451. Report Prepared in the National Security Council1
Evening Reading Item
The PRC met today to discuss the policy implications of a possible increase in Soviet pressure on Pakistan, including a direct attack.2 The CIA estimates that while a direct Soviet attack cannot be excluded as a possibility, it is unlikely, given Soviet concerns with detente, Muslim attitudes and the danger of provoking closer US involvement with Pakistan. The Soviets will, however, put increasing pressure on Pakistan. (S)
Rather than move directly to specific issues for decision, Ed Muskie used this session for a broad exploration of the implications of the problem, leaving the specifics for a second meeting next week. A number of extremely interesting issues were developed, notably:
—What steps can we take that will both signal our concern to the Soviets and encourage the Pakistanis to continue their support of the insurgents?
—The possible need to respond to a Soviet thrust against Pakistan; is the US willing and able to respond militarily?
—To what extent does our aid to the Afghan insurgents contribute to an escalation of Soviet pressure on Pakistan which, in turn, could draw us in?
—Should we begin to approach Congress now to educate them on the possible choices before us? How should we proceed on the Symington Amendment? (S)
Defense will be preparing some specific arms packages that we might need to supply to Pakistan in an emergency; we will discuss that and other issues when the PRC reconvenes early next week. (S)
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Daily CIA Brief File, Box 29, 7/16/80–7/22/80. Secret; Sensitive. Carter initialed “C” in the upper right-hand corner of the report. Thornton sent the report to Brzezinski under a July 17 covering memorandum, in which he reported that “there would be no Summary of Conclusions at this point.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton Subject File, Box 103, PRC: Pakistan 7/17/80: 7/80)↩
- For the minutes of the meeting and Thornton’s July 21 memorandum on the proceedings, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Documents 303 and 304.↩