358. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the White House and the Department of State1
Secto 1018. For the President. Subject: Memorandum For the President of the Secretary’s Second Meeting With Gromyko, Monday Afternoon, January 7, 1985.
MEMORANDUM FOR: The President
FROM: George P. Shultz
SUBJECT: My Second Meeting With Gromyko
1. Summary: We had another three-hour session this afternoon which began with my answers to Gromyko’s questions on how we would handle space issues in a third forum. I was able to give, and Bud ably buttressed, a complete statement of your rationale for proceeding with SDI. This led Gromyko to a long and tortured response saying that they could only conclude that SDI was a prelude to a first strike strategy. I rebutted that position and also found an opening to state our strong view on the importance of verification. Both Bud and I tried to show how a defense integration with offense could at some point lead to greater strategic stability. I would have to say based on Gromyko’s reaction that we struck out. He did, however, push on to outline in excruciating detail his plan for negotiation on all these issues. He outlined what he called an interrelated structure for discussing space, strategic arms, and medium range missiles which has a Rube [Page 1318] Goldberg character about it. We will have to come up with a tactic for dealing with this later this evening. End summary.
2. The meeting began with my answers to Gromyko’s two questions at the end of the morning session dealing with the timing of any discussion on SDI. I emphasized that we have nothing concrete at the moment since our research is not far enough along, although we would expect to discuss such matters with the Soviet Union when and if the research efforts of either side demonstrated that there can be systems which could usefully contribute to a transition away from reliance on the threat of massive destruction. Nonetheless, I went on, we are prepared to enter into discussions even in advance of any positive research developments on how such defense systems could play a role in enhanced deterrence.
3. In response to Gromyko’s request for clarification of what subject matter the third forum we had proposed would address, I noted that we would expect it to be a forum in which both sides would be free to raise whatever issues relating to defensive systems it wished to raise, including those based on Earth or space or directed against weapons either on the Earth or in space. I observed that nuclear offensive weapons in space were already banned by the Outer Space Treaty. At the same time, I went on, recent technical developments had made distinctions harder to draw both between ABM and certain anti-aircraft systems and between radars for the purposes of early warning, National Technical Means, space track, and ABM. There was, I observed, a good deal of work to be done in reexamining and reinforcing the fundamental ideas underlying the ABM Treaty and defensive systems in general. Additionally, such a forum would seem to be appropriate for the discussion of possible future systems and technical developments as they might bear on our eventual goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. We did not think, I concluded, that bans on research could be verifiable or effective; indeed, if such research could contribute to lessening the dangers of war, it should not be banned.
4. I then gave a philosophical overview of how offensive and defensive systems related and drew the conclusion that the Soviets must agree since Chernenko said they were organically linked. I related this to assumptions of the early 1970’s and the fact that we were both engaged in research in this area. I concluded by making the point that if nuclear arms are seriously reduced there is less to defend against and therefore an SDI role is more easily defined.
5. This led Gromyko to a long disquisition on how the Soviets view SDI as not defensive but offensive because it will become the basis for the first strike. He concluded that neither side needed SDI. We need to do away with sword and we don’t need a shield, he said. We will not participate in the creation or justification of any such system. He [Page 1319] called on us to end our SDI research program (we had already said that we would not do so, and why). If the U.S. creates it we will take measures to guarantee our own security, he said. He claimed they have been restrained in their criticism of SDI thus far but would really go to town on world opinion if we proceed. Therefore he urged us to reconsider. He digressed to say that he had reported faithfully to his colleagues the good words you had said to him, particularly in private in Washington, but they all want to know what this means in practice. Things today seem even worse than in September. He particularly denied that they had an important SDI program of their own. He said on verification that they are prepared to go for highly developed measures if an arms control agreement is really important and, by implication, the inverse.
6. I then gave a long pitch on importance of verification and our disappointment with past performance on their part. I then tried to contrast his view of our effort with what a neutral viewer might conclude: pointing to the sustained Soviet effort in both offensive and defensive fields and lagging U.S. effort. I again made the point that a serious reduction in offensive arms makes the argument on defensive effort leading to a first strike have much less force until nuclear weapons reach zero level when the argument has no force at all.
7. Bud gave an excellent presentation of your reasons for attempting to see through research on whether there is a role for defense to enhance deterrence. He emphasized the effect on deterrence if the offensive balance should become unstable through the growth of cruise and mobile missiles. Also that Soviet offensive and defensive programs could undermine offensive deterrence. He added the psychological problem of relying on massive offense versus systems that threaten no one. He also described why Soviets should have no fear of first strike.
8. I then asked a series of questions designed to get Gromyko to say how they would propose to get radical reductions. He was resoundingly unprepared or unwilling to give a credible response. But he went on to claim credit for a whole series of initiatives designed to make a more peaceful world.
9. Our final and most interesting exchange was on the structure of possible negotiations. He in effect proposed three fora—on space, strategic forces and INF—but gave it a complex overlay where a senior negotiator on each side would decide with his opposite number two questions: first, the terms of reference of each group; and, second, whether anything decided or negotiated in a particular group or fora could be allowed to surface for decision by governments if its interrelationship with work in the other groups had not been approached. This is their way of applying the quote, organic link, unquote. Gromyko said that their senior man would also be the negotiator in one of the [Page 1320] groups. Some things would not require the establishment of interrelationship, e.g. an agreement or moratorium on space weapons or certain CBMs in strategic talks. Anytime an agreement met the criteria it could be brought out and approved. At no time did Gromyko indicate that they had given up their demand that the objective for one of the fora was prevention of the militarization of space. He did say magnanimously that of course such matters as non-first use, freeze proposals, TTBT/PNE and CTB could be brought out and agreed at any time.
10. We ended with my expressing some skepticism that we could do this with any ambiguity remaining that we were proceeding with the third forum on the basis of their formula on the preventing the militarization of space. I also stressed that I would want to personally keep a close hand on any such talks as they proceed and would hope to have periodic reviews to move them along.
- Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N850001–0159. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Priority to Moscow. In his diary for January 7, Reagan wrote: “Only 1st reports from George S. & Bud in Geneva & not much to talk about. I’ll try to remember ‘no news’ may be good news.” (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 414)↩