359. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the Department of State1
Secto 1019. For S/S only. Subject: Message from Richard Perle to SecDef Weinberger.
1. (S—Entire text)
2. Richard Perle delivered the message in para 3 for transmission to SecDef Weinberger.
3. Begin text: To the Secretary of Defense Eyes Only From Richard Perle.
The hours since the first negotiating session have been spent evaluating the Soviet position and drafting additional material for Shultz.
My impressions are based on McFarlane briefing given to delegation following negotiating team’s return from the Soviet Embassy, and while I believe his account was complete, I cannot be certain.
[Page 1321]Gromyko was tough and demanding along expected lines. His emphasis on “preventing the militarization of outer space” was evident throughout. He sought to lay the foundation for Soviet insistence that the treatment of offensive arms is not only linked but actually conditional on the treatment of “space weapons.”
Notetaker’s account
On this point reads: “. . . it is impossible to consider the question of strategic arms and intermediate range missiles separate from the question of space weapons, and the demilitarization of space.”
I think it clear that Gromyko’s principal objective is to hold offensive weapon reductions hostage to agreement to negotiate [garble—far]-reaching limits, and ideally a total ban, on SDI (and most likely ASAT as well). I expect that the last issue to be resolved will be the agreed characterization of the “objectives” or “goals” of whatever negotiation deals with space.
The following “proposal” is taken verbatim from John Matlock’s notes. But while the notes deal separately with (1) space, (2) strategic arms and (3) intermediate-range weapons, McFarlane’s briefing stressed Gromyko’s insistence on the inter-relatedness of the issues which Gromyko proposed as a “complex”, saying that “all must be considered in one complex”.
Begin quote:
I. Space (underline)
—A ban on development, testing, or deployment of “attack space weapons” and the destruction of weapons of this type which already exist.
—“Attack space weapons”, to be defined as follows: space weapons based on any physical principle, regardless of the basing mode, which are designed to attack targets in space or to attack targets on earth (land, sea or air) from space. This includes ASAT’s and relevant anti-missile weapons.
II. Strategic Arms (underline)
If there is a complete ban on space attack weapons, the Soviet Union would accept a radical reduction in strategic arms and a complete renunciation, or strict limitations on, the development and deployment of strategic systems, including: long-range cruise missiles, new types of ICBMs, new types of SLBMs, and new types of heavy bombers.
III. Intermediate-Range Weapons (underline)
—At present, it is impossible to resolve the problem of strategic arms separately from the question of intermediate-range weapons, since those deployed in Europe are strategic in regard to the Soviet Union.
[Page 1322]—The aim of the third set of negotiations, therefore, would be to agree on no further deployment of U.S. missiles in Western Europe, the ending of Soviet counter-measures, followed by reduction of intermediate-range nuclear systems in Europe to an agreed level. Those levels would take into account the medium-range missiles possessed by Britain and France. End quote.
As you will have observed there is not the slightest give in Gromyko’s position on any of the three issues. Strategic arms are tied to a “total ban” on space weapons and the treatment of INF is unchanged from earlier Soviet positions: we would be left with zero (the French and British would use up our allotment) and the Soviets would merely reduce the level of SS–20s in Europe (last two words underlined). Shultz in discussing the morning found it remarkable that Gromyko was not interested in signs of movement from us on START or INF. So much for the theory that we needed to adopt new positions on START/INF to coax them back to the table.
In my view we should build on the inevitable division of subject matter into three distinct areas and, while picking up the Soviet notion of a “complex” of negotiations, stress the establishment of three “negotiating groups” without giving substance to the “complex” itself. While we will face a difficult negotiation over the characterization of the negotiating group that will deal with, in our formulation, “defensive nuclear and space arms,” we stand a good chance of emerging with three entities while reducing the “complex” to an insubstantial concept. At least that is what we have urged Shultz and McFarlane to attempt.
In drafting language that would carry this approach forward we prepared several formulations, one covering, in a single short statement, the “Subject and Objective: New Negotiating Complex,” and two others that deal with the subject and objectives of three negotiating fora. These are quoted below in order of preference:
Begin quote:
Subject and Objective: New Negotiating “Complex”
The United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to begin a new complex of negotiations to address the interrelated questions of nuclear and space arms. To this end, three negotiating groups will be convened in Geneva, beginning on March 5, to begin the process of negotiating agreements on strategic offensive arms, intermediate-range nuclear arms, and defensive nuclear space arms. The objective of these negotiations shall be the reductions of nuclear arms and the enhancement of strategic stability with the ultimate goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.
Subject and Objective: Three Negotiating Fora (Version I)
The subject of the first negotiation would be strategic offensive arms. We are prepared in step-by-step fashion to reduce radically the [Page 1323] number and destructive power of such arms, with the immediate goal of enhancing the reliability and stability of deterrence, and with the ultimate goal of their eventual elimination.
The subject of the second negotiation would be intermediate-range nuclear forces. We propose that the objective of such talks should be an equitable agreement providing for effectively verifiable and radical reductions in intermediate-range offensive nuclear arms.
We propose that the subject of the third negotiation be defensive nuclear and space arms. The objective would be agreements on measures on Earth or in space to enhance the reliability and stability of deterrence, and to contribute to the use of outer space to ensure peace.
Subject and Objective: Three Negotiating Fora (Version II)
The subject of the first negotiation would be strategic offensive arms. We are prepared in step-by-step fashion to reduce radically the numbers and destructive power of such arms, with the immediate goal of enhancing the reliability and stability of deterrence, and with the ultimate goal of their eventual elimination.
The subject of the second negotiation would be intermediate range nuclear forces. We propose that the objective of such talks should be an equitable agreement providing for effectively verifiable and radical reductions in intermediate-range offensive nuclear arms.
We propose a third negotiation, the objective of which would be the achievement of equitable and verifiable controls on defensive nuclear arms, including military systems based on Earth or in space. End quote.
You will note that the only difference between versions one and two of the three negotiating fora formulations is found in the final paragraph. You should know that version two of the three negotiating fora formulation was proposed by me as a “fallback”. Loathe as I am to propose fallbacks I believe that this protects our interests adequately and I succeeded in getting it adopted (by the advisory group).
I do not know how Shultz reacted to the versions above. They were hand-carried to him in the afternoon session. I will report further as soon as we are debriefed. (The session continues as I draft this message.)
I intend to resist vehemently any inclusion of the term “militarization of space” in any agreed statement. How far we travel down the path of burdening the forum in which space is discussed with language like “preventing the militarization of space”, or dealing with such issues as “the militarization of space” and the like will become the crunch issue and I doubt that it will be resolved before the last minute.
[Page 1324]Rick Burt has prepared a memorandum for the President which I have not seen.2 As soon as I obtain it I will send any necessary comment by message. Best regards. End text.
- Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N850001–0161. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.↩
- Presumably the memorandum transmitted in telegram Secto 1018, Document 358.↩