms and that it would not be acceptable to have a separate group. NITZE clarified that he was speaking about a sub-group of the current group.

AKHROMEEV still thought this suggestion unacceptable and Nitze proposed to move on. Akhromeev observed that the sides should discuss which document should be worked and how many meetings were feasible before Thursday.⁴ There was then a discussion of the schedule, it being tentatively agreed that the group would meet Wednesday, December 9 from 8:00–10:30 A.M. and again later in the day and after the dinner. Akhromeev emphasized that he must obtain permission from General Secretary Gorbachev to adjust his schedule.

AKHROMEEV turned to sublimits, noting that the Soviet side had laid down its position in Geneva and that, in principle, the difference between the two positions was 300 warheads. Akhromeev restated each side’s position: the U.S. spoke of 4800 warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs and the Soviet side spoke of between 5100 and 5300 warheads. Akhromeev emphasized that the Soviet Union was not going to build heavy bombers for the deployment of more than 900 cruise missiles. There was no need for more than that. Akhromeev stressed that he could say frankly that the Soviet Union’s production capacity would not allow the production of more bombers than that and that this was an objective fact, not a whim. Akhromeev proposed that the sides agree on a sublimit of 5100 for ICBMs and SLBMs.

NITZE proposed that the sublimit be 4800 on ballistic missiles and 3300 on ICBMs, but the main point was that the U.S. side thought it would be more orderly to discuss counting rules first because the counting rules would determine to some extent what the sublimits should be. Nitze clarified that the sides should discuss how one defines ALCMs and reentry vehicles before the sides turned to the sublimits.

AKHROMEEV said that he understood and turned to the Backfire bomber. He stated that the Soviet position was well-known; this was a medium-range bomber with a range of 2300 kilometers. He stated that the Soviet Union remained in compliance with the 1979 statement of the Soviet leadership⁵ and that nothing had changed regarding that bomber since that time: the bomber continued to be produced as a medium-bomber; it was not capable of mid-air refueling or of carrying cruise missiles with a range in excess of 600 kilometers. He concluded that it was unjustified to subject it to the Treaty on strategic offensive arms and that the sides could not arrive at an acceptable resolution of the problem if the U.S. insisted on counting the Backfire. Akhromeev recalled that the U.S. statement referred to the counting of the U.S. B–1 and B–52 and the Bear H and that the U.S. had proposed to count each with six cruise missiles.

NITZE confirmed that this was the U.S. proposal. Akhromeev stated that the U.S. bombers had the capability to carry significantly more than six each. He wondered why the Soviet side should count each with six.

LEHMAN explained that the question of counting ALCMs had two dimensions. First, one should simplify a difficult verification issue. Second, one should deal with the operational realities of heavy bomber aircraft. As Akhromeev was aware, the theoretical capability of a bomber could be significantly higher than the operational capability. What the U.S. had done was to seek a straightforward approach to counting ALCMs on ALCM-carrying heavy bombers. The U.S. thought this a simplification of the task because one simply had to identify the ALCM-carrying bombers in order to attribute the number to be accredited to the side.

AKHROMEEV thought the sides should not proceed in such a manner. He suggested that the sides select an airfield and land bombers such as the Blackjack and the B–1, old ones and new ones, with mock-ups of cruise missiles aboard. They could be examined to see how many cruise missiles existed and the proper number could be attributed. He thought this manner the best way to verify ALCM deployments.

NITZE stated that in U.S. operational practice, heavy bombers carried considerably fewer than their theoretical capability. So he wondered what the Soviet side proposed to examine.

AKHROMEEV said that the Soviet side was aware that U.S. bombers were capable of carrying many more than six ALCMs and so he did not see why the Soviet side should attribute six to each. The Soviet side was prepared to demonstrate to the U.S. how many cruise missiles were actually carried by Soviet bombers. CHERVOV recalled that the U.S. had tested not six, but 20 or more ALCMs. AKHROMEEV suggested that on-site inspection on a designated airfield be employed so that an appropriate number could be determined.

NITZE asked again what would be inspected. AKHROMEEV stated that the sides would inspect the number of cruise missiles that the bomber was carrying. He stated that bombers also have unique equipment for cruise missiles, such as special containers, and special pods under wings. It was therefore easy for experts to determine how many ALCMs a bomber was equipped to carry.

NITZE stated that the U.S. simply would not agree to a counting rule that counted phantom cruise missiles that we were not going to carry. He stressed that the U.S.-proposed rule was fair and worked well for both sides.

AKHROMEEV recalled earlier discussions on heavy missiles, which the U.S. side had argued were special weapons which were capable of carrying significantly more reentry vehicles. The Soviet side agreed with the U.S. on this score and had undertaken appropriate limitations. Now the same arguments should apply to U.S. heavy bombers, which carry more ALCMs than Soviet bombers, and should be attributed with the actual number they carried.

LEHMAN explained that the type of heavy bomber of which the U.S. side was speaking existed on both sides. They were similar in design, capability, and size, and therefore it would be difficult to be certain how many ALCMs a bomber would carry at any one time. Lehman thought that the Soviet side’s approach complicated a problem for which there existed a simple solution.

