Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

303. Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, July 17, 1980, 11 a.m.–12:20 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Minutes—PRC Meeting on Pakistan (C)

PARTICIPANTS

• State

  • Secretary Edmund Muskie
  • Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary
  • David Newsom, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
  • Harold Saunders, Ass’t. Secretary

• Defense

  • W. Claytor Graham, Jr., Deputy Secretary
  • Ambassador Robert Komer, Under Secretary for Policy

• Office of Management and Budget

  • John White, Assistant Director
  • Edward Sanders, Assistant Director for Nat’l. Security & Internat. Affairs

• Arms Control and Disarmament

  • Ralph Earle, Director
  • Spurgeon Keeny, Deputy Director

• Joint Chiefs of Staff

  • General David Jones, Chairman
  • Lt. General John Pustay, Ass’t. to the Chairman

• Central Intelligence Agency

  • Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director
  • Robert Ames, NIO for Near East and South Asia

• International Development Cooperation Agency

  • Guy Erb, Deputy Director
  • Frederick Schieck, Deputy Ass’t. Adm. for AID-Bureau of Asia

• White House

  • Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • David Aaron
  • Henry Owen

• National Security Council

  • William Odom
  • Thomas Thornton

Muskie: Expressed his appreciation for the opportunity of considering our current policy towards Pakistan to determine if it is relevant to the problems that we may be facing. He asked Adm. Turner to begin with an estimate of Soviet intentions.

Turner: Summarized the CIA paper which is Tab A of the package for the meeting.² He reiterated that the Soviets are likely to concentrate their efforts on the Afghan side of the border. We have noted the use of a large number of land mines already and a strong pressure on food supply. He believes that they will also continue to probe against Pakistan on a small scale but the degree of Pakistan resistance is likely to be the measure of how aggressive they get. (That is, if the Pakistanis resist effectively, the Soviets will hold back.) He does not expect a change in that policy barring a drastic further deterioration of the situation in Afghanistan or a belief that the western countries are backing the insurgents more openly.

Muskie: To what extent are the Olympics a factor? After they are over will the Soviets increase their pressure within Afghanistan or in cross-border raids?

Turner: They certainly will within Afghanistan, although we have not yet seen any build-up yet. I do not think that the end of the Olympics will have much impact on their intentions towards Pakistan.

Jones: Said that he agreed with Turner’s estimate. The Soviets would be very ruthless internally and would try hard to seal the border. There might then perhaps be some increase in incursions after the Olympics.

Turner: Estimated that the Soviets would need from 200,000 to 250,000 men to suppress the insurgency in the major border areas. It would take them from six to twelve months to achieve that kind of a build-up. He also noted that October–November is the beginning of the bad weather.

Muskie noted that a build-up of Soviet forces within Afghanistan would be likely to trigger an enlarged flow of equipment to the insurgents, hence increasing the importance of control of the border. Would that sequence of events be likely to trigger a stronger Soviet reaction?

Turner: Possibly. The issue seems to be more what the Soviets think is the flow of weapons to the insurgents from outside. They probably overestimate that considerably today. The bulk of the equipment being used is acquired within the country. In an escalating situation ammunition would be an increasing problem.

Muskie: A substantial Soviet build-up would seem to be counter to the diplomatic initiatives they are taking with regard to claims of withdrawal, SALT, TNF, etc. How would this affect their thinking?

Turner: We think they will probably take a middle course. The drain on their resources is not unbearable. They are very intent on playing the European card and are unlikely to risk this by a dramatic upswing in their activity. We think that they are following a long haul strategy.

Muskie: If the Soviet small scale probes meet only soft Pakistani resistance, might this expand the Soviet probes?

Turner: Perhaps, but these are raids, not an invasion. We have noted that the nationalists are using Pakistan increasingly as a base of operation rather than simply as a refuge. We expect that small Soviet incursions are a likely response.

Muskie: Is there a possibility of an interplay arising out of this that would generate momentum towards an invasion? Should we not take this into account in our current activities?

Turner: Certainly, but I still think that the Soviets will show a lot of patience.

Jones: We agree that they will be ruthless internally and perpetrate some incursions. If that doesn’t work then they are likely to escalate their attacks.

Turner: Also notice that there is an air option available. It is a less clear-cut kind of aggression and the Pakistanis have less capability to meet it.

Muskie: There probably will be a need for increased help to the insurgency. Does this mean that we should help the Pakistanis more? Are they likely to ask for substantial increase of that assistance?

Komer: If the Saudis come through, we will be able to supply quite a bit of equipment in sales. So far we have only had tentative probes from them asking what sort of equipment might be available.

Turner: We do not think the Paks have any expectation of military aid from the United States unless things get much worse for them.

Komer: There is a modest flow of material now in sales and a fairly big pipeline.

Saunders: We should remember that there was a large exercise earlier this year to respond to Pakistani concern.³ Since then they did not want to continue along this line with us. We have very little exchange with them now in terms of discussions of military matters.

Muskie: If we assume the most probable scenario as set forth by CIA, should we not now be considering a shift to a more overt program of assistance to Pakistan and the Afghan insurgents?

Claytor: One possibility will be to earmark a regional contingency fund in FY 1982 to take care of Pakistani requirements should they arrive.

Christopher: We would still however have to get a waiver to the Symington Amendment.

Aaron: Why don’t we try to get some IMET money for Pakistan and then use that as a vehicle to seek a waiver of the Symington Amendment. Perhaps we would get more support on the Hill for that approach.

