Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985

123. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, October 3, 1983

SUBJECT

• U.S.-Soviet Relations Post KAL–007

As most participants in your Saturday session on U.S.-Soviet relations concluded, the KAL shoot-down, while not changing the nature of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, has modified the timetable in a way which could in turn have significant impact upon those relations.² Prior to that event, we had underway a process of gradual and tentative expansion of the U.S.-Soviet dialogue. This expansion affected the level of contacts, with two Gromyko meetings scheduled this month alone and the possibility of a Summit next year, and their substance, with agreements on grain, consulates and cultural exchanges in hand or in prospect, with progress on specific human rights cases, and movement on MBFR and START.

Our objectives were to restrain the Soviet reaction to INF deployment, to reassure the European and American people during a difficult period, and to open the prospect for significant East-West agreements in several areas. The key element of the pre-KAL U.S. strategy, both for restraining the Soviets and for achieving significant new agreements, was movement on START. For the Soviet part, there was some tentative evidence of a willingness to also move in START and meet us half-way on several other issues which divide us.

While the KAL shoot-down has not necessarily derailed this strategy, its evolution has been slowed to the point where there is little prospect for meaningful movement in U.S.-Soviet relations before the U.S. electoral season intervenes next summer. As a consequence, the plight of KAL–007 has also diminished our ability to restrain the Soviet response to INF deployment or to modify Soviet behavior in other areas. In shooting this plane down, the Soviets had made it more difficult for us to expand either the form, or the substance, of our dialogue, as we had intended.

Continuing Incentive for Dialogue

As your discussions in New York have illustrated,³ there is general and, I believe, justified view that the Soviets are likely to maintain their current tough and unyielding attitude for some time, probably through 1984—unless they see a greater likelihood than they now do of getting something substantial in negotiations with the United States. Events in the coming months, in particular INF deployment, will lead the Soviets toward further steps which are likely to increase still more the strain upon our relations. While it remains unlikely that the Soviets, in reacting to our deployment, would court a major confrontation—over Cuba or Berlin, for instance—we cannot be certain. In any case, there are measures short of nuclear deployments to Cuba or pressure on Berlin which could force U.S. responses, and Soviet countermoves, the net effect of which could produce confrontation, or something approaching it.

Another INF move is probable, designed to stop our deployments. There is some evidence the Soviets could be considering a unilateral withdrawal combined with a joint moratorium on new deployments. We also should not rule out a more major “peace initiative,” e.g., proposal for a summit premised on no U.S. deployments. Over the next six weeks they could focus on raising the level of fear, getting Europeans really scared and then hit with their peace initiative. On balance, however, we think a basically tough stance is most likely—with only a cosmetic move on INF.

Other factors will also intervene throughout the year to further complicate the U.S.-Soviet relationship. In the early months of next year, for instance, the Chinese Prime Minister will visit Washington, and the President will visit China. These events, and the statements which will accompany them, will further feed Moscow’s sense of encirclement. Stimulating Moscow’s paranoia can be beneficial, in giving the Soviets a motivation to improve their own ties to Washington, but for this benefit to be realized, we must be in a position to channel Soviet frustrations in positive directions. This will be difficult in early 1984. Later in the year, the U.S. election campaign will divert Washington attention, and affect, in ways not yet fully predictable, Soviet calculations.

American military power and other factors impose important disincentives to provocative Soviet action. Yet vigorous and, when possible, positive dialogue can also help avoid misunderstanding or miscalculation, and add incentives for restraint to Moscow calculations.

In the current, pre-deployment period, American initiatives to explore areas for agreement with the USSR can pay immediate benefits, in allowing us to occupy the high ground in public perceptions and in calming the mood in the United States and particularly Europe. Such initiatives can perhaps also temper decisions which will be made in Moscow in these months, the results of which will become apparent only after the U.S. deployment begins.

But with Allied confidence in our ability to deploy on schedule growing, our principal concern should gradually shift toward the management of the U.S.-Soviet relationship in the post-deployment period, when new and threatening Soviet statements and actions must be anticipated. Given the pressures to which U.S.-Soviet relations will be subject throughout 1984, it is in our interest that we fully engage all the governors on that relationship which a dialogue can provide.