AKHROMEEV suggested that the sides think about it and suggested that the U.S. side do the same. NITZE agreed to think about it, but repeated that the U.S. could not count ALCMs that it was not going to carry.

AKHROMEEV said he understood the problem, but that in equal degree, the Soviet side could not count each bomber at six when the real number was 12 or more. He observed that this was a new proposal, and asked that it be studied seriously, for any response now would necessarily be off-the-cuff. Akhromeev concluded that if the sides landed bombers on a common airfield, then the Backfire would be landed as well. NITZE suggested that the sides might have an easier time with the proposed counting rule for existing ballistic missiles.

AKHROMEEV said that he had not yet finished with cruise missiles. He stated that the range for long-range cruise missiles had been previously settled at 600 km and now the U.S. proposed to raise the threshold to 1500 km. He wondered why the U.S. proposed such a number.

LEHMAN said that this had been discussed peripherally in Geneva. The U.S. side had made clear that the overall package must address U.S. concerns about stability. The U.S. had come to the conclusion that the 600 km threshold was not acceptable and that the proper number was 1500.

AKHROMEEV thought this to be Lehman’s opinion but that seven years experience in SALT II had shown—and Rowny had been a witness to this—that the range should be recognized to be 600 km. The Soviet side continued to believe this adequate; he wondered what had changed. If anything, the range of bombers had increased, not decreased.

NITZE rejoined that air defenses had improved. ROWNY said that the 600 km threshold had always been a Soviet formulation—the U.S. had never agreed that the SALT II number was applicable in START. The SALT II Treaty had many problems, which was why it had not been ratified, and this was one problem.

AKHROMEEV observed that nevertheless the 600 number had been accepted and the Treaty had been signed by the U.S. Delegation, though not ratified. Rowny had objected, but the position was that of the United States Government. NITZE said that the sides had noted a number of differences between the two positions. He said he had hoped to get on to areas of agreement, and suggested the sides discuss counting rules for existing missiles.

AKHROMEEV thought the sides would come to this but for now, the sides had not finished their discussion of cruise missiles. Here there were many differences and it seemed that the U.S. delegation had toughened its position. The number and range issue had been stipulated in SALT II which was signed but not ratified. It would be unjustified to depart from those agreed figures.

NITZE said that there was a basic problem; the U.S. side did not think that the SALT II provisions were any longer valid.

ADELMAN said that in START the U.S. side was trying to fill in the numbers and was clarifying its position, not hardening it. The U.S. side had never proposed the SALT II number to the Soviet side in START.

AKHROMEEV agreed that this was the first time that these positions had been offered in the current talks. But the sides had twenty years of experience in strategic weapons talks, and that history remained of some significance. He was not saying that SALT II was U.S. “law,” no such Treaty existed at present. But considerable work had been done previously; it should be the basis for discussions of this issue.

AKHROMEEV turned to ballistic missile counting. He asked for confirmation that the U.S. proposed to attribute to a missile the number of reentry vehicles with which it had been tested.

NITZE said that this was not the case; the sides would declare the number of deployed reentry vehicles which would not be exceeded in the future. This declaration would be subject to inspection.

AKHROMEEV said that the Soviet side would study the matter and offer an opinion later.

KARPOV asked if the Trident II were to be tested with twelve warheads prior to the conclusion of an agreement, would the U.S. suggest that it be counted as 8.

NITZE said that it would be possible to declare that its deployed number would be 8 even though it might have been tested with twelve. KARPOV asked whether the U.S. would test at 12.

ADELMAN replied that this could be done only prior to signature.

AKHROMEEV said this was not logical; he was not saying he disagreed, but he thought that if the sides agreed on such an approach, then missiles should not be tested with greater than their declared number. ADELMAN repeated that this would be possible after entry-into-force.

NITZE explained that the U.S. was trying to get away from capability. For example, some estimated that the SS–18 could carry 14 reentry vehicles, but if the Soviet side presented a declared number of 10, the U.S. was prepared to accept it—and would expect the Soviet Union to accept U.S. assurances that the Trident II would be deployed with no more than 8, which would be subject to inspection.

AKHROMEEV stated that the Soviet Union had never tested the SS–18 with more than 10 reentry vehicles. If the Soviet Union accepted such a solution, then a missile should not be tested with greater than its declared number of warheads.

NITZE replied that the U.S. side did not wish to base limitations on previous tests; it would only limit future tests.

LINHARD announced that the Soviet side’s cars had arrived, and that when the sides returned, they could pick up on the discussions on ballistic missile warhead counting.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Washington Summit. Secret. Drafted by Moon. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s Conference Room at the Department of State.
2. Not found.
3. See Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, footnote 5, Document 107.
4. December 10.
5. Reference is to Brezhnev’s June 16, 1979 written statement to Carter asserting that the Soviet Tu-22M “Backfire” airplane was a medium-range bomber, and that the Soviet Union would not increase its range to strike targets in the continental United States. (“Vienna Summit Meeting: United States-Soviet Union Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and Related Documents,” June 18, 1979, Public Papers of the President: Carter, 1979, pp. 1051–1079)