Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

248. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 9, 1987, 6–6:35 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • Amb. Nitze
  • Amb. Kampelman
  • Amb. Lehman
  • Amb. Cooper
  • Amb. Rowny
  • Amb. Hanmer
  • Dir. Adelman
  • AS Holmes
  • Mr. Castillo
  • Adm. Howe
  • DAS Thomas
  • DAS Joseph
  • Col. Linhard
  • Dr. Graham
  • Mr. Timbie
  • Ms. Sutter
  • Mr. McConnell
  • Mr. Stafford (Notetaker)

• U.S.S.R.

  • Marshall Akhromeyev
  • Amb. Karpov
  • Amb. Obukhov
  • Amb. Masterkov
  • Amb. Nazarkin
  • Gen. Medvedev
  • Gen. Chervov
  • Mr. Popov
  • Mr. Shebalin

SUBJECT

• START, Defense and Space

AKHROMEYEV suggested the sides begin by hearing the reports from the Drafting Group, and NITZE agreed.

OBUKHOV said that, as a result of the day’s work, the group had, on the whole, reached agreement on the text dealing with strategic offensive arms. Comparing the Russian and English texts, he realized it would be necessary to do some drafting work, but this could be done in a short time. Among the outstanding issues to be considered by the Working Group, and later in the Drafting Group, were questions concerning the number of warheads the sides would deploy on ballistic missiles. Specific figures had been recorded tentatively. There were also two blanks in the text. These dealt with limits on long-range SLCMs. The U.S. side had thus far made no counterproposal on SLCM limits. He suggested that, after this brief meeting, the Drafting Group continue working on the text, and he expected the U.S. side to introduce its proposal on SLCMs.

The Drafting Group had also considered proposals regarding the ABM Treaty. Here, regrettably, no common text was emerging. The Soviet side had not yet studied a Russian text of the U.S. proposal, but it did not appear to contain any changes in the U.S. position. It would perhaps be appropriate to write a shorter joint text on this subject, based on the language of the joint statement of October 30. That language was in the Soviet text proposed earlier. The U.S. proposal did not make any step toward the Soviet proposal.

HANMER reported that he essentially agreed with Obukhov’s report on the START section. He summarized the outstanding issues as two: the numbers for Soviet SLBMs were yet to be provided and placeholder language was in the text for SLCMs. Otherwise, the agreed text was very adequate.

NITZE said he had some language to propose on SLCMs, and passed a text (attached)² to the Soviet side.

After studying the text, AKHROMEYEV said he thought the sides had not found a solution to the cruise missile question. He believed the sides should reach agreement on the number of SLCMs deployed in excess of 6000 warheads, the types of ships on which SLCMs could be deployed, and where inspections should take place. This was an elementary thing. Without such agreement, there would be no instructions to delegations; the delegations would mark time and would prepare nothing.

NITZE disagreed, saying each side would issue instructions to its delegation and would try to work this problem out. The technology for verification had been previously reviewed by the U.S. side, but it would undertake to review it again.

AKHROMEYEV said he understood Nitze’s point, but today Ministers were in Washington. They expected proposals from this group. The delegations would be in Geneva, far from Moscow and Washington. Both sides knew the capabilities of the delegations there. The draft joint statement contained no basis on which the delegations could work. While on other issues there was a certain basis, there was no prospect on SLCMs.

NITZE said this should not be a surprise. At Reykjavik, the U.S. side had said this problem was very difficult; it did not see a way to solve it except, perhaps, through unilateral declarations. The Soviet side had not been able to accept that, but the U.S. side saw no way to make the problem easier.

KARPOV argued that more than a year had passed since Reykjavik. It was time to come up with a solution. The U.S. side said the Soviet side had introduced inadequate verification methods, but the U.S. side had introduced nothing. The U.S. side had no desire to consider this question.

AKHROMEYEV concluded that the U.S.-proposed SLCM language could be included in the text, but added that he considered it to be inadequate. He would report to his Foreign Minister that this was a unilateral U.S. proposal, and that, since the Soviet proposal had not been taken into consideration, there had been no movement.

