Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985

35. Memorandum From Norman Bailey, John Lenczowski, and Donald Fortier of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)¹

Washington, April 4, 1983

SUBJECT

• Shultz Memo to the President on a New Long-Term Grain Agreement (LTA) with the USSR

Secretary Shultz has written to the President (Tab A)² recommending that he be authorized to announce to our Allies on April 11 and to Ambassador Dobrynin on April 12 our decision to negotiate a new long-term grain agreement (LTA) with the Soviets. The reasons given for wanting to do this are:

—It is a political necessity.

—To preempt the Percy/Dole Senate resolution calling on the President to negotiate a new LTA (scheduled for vote April 13 or 14).

—We would gain credit with Congress and the public.

The memo sets forth a series of steps to deal with Allied and public criticism and proposes that Regan, Block, Baldrige, Weinberger and Brock be notified of the President’s decision the same day (April 11) we notify the Allies.

We believe this to be part of the State Department’s attempt to implement on a piecemeal basis Secretary Shultz’s strategy memos on U.S.-Soviet relations of January and March.³ The memo further states: “The Soviets will need to understand that we are taking this step as part of our strategy of testing the Andropov leadership’s intentions on a step-by-step basis.” This is indeed the intent of the strategy suggested by the earlier Shultz memos. But, whatever the merits of a new LTA, we do not see how it can be construed as a means of “testing” Andropov’s intentions.

Our principal reservation with the Secretary’s proposal is that launching negotiations for an LTA at this particular moment does not seem to be in complete consonance with what we understand is the President’s overall approach to U.S.-Soviet relations. It is our impression that the President wants an incremental process:⁴ some concrete progress on some of the smaller issues such as the Pentecostalists; and if the Soviets are willing to concede something on such issues first, then we would return a Soviet favor by negotiating certain agreements with them. Then, having established a pattern of negotiating behavior which impresses the Soviets with our strength and ability to enforce reciprocity, we could approach them on larger issues like an LTA without suffering the consequences of negotiating like a supplicant from a position of weakness.

Additionally, the timing Shultz’s proposal suggested is bad for the following reasons:

—The President may announce soon Soviet violations of existing arms control agreements.

—The East-West economic relations studies are in a delicate stage and grain sales are a red flag before the European bull.

—Such an announcement is likely to impinge unfavorably on an harmonious economic Summit.

The most persuasive arguments for an LTA are domestic political and economic ones. So, if a decision is reached to proceed with this, it would be in spite of a variety of compelling foreign policy considerations.

Finally, at Bill Brock’s urging, you have requested that the LTA issue be put on the SIG-IEP agenda, and it is scheduled for April 14. Of course, it can be taken off, but what explanation do we make to Brock? Indeed, what explanation do we give to all the Cabinet officials listed above when they are told on April 11 of a decision in the formulation of which they not only had no role but were not even given a chance to have a role?

If Shultz’s proposal is approved, it would cause an uproar from other Cabinet members who have an abiding interest in this issue. This, in conjunction with the other foreign policy problems, could be damaging not only to the President, but to Secretary Shultz.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

That you sign the attached memo to the President (Tab A).⁵

That you raise orally with the President the potential problems this proposal creates within the Cabinet and for the Administration as a whole.⁶

1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (04/01/83) (3). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for Urgent Action. In a cover note to Poindexter, McFarlane wrote: “The attached memo, which Shultz sent over by courier, is being staffed (close-hold) by Norman Bailey in coordination with John Lenczowski, Doug McMinn and Don Fortier. The Secretary’s proposal that no one else be involved until the day of the announcement (Brock, Block, Regan etc) won’t work. Still we can find a way to do it discreetly.”
2. See Document 32.
3. See Documents 1, 13, and 19.
4. “Incremental process” is underlined, likely by Clark.
5. Clark indicated neither his approval nor disapproval of the recommendation; however, the memorandum from Clark to Reagan, with Shultz’s April 1 memorandum attached, was sent on April 5 (see Document 32).
6. Clark indicated neither his approval nor disapproval of the recommendation.