Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

245. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, undated

Ermarth: The President opened up with his talking points. He read them all. Shultz then picked up with his line, the thrust of which you know I presume: (1) No deployment of defenses prohibited by the ABM Treaty, (2) to be negotiated on how long that applied, then after six months withdrawal, deployment allowed without reference to the ABM Treaty, (3) various stability predictability packages—data observation, consultations on how things are going and decade minus three years. Carlucci then picked up to describe the predictability package.

Brooks: Consultation on things decade minus three years is a new concept that I have never heard before.

Ermarth: Consultation during the last three years of the nonwithdrawal period on where things are going before the end of the nondeployment period. The Soviets suggested it.

Brooks: Is it Shultz’ idea or a Soviet idea?

Ermarth: Shultz’ idea. Talking with the Soviets. Regular meetings about strategic stability no later than three years before the end of the nondeployment period. Soviet suggestion. It is a period about a couple of presidential terms away with the results of research discuss what research the Soviets are going to be doing. To discuss strategic stability in the light of new developments—to develop intensive dialogue about strategic stability before the end of the nonwithdrawal period. This was regarded as an amplification of the President’s remarks. At another point, Shultz got very close to proposing prohibited and permitted. Carlucci then picked up with his package of predictability measures—confidence-building measures—so aimed specifically at assuring both sides that no offensive weapons were being developed and deployed in the period. Open labs, he made some suggestions, you didn’t respond, I said something about the free electron lasers, Lawrence Livermore chemical lasers, labs in space, their mere lab and our shuttle, experiment sensors, Astronauts going up and looking at the hardware that is being tested or developed and he is going to discuss all this with Oppernav this afternoon over at Defense Department with Abrahamson available to talk about it too. I finished the American presentation. Then Gorbo starts. The essence of Gorbo’s line is we can’t support your pitch—your approach. Basically you are trying to bring the Soviet Union into a collaboration on something like SDI—an SDI affair—and get us to invite the United States to renounce the ABM Treaty. The ABM Treaty works however. And preserving the ABM Treaty has been understood from day one as to be the essence of our enterprise going back to Reykjavik. Later in the meeting Dobrynin intervened and said “how can you propose to us that we end this summit with a statement that says—that foreshadows the end of the ABM Treaty which is the foundation of all arms control here?” Back to Gorbachev, if you try to draw us into SDI that won’t speed up the process of getting to a START agreement, it will slow it down. What you are able to do or want to do during and after the ten year period is your business. We object to SDI. We are not going to do it ourselves. We will respond in a way that doesn’t ????????² cost effective. Defeating it and all that, but what you do is your business. We insist however on a ten year period of nonwithdrawal, a guaranteed maintenance of the ABM Treaty. Later he said, well, how about nine. So they are probably willing to play around with the dates. The President intervened and said “Hey lets get going with the 50 percent cut.” And we need SDI in the future as insurance. The gas mask madmen bullshit. Gorbachev said something about his Brokaw interview. Gorbachev clarified that we weren’t citing it accurately. As to START, we are ready to compromise but if we involve SDI the way we are proposing there won’t be any START treaty with you or your successor. Shultz tried to recapture control of the meeting. He tried to recapture control by saying the Working Groups were making progress which apparently is not true but correcting the President as not advocating any kind of linkage to SDI—there is no link. Gorbachev intervened quite forcefully saying “Yeah but there is a link to the ABM Treaty which you are trying to break.” Shultz resumed “What you propose is consistent with our approach and our approach is consistent with the ABM Treaty. What we are proposing is to go into this clarifying what is going on during the period. Knowing what we are doing. You advocate predictability over ten years. That each side know what’s going on under the ABM Treaty. You said that the U.S. could decide what it wants to do but what goes on in the meantime at the end of the period. We would try to get at that with some proposals like Frank Carlucci gave. Give you a sense of confidence, even hope that you would participate. Willing to look at your ideas.” Shevardnadze intervened and basically came back and said “Look why not zero in on the requirements for 50 percent cuts in the strategic forces under a regime in the context of ten years non-use of the withdrawal provision with two to three years to discuss what happens at the end of the ten year period. This approach would impose no burdens on the present phase of the 50 percent cuts with all that talk about SDI which isn’t necessary. We have the added factor of time. If there is a serious prospect for a reciprocal visit in Moscow, we have to understand what it is going to produce and our understanding was that we were going to get a 50 