Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985

333. Memorandum From Ronald Lehman of the National Security Council to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, December 13, 1984

SUBJECT

• Conversations with Paul Nitze

During a discussion of Geneva formats,² Paul Nitze indicated to me that he could serve for only three or four days every few months and for that reason, would not be able to head a permanent combined negotiation. He admitted that Shultz favored Option 5,³ a combined negotiation, but pointed out that Shultz had not objected during the last NSPG when the President noted that there seemed to be something of a consensus to go in with Option 2 (3 different talks) and fall back to 4 (merge Start and INF and have a different space negotiation). Nitze said that Shultz’s reluctance may have been related to the difficulty of finding someone to head the combined talks. Nitze made clear that, because of his wife’s health, he would not be available. He believes that he has made that very clear to Secretary Shultz and to you.

Nitze had met with Ken Dam to review a list of possible candidates for formal space talks.⁴ Paul flashed the list in front of me pointing out that no one was satisfied completely with anyone on the list. Some of the names had checks by them, but it was not clear what that meant. He noted specifically that Ed Rowny is supported by the President, but was not on the list. Paul noted that Bill Hyland was on the list, but considered very far down (no check), and that Larry Eagleburger was on the list but “uncertain” (no check). Bob Buchheim had been ruled out for health reasons.

Beyond that, the names I can remember are John Tower (check?); Warren Zimmermann, former DCM in Moscow (check); Roger Kirk, FSO (check); Mike Glitman, MBFR (check); John Woodworth, OSD representative to INF (check); Brent Scowcroft (check); General Lew Allen, Ken Adelman (check); Jim Goodby, CDE (?); Dave Emery (check); Hal Sonnenfeldt (check), Johnny Foster, TRW (?); Bob Plunkett, Hughes Aircraft; General William Y. Smith (?); and about five others. Paul noted that my name was on the list, and I saw that there was a check by it.

I pointed out to Paul that option 5, more than with options 1 through 4, requires a very distinguished negotiator, someone of his stature. Again, he responded adamantly that his wife’s health would not permit it. This may explain in part why he has not been pressing for early establishment of formal negotiations. His own participation is enhanced, absent his ability to chair formal negotiations, by continuation of the talks at the ministerial level because this is likely to be periodic rather than continuous.

Prior to my private discussion with Paul, Bob Linhard and I joined Paul and Jack Chain in a discussion of Paul’s Offense/Defense paper. We offered a few changes having to do with leak-proofing it on the issue of the circumstances under which we might “strike the first blow,” and offered to send further changes over in writing (Tab A).⁵

We then had a discussion of some basic substantive questions which Paul and his group had not answered. We pointed out to Paul that the Soviets are not opposed to defense, or even ABMs, per se. Rather they are focusing on space which gives them a handle on our ASAT and key SDI elements such as boost-phase kill and exoatmospheric intercept, while not interfering with their predominately ground-based BMD. I pointed out to Paul that it is the Soviet Union, not the United States, which is now in the best position to break out of the ABM Treaty. Citing the Beecher interview,⁶ I noted while it is imperative that we link offense to defense, there is a possibility that the Soviets might be willing to agree to expanded ground-based BMD, as long as space-based BMD research were further restricted. Clearly, it is the space-based technologies which give us the most military and negotiating leverage and it is in space that we can most easily compete with the Soviet Union.

((Note: Paul has himself indicated that he falls into that school which is most comfortable with ground-based systems and once said to me that he thought we might look at temporary limitations on space systems in order to reach agreement with the Soviet Union. It was for that reason that Bob and I thought it wise to stress the importance of protecting space options in order to protect the President’s vision and US leverage.))

I explained to Paul that while it is likely that the Soviet Union would attack SDI as a threat to the ABM Treaty, it was not at all implausible that the Soviets might offer, at some point in our negotiations, a compromise designed to exploit differences within the US. I gave a hypothetical example. While it is wise for us to address the offense/defense relationship by talking near-term versus far-term, with the near-term focus on compliance and limiting offensive arms and the long-term focusing on transition to defense, the Soviets could give us a package which does that in a way harmful to SDI. Suppose for example the Soviets said that for the near-term both sides will agree to tighten up the ABM Treaty to include much tighter restrictions on space R&D contained in a protocol that would expire in 1990, and a commitment not to deploy nation-wide or space systems contained in a protocol which would expire in the year 2000. Furthermore, suppose that they agree that we should re-establish in the near-term the relationship between offense and defense, as called for in the ABM Treaty, but require that we do it not by any significant reductions in existing offensive forces, but rather by increasing ground-based defenses of limited areas such as capitals and ICBM fields. Their approach to the Krasnoyarsk radar compliance question would then be to make it legal as part of an expanded ABM deployment made legal by amendment to the treaty. Such a proposal would look very attractive to those in the US who want to get us started with interim defenses, especially the ICBMs. However, it could work against the US in a number of ways. First, it is the Soviet Union, not the United States which is in the best position for near-term, ground-based ABM deployments. Second, effective use of BMD for ICBM survivability requires an MX and could be helped by improved basing modes not yet available. Third, keeping offensive forces at high levels is easier for the USSR than for the US and reduces the usefulness of ground-based BMD to us. Fourth, such a package would simply result in diverting funds and political support away from the high technology approaches to defense in which we excel, and push us toward the need for more traditional BMD deployments which are both expensive and politically controversial.

Bob Linhard was very successful in reminding Paul of the different legal and social problems we face with respect to land-based deployments of anything. He noted that political guerilla warfare and socio-environmental challenges stand in the way of any extensive deployment of small mobile missiles or ground-based BMD. This does not mean that we cannot do such things, but it does mean that it is important to us to avoid placing ourselves at a competitive disadvantage during the transition to defense.

I pass all of this on to you simply because I know you have given a great deal of thought to these issues and may be faced with near-term decisions that have enormous impact on the future. We remain available to talk to you about these and other issues.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Geneva Talks—Background #2 12/13/1984. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. McFarlane wrote in the upper right-hand corner: “Good work Ron.”
2. See Document 332.
3. See footnote 4, Document 331.
4. In a personal note on December 12, Dam wrote: “I had an interesting luncheon today with Paul Nitze and Jim Timbie to go over ideas about negotiators for the upcoming arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union and to discuss Nitze’s general philosophy with respect to arms control negotiations. Nitze’s main substantive point was that he was opposed to interim agreements, or indeed even a permanent agreement, that did not go all the way that we wanted to go in achieving reductions. His view is that the United States made a very serious mistake in entering into the offensive weapons interim agreement in 1972 and we should not make that mistake again. In fact, he went so far as to argue that SALT II was defective in large measure because the 1972 agreement left us in a position of inequality.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1984–June 1985)
5. See Document 343.
6. William Beecher, “Soviet Softening on Arms is Seen,” Boston Globe, October 25, 1984.