332. Memorandum for the Record by Ronald Lehman of the National Security Council Staff1
SUBJECT
- Shultz, Nitze, McFarlane, Lehman Conversation
Following the December 10 NSPG,2 Paul Nitze indicated that Secretary Shultz wanted me to join in on a meeting with Bud. Shultz began [Page 1181] describing a concept for dealing with Geneva. The basis of his concept which he called the “Christmas Tree” was to begin with general discussions which would lead to the formation of branches. Shultz indicated that Nitze had prepared a short paper on the basic presentation and asked Bud to take a look at it. Nitze noted that it was the same paper that he had given me earlier. I responded that it was similar in focus to ideas which Bud and I had discussed. Nitze said that this was because it had been my idea and that he had simply fleshed out what I had told him. I responded that it was close to our thinking but that there were some problems with the approach.
Shultz added that we need a program for dealing with the Allies and Congress and we need a Public Diplomacy strategy. We need to know in advance what we will say in Geneva to the press. Shultz had wanted to take Nitze to Europe with him for consultations but it was more important for him to stay here with Jack Chain to complete the work that must be done. Shultz indicated that Nitze had been talking with various officials around town and he hoped that by working with Cap and the Chiefs, we could get a consensus. Bud responded that would be very constructive and that the whole purpose of the SACG was to make certain that everyone was heard and that we could draw from best ideas. Bud noted that we were working on clear decisions on objectives for Geneva and instructions which set boundaries on what should and should not be done. Such instructions should be to the President by January 1. We will have to deal both with format and with substance to include tradeoffs and incentives. We need to know how and when to deal with Shultz’ proposals.
Shultz indicated that the magnitude of Soviet buildup provides us with major incentives to reduce and with respect to START and INF, mutual threats provided them an incentive to come back to the talks, however, we have more incentives to come back than they do. The Soviets have studied defense longer than we have. Shultz could imagine a very good defense compatible with little offense but we have to reduce the offense otherwise we could never do defense. The President was correct in pointing out the value of new technology but if we are not careful, SDI will only encourage the Soviets to build up in ways that we cannot match. SDI also doesn’t address defense of their air-breathing systems. I responded that possible high leverage defenses could permit the defense to negate even very large forces. Shultz said that could be true but that in Geneva, we need to find a way to present SDI that doesn’t exacerbate the problem. He indicated that he thought Paul’s paper could do that by focusing on immediate and long term goals that would protect R&D but not deployments. I responded that we must be very careful with such phasing because it could result in undercutting the SDI program. I thought we could work these problems [Page 1182] if we were careful but we must not lose sight of our objectives. Bud commented that I should work with Paul to improve the paper. Attached is a copy of Paul’s draft with my immediate comments.3
- Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Geneva Talks—Background #2 12/13/1984. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. The memorandum for the record is unsigned. In a covering memorandum to McFarlane, Lehman wrote: “Attached for your information is a Memorandum for the Record of our conversation with Paul Nitze with a copy of his paper that I have annotated.”↩
- See Document 331.↩
- The attached paper is a draft; the final version is printed as Document 343.↩