KAMPELMAN asked how the Soviet side would feel about putting a period after the reference to the aggregates and leaving out the characterization.

AKHROMEYEV asked what would be done about verification measures. In Reykjavik, the sides had already agreed that SLCMs should be limited, and that this should be included in the treaty. The current U.S. proposal did not move the sides ahead by one inch. The Soviet side, after Reykjavik, had introduced a series of proposals for relevant instructions.

NITZE replied that it was just in the last few days that the Soviet verification proposals had been presented. They had not been made at Reykjavik. What the U.S. side was proposing now was that, even though it had already looked at such verification measures, it would re-examine them since they had been raised by the Soviet side. So the situation was not unchanged.

AKHROMEYEV retorted that, while it was true that there had been a change in verification, the Soviet side had proposed specific terms to limit SLCMs to 400 on certain types of submarines. The U.S. side had not once cited a figure or a limit on where they could be deployed. What was the U.S. view?

NITZE said it was not appropriate to negotiate a figure until the sides had some understanding on a general approach to verification of SLCM limits.

Turning to the ABM question, AKHROMEYEV said there appeared to be no common wording. COOPER agreed, but added that the U.S. side had provided new information. It was not entirely correct that the U.S. side had not changed its position, although there were no major changes. This morning, Kampelman had explained the reason for there being no nonwithdrawal language. This afternoon, the U.S. side had returned to nonwithdrawal language, reverting to its previous Geneva position. It had proposed clarifying language to avoid papering over real differences. The U.S. side had sought to modify its lead-in language, taking into account the text Karpov had provided this morning. The Soviet-proposed language on “interrelationship” had given the U.S. side trouble; he understood the words “defense and space” gave the Soviet side trouble. So he had suggested a compromise using the phrase “offense/defense relationship.” Cooper also wanted to raise another issue: for the last 8 or 9 months, the Soviet side had understood that the sides were working for a separate agreement.

AKHROMEYEV interrupted, saying that the sides were wasting time. They had discussed these issues for two hours earlier. The Soviet side had provided its proposed wording, and the U.S. side had said it would study it. The sides had only 5 more minutes for this meeting. He suggested they leave behind their drafters, so they could deal with the problem of the relationship between the START Treaty and the ABM Treaty as it had been set forth in the October 30 Shultz/Shevardnadze joint statement.

COOPER accused the Soviet side of reversing its position concerning a separate treaty.

KARPOV said that the sides, in their drafting work, had to be fully aware of context. He was talking about ensuring in material terms the visit by President Reagan to Moscow next year. If the U.S. side was ready to work, then the sides should work. If the U.S. side was unprepared, it should say so.

KAMPELMAN objected, saying that what he heard Karpov saying was that the U.S. side should agree with the Soviet position or there would be no visit to Moscow. The U.S. side had a right to its own position. KARPOV countered by urging that the sides discuss real proposals.

AKHROMEYEV said that no one was dictating anything to anyone. But the sides could not proceed as Cooper was doing. The sides had discussed the issues for two hours and Cooper was now, eight hours later, just repeating the same arguments. There was no time for this. He suggested the sides leave their drafters behind and let them work the basic documents. The Working Group could meet again after dinner to review the work of the Drafting Group. He asked most emphatically that the sides not repeat what had already been said. The U.S. side could maintain its position; he respected that. But the sides should not waste time repeating their positions.

NITZE agreed to leave drafters behind and reconvene after dinner, which he estimated would be about 10:30 p.m.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Washington Summit. Secret. The meeting took place at the Department of State. It followed a plenary meeting, also at the Department of State, led by Shultz and Shevardnadze, on the topics of human rights and regional affairs. That meeting, which Nitze and Akhromeyev and their respective delegations did not attend, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, volume VI, Soviet Union October 1986–January 1989, Document 111.
2. Attached but not printed is an undated draft text: “The sides shall find a mutually acceptable solution to the question of limiting the deployment of long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs. Such limitations will not involve counting long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs within the 6000 warhead and 1600 SNDV limits. The sides committed themselves to seek mutually acceptable and effective methods of verification of such a limitation, including the employment of National Technical Means, cooperative measures and on-site inspection.”