percent START agreement with nonwithdrawal from the ABM Treaty. We’ve laid that ground work. If we begin to introduce philosophical excursions the President’s visit won’t be crowned with START. Its very important that we decide at a high level the parameters under the 50 percent reductions. If we leave it to experts, it will go on endlessly. We have to decide at the high level the duration of the nonwithdrawal provision and we have some flexibility regarding what’s permitted and prohibited under ABM. We are prepared to discuss that. The third element we have got to have limits on SLCMs. We have got to decide these things at a high level in order to move ahead. This is where Dobrynin intervened forcefully to say “How can a summit end with a communique that foreshadows the demise of the ABM Treaty under this with no reference to the language we have been using” The President intervened again, “Our people feel strongly about pursuing SDI and meanwhile you guys are violating the ABM Treaty with Krasnoyarsk.” Shultz tried once again to sort out what we had agreed on and what not. Let us make another effort. We agree that there is a period of time of nonwithdrawal. Lets discuss that. We know that there shall be no deployment during that period that’s prohibited by the treaty which is a concept that we agree. We also agree at the end that either side has the right to do what it wants and we want to nail that down at the beginning. Shultz ended up noting that there were some differences about what we believed is permitted under the ABM Treaty but he referred once again to Krasnoyarsk. Gorbachev said “Yeah we have different interpretations but only after 1983. For eleven years we had a completely consistent interpretation supported by Congressional hearings, DOD reports. We only got different interpretations when you started looking for lawyerly rationalizations on how to get out of the ABM Treaty and we know this is a trick. Why don’t you respect our intelligence? This is no way to proceed. Especially since 1994 you won’t have anything to deploy by then. Lets be patient for ten years and two to three years before the end of the ten years we can discuss strategic stability if you want to deploy something and we want uncork our responsive measures or whatever we have developed by then.” The President intervened forcefully saying, “Look ABM and SDI are another subject. Lets agree on 50 percent—eliminate those. Then people would be even more happy than they were—you could almost feel the happiness at the dinner last night. That we had actually achieved something. Lets get started working on the details.” Gorbachev says, “Yeah but we got to base this on parameters necessary to find a way to a START agreement. SLCMs are very important but we have got to also take care of assurances on the ABM Treaty and a ten year nonwithdrawal period. Here’s one I introduced nine years, if you are interested.” Shultz resumed saying that he thought there had been about enough on this subject—eventually got somewhere. We have agreed on the concept of the period of nonwithdrawal. Rights and activities under that period were not quite agreed there. Exchange with the President involved a considerable amount of electricity when the President said “Come on lets get on with the 50 percent,” and Gorbachev said, “No not until you satisfy us with the ABM Treaty.” Then Gorbachev hit on SLCMs, saying, “Alright you had your turn to avoid SLCMs. Why are you trying to avoid SLCMs? If they are not taken care of there won’t be a treaty. Our position is a 400 limit. What’s yours?” The President said, “Let the Working Group take care of it.” If there is no guidance from the top, the Working Group won’t resolve it. Shultz intervened saying, “The President has said that we are ready to hear your verification ideas.” Gorbachev said, “Fine.” “We are ready,” said Shultz, “to study your ideas to see if they satisfy us on verification. We don’t have a response to the 400 number.” Gorbachev said, “Well you have given us no answer on mobiles, you given us no answer on SLCMs. All you do is place demands on us and squeeze us for concessions. We’ve pampered you by letting you do that. We’re as concerned about verification as you are. You’ve many more SLCMs, you have many more submarines to put them on. It is important to decide that they must be limited, to set a limit and then move on to verification.” Gorbachev and other Soviets intervened at various times to establish that elimination of nuclear weapons is the objective here. The President said, “No I’m not stopping things. I don’t want to come to Moscow unhappy.” Gorbachev then said, “Now if you want to come to Moscow without an agreement you tell us. Our assumption has been that we want a document, some forward steps here and move toward an agreement in Moscow. We thought you had the same idea. If you have changed your mind, lets quit playing around here. We can let the guys in Geneva fiddle around and waste the government’s time and money but if you believe that its not necessary for a treaty to be ready for Moscow tell us. We believe we want to move ahead with this administration but if you have changed your mind about proceeding, then say so. Shultz said, “Well you’ve heard how forcefully the President spoke on behalf of a START agreement.”

1. Source: Reagan Library, Tobey Files, Washington Summit. Secret. The memorandum of conversation of the December 8 meeting among Reagan, Gorbachev, and U.S. and Soviet officials, described herein, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 107.
2. Question marks are in the original.