Incentives for Restraint

As before KAL–007, arms control, particularly START, will have to carry the weight of any positive effort to restrain Soviet behavior. To take steps now on arms control may be politically difficult; significant movement in other areas is almost certainly out of the question at least for the immediate future. In INF, we can and should elaborate upon our new offer in the coming months. We must recognize, however, that we have taken the last major unilateral step we can afford in this negotiation, and prospects for progress now really do depend upon Soviet movement, which is improbable before December. In MBFR, we should pursue the bilateral dialogue which the Soviets have agreed to open, and also take a forward step in the multilateral negotiations. Yet we should recognize that there is nothing we can offer the Soviets in this negotiation which would affect their concerns over INF deployment.

Only in START, ultimately the more important of the two nuclear negotiations, could the prospect of a mutually advantageous accommodation significantly affect the Soviet behavior in other areas. In particular, only the prospect of achieving meaningful limits on the strategic threat could help offset the consequences on U.S. INF deployment for Soviet planners.

Unfortunately, the now-approved “build-down” concept will not strike the Soviets as a plausible basis for negotiated arms control, although we can expect them to seize upon aspects of the idea to impose unilateral constraints upon American force planning. Neither should we expect the other modest steps on START which were discussed at the NSPG to lead to a more optimistic Soviet assessment of the prospects for this negotiation.⁴ If strategic arms negotiations are to play any significant role in either Washington’s or Moscow’s calculations over the coming months, we will need to revitalize consideration of steps designed to merge the U.S. and Soviet negotiating frameworks.

In moving toward a more dynamic START negotiation, we cannot realistically aim for an agreement, even a Vladivostok-type framework agreement, by next year. START remains, however, the most powerful of the positive potential governors on the U.S.-Soviet relationship. It is thus an important device with which to help manage this relationship through what is likely to be a rough period.

Opening Channels

We also need to consider steps to restore the appearance of a dialogue between Washington and Moscow. President Reagan has not yet responded to Andropov’s message on INF of several weeks ago.⁵ He should do so soon, and we should let this become publicly known. When and if significant decisions are taken on START, we might consider despatching Brent Scowcroft to Moscow as a Presidential envoy to explain the new American ideas. Lower level exchanges with the Soviets (e.g., Chet Crocker with his counterpart, perhaps Max Kampelman with appropriate Soviet officials on human rights and CSCE follow-up, perhaps further talks on hot-line upgrade and other CBM’s) should continue. We also might consider sending someone from the Department to Moscow for another review of the bilateral relationship, as part of showing that a dialogue still exists. We should not anticipate, however, that these lower level exchanges can make more than a marginal impact, either perceptually or substantively, on the dialogue.

Thus we also need to consider when and how to resume contacts at your level. As substantive developments allow, I recommend you take up again your discussions with Dobrynin on START, MBFR and other issues, letting the fact, but not the content, of these meetings become publicly known. The next natural occasion for a meeting with Gromyko will not occur until next Fall’s UN General Assembly, unless a Ministerial level opening of CDE this January is agreed. I understand the reasons you prefer that such a CDE session not be held. Yet the potential benefits, in terms of renewing the high level U.S.-Soviet dialogue and demonstrating continuity in the East-West relationship in the immediate aftermath of INF deployment, are sufficiently great that I recommend you not exclude altogether the possibility of eventually agreeing to join in a January meeting in Stockholm. Neither should we entirely exclude, at this point, the possibility of proposing a meeting with Gromyko at some other neutral site this Fall, although we will want to be wary of feeding unrealistic hopes for a last moment breakthrough on INF just as the deployments begin.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, October 1–8 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Printed from a copy that indicates Eagleburger initialed the original.
2. Shultz held regular Saturday morning meetings with various Soviet experts to discuss issues and policies related to U.S.-Soviet relations. There was no consistent note taking for these meetings.
3. See Document 119.
4. An NSPG meeting on START took place on September 29. See Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XI, START I, Document 80, footnote 2.
5. See Document 81.