Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985

36. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan¹

Washington, April 6, 1983

SUBJECT

• The Menu of Current Issues in East-West Relations

We currently have before us several State Department proposals on East-West relations requiring decisions. Although you have received individual memoranda on each of these, we believe it would be useful for you to consider each in the broader context. The specific proposals are:

—To negotiate a new cultural exchange agreement with the Soviets (Tab 1);²

—To negotiate a new Long-Term Grain Agreement (LTA) with the Soviets (Tab 2);³

—To set up new consulates in New York and Kiev (a proposal contained in Tab 3);⁴

—To adopt a new strategy for Poland, including: a linkage between debt rescheduling and a lifting of repression, an offer to the Polish regime to renew LOT (Polish airlines) charter flights, and an effort to seek Soviet acquiescence on a national reconciliation in Poland (Tab 4).⁵

While these proposals have merit, taken together they may give the appearance of expanding ties and increasing cooperation, allowing the contention that we are tilting toward detente.

Each proposal forms a part of a broader set of issues. The cultural exchange question might be handled in tandem with the problem of enforcing reciprocity and controlling the hostile intelligence presence. The SIG-Intelligence is developing a broader set of options on part of this issue that will need high-level discussion. This is an issue on which our Allies are working seriously. Seven of our Allies have expelled Soviet agents this year alone.

The proposal for new consulates has been presented with virtually no pros and cons and we might discuss those today with George. Of all the proposals, this one gives the greatest appearance of expanded diplomatic ties and cooperation. Whether or not you proceed with it might depend on a careful balancing of the intelligence benefits versus the various disadvantages. The LTA proposal has not been handled through the interagency process, and currently presents potential problems for us with our Allies. Finally, of the various proposals for Poland, any request for the Soviets’ assistance must be placed in the context of the extreme unlikelihood that they would actually help us to bring about reforms in Poland; and the proposed renewal of LOT flights must be analyzed in terms of how the Soviets would perceive such a move: as yet another “first step” or olive branch extended by the US as if we were responsible for the tensions in US-Polish relations—as if our sanctions were somehow mistaken and deserved to be retracted.

All of these proposals, of course, appear in an even more complex context. Other issues bearing on them are also coming up soon:

—The whole problem of Soviet compliance with arms control agreements. The NSC staff is working on an options paper that will raise serious questions about how we are to deal with the Soviets in light of ever-increasing evidence that they have not been playing fairly. If indeed we raise the compliance issue, as I believe we inevitably must (given the mounting evidence), the prospect of conducting a whole new set of negotiations, expanded ties and cooperation may appear to be totally illogical and short-sighted. It gives the impression to the Soviets, our Allies and the American people that Administration is neither serious about treaty compliance nor capable of coordinating both right and left hands at the same time.

—The wholesale Soviet rejection of your latest INF proposal.⁶ Apparently the Soviets must still believe that the correlation of forces is tilting so much in their favor that they can risk rejecting a proposal that at least today has won the support of our European allied governments. The only conceivable reason for this summary rejection is that they must feel that their disinformation, propaganda, and manipulation of Western public opinion has been so successful that they believe that they can stoke up enough public opposition to your proposal in the next few months to pressure Allied governments once again to call for a new, more satisfactory US INF proposal. The Soviets feel that they succeeded in doing this to your zero option and that they can do the same again.

—Andropov has personally accused you of lying.⁷ This raises to new levels the temerity with which the Kremlin feels it can deal with the West. Although the Soviet propaganda machine regularly makes such accusations, the last time in anyone’s memory that such an accusation was made by the Party boss was when the Soviets were in a position of relative weakness—a position that was definitely perceived as such by the Kremlin itself. The difference today is that the Soviets perceive that the correlation of forces is tilted in favor of socialism worldwide—especially in the most critical element in their view—the political-ideological measurement. How you might handle this new Andropov accusation is at issue.

—Georgi Arbatov, the well-known Soviet scholar-disinformation agent, has applied for a visa to come to the US for several weeks to attend conferences and utilize the US media for Soviet purposes. State recommended⁸ granting him a visa despite the fact that the technical-legal circumstances of his visa application permit us to deny him one. His planned activities here are symbolic of the utter lack of reciprocity in these matters—especially access to the mass media. This issue gives special impetus to deal with the legal mechanisms at our disposal to enforce real reciprocity.

—Our effort to persuade the Pentacostalists to leave our Embassy.⁹ If the Soviets actually permit them to emigrate, it will be a victory for quiet diplomacy and the humanitarian cause of these beleaguered people. However, there are two dangers involved here: First is the possibility that the Soviet will not follow through. If this is the case, we must be prepared to inflict a sanction that must do justice to the pain that these poor people may have to suffer. Secondly, there is the danger that the Soviets may attempt to show the world what great liberals and humanitarians they are. This is standard practice most every time a communist regime lets somebody out of the gulag or permits someone to emigrate. This is a normal element of their strategy to deceive the West about their real intentions.

—Finally, we have the defense budget, the MX, the nuclear freeze and Adelman votes coming up in Congress. How we conduct the overall US-Soviet relationship, including our assessment of how much a political as well as military threat the Soviets present, will have enormous bearing on each of these issues.

All this is not to say that State’s proposals should be rejected. For example, there is merit in a new exchange agreement so long as we utilize existing legal mechanisms first to enforce reciprocity and to gain negotiating leverage. There is merit to an LTA—but for domestic, political and economic reasons. The question of new consulates may have some merits—but pros and cons have yet to be aired.

In conclusion, NSC staff feels that all these issues must be discussed as part of the broader context. They also feel that things are moving much too fast and deserve more caution and coherent planning. Each issue has enormous public diplomacy implications which have not been adequately raised as yet. Since these public questions, both domestic and foreign, affect such things as the defense budget and our intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities, I feel that Defense, CIA and other relevant parties should be permitted some input into these decisions. Too much is at stake here to permit their absence.

1. Source: Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (5). Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Lenczowski. A note in an unknown hand at the top of the page reads: “For discussion with Geo. Shultz at 4 pm.”
2. See Document 18.
3. See Document 32.
4. A memorandum from Shultz dated March 16 is listed but not attached.
5. A memorandum from Shultz dated March 28 is listed but not attached.
6. On March 30, Reagan proposed an “Interim Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Reduction Agreement,” in remarks at the White House. “To this end, Ambassador Paul Nitze has informed his Soviet counterpart that we are prepared to negotiate an interim agreement in which the United States would substantially reduce its planned deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles, provided the Soviet Union reduce the number of its warheads on longer range INF missiles to an equal level on a global basis.” (Public Papers: Reagan, 1983, Book I, p. 474)
7. For Andropov’s reaction to Reagan’s March 23 speech proposing a new U.S. missile defense program (see Document 23), see Document 30.
8. An unknown hand revised this to read “may recommend.”
9. See Document 34.