Muskie: It is not only a question of what the Congress wants. We would also have to consider how a more open supply program would affect our relations with the Soviets. We are now in a dialogue with them on a number of matters; open assistance to the insurgents and the Pakistanis would have some effect on that.

Turner: We can avoid being seen as giving open help to the insurgents. The controlling factor there is Pakistan; they are unwilling to take greater risks by being a conduit for equipment.

Muskie: Should we therefore give up the idea of a more open involvement?

Turner: The issue is, if Pakistan is put under more pressure by the Soviets are they likely to respond by retrenching their efforts or by going open in their support of the insurgents?

Christopher: Let us ask what the action forcing events might be that would cause us to increase our aid to Pakistan, and how we can be ready in that case. I see the critical event as a threat to the independence and integrity of Pakistan. We need to define perhaps more exactly what that would involve. If there is a possibility of such a threat, what steps should we then take and how can we plan for them?

Saunders: Also, what steps should we take if we see danger looming on the horizon but not quite imminent?

Aaron: I don’t agree with the CIA estimate. I think that the Soviets will continue their program internally until they have subdued the insurgents and then they will lean hard on Pakistan. The best way to do that would be to create a major incident inside Pakistan. Do we think that Zia would be able to withstand such an incident? Pakistan needs some firm signs of assurance from us as Hal Saunders suggests.

Jones: They will seek to intimidate Pakistan.

Newsom: One unknown is what the Pakistanis may think of all of this. Perhaps we should raise this question with Agha Shahi when he comes here and Hummel could speak directly to Zia. Pakistan may prefer a non-military response in case of a Soviet threat—for instance recourse to the UN or to the other Islamic countries.

Muskie: Is the requirement for us to give a signal to the Soviets? What should we be considering in the way of a US response including military supply? There are a number of aspects—the attitude of Congress, the governing law, allies, our relations with the Soviets, etc. Should we be considering specific steps now or should we wait until we have had consultations with the Pakistanis?

Brzezinski: In addition to speculating on what the Soviets and Pakistanis might think we should ask what we want to do in order to influence the Soviets and what we want the Pakistanis to do. I see two things: First, we want to deter Soviet political intimidation of Pakistan. Second, we want Pakistan to continue its role of maximum support to the Afghan resistance. If this is correct then we should take actions that first, send a message to the Soviets that would threaten escalation should they put too much pressure on Pakistan (this might not necessarily imply a military response), and second, give the Pakistanis a political and psychological sense of assurance that we will respond if they turn to us. This will fortify them. Both of these objectives can be served by the same policy, specifically a greater predisposition to help on military supply. I do not think there is any basis for approaching the Soviets now with warnings about actions against Pakistan.

Muskie: I agree with that. But what are we prepared to do?

Brzezinski: The State Department paper (Tab B of the briefing package) outlines a number of steps to be taken in the military supply area.⁴

Erb: The Congressional attitude is also vital. How can we best handle the Symington problem—the way David Aaron suggests?

Aaron: Pakistan may not want military assistance from us; IMET may be the best path for both of us to take.

Brzezinski: Consultations with Congress would in themselves be a desirable signal.

Owen: I agree that pursuing IMET is the best route.

Aaron: The danger is however that Congress might just change the law only to deal with IMET and not give us a broader waiver.

Muskie: There would certainly be no point in having to go to Congress twice if we could avoid it.

Owen: But would you not be able to explain to them what we are trying to do?

Muskie: If we go and ask for a waiver of the Symington Amendment this will be seen as a major signal of increased US involvement with Pakistan. Are we ready to take that step?

Brzezinski: What do you think the chances are of Congress cooperating with us?

Muskie: It would depend on how hard we attempt to sell it. We would have to make the contingency of Soviet pressure seem real and serious. This would be the Tonkin Gulf Resolution of the Middle East.

Brzezinski: But let’s look at it the other way around. What would the response be if the Soviets were to crush resistance in Afghanistan and successfully intimidate Pakistan?

Newsom: We can help Pakistan without lifting the Symington Amendment if the Saudis are prepared to pay the bill in an emergency. We have the airlift authority as we have used in Thailand.

Muskie: But the Saudis are pressing us to increase our aid to Pakistan. Will they help us out if it means that we can avoid increasing our aid because of their help?

Saunders: The Saudis would be likely to help us if there were a real emergency, but it would be harder to get their assistance if we were simply trying to fend off a future Soviet action.

Newsom: We have to accept the fact that we will get no help from the Pakistanis in this area in terms of their moderating their nuclear program.

Aaron: Are there perhaps ways to diminish the image of a major commitment and the symbolic qualities? Congress after all was prepared to act earlier; could we not go back to them in September to take a “modest step”? Perhaps we could provide some continuing role for Congress if we were to take further steps in waiving the Symington restriction.

Muskie: The environment has changed. It would have been easier in January but now Congress is less concerned about a Soviet attack on Pakistan and more worried about US involvement. They remember that “modest steps” led us into Vietnam.

Brzezinski: But we are already in July now and moving on towards August. Perhaps in the near future you and Harold Brown could start consultations quietly explaining that the post Olympic period may bring the Soviets into a direct confrontation with Pakistan. You could ask for Congressional views and point out the various ways in which we might have to respond. If we did this it would become public knowledge through leaks, and this would be a useful signal in itself.

Muskie: That might be a useful approach. We would not want to take steps now that assume there will be a Soviet action after the Olympics. Bear in mind that there are restraints on the Soviets. Discussions would however be good to forewarn Congress and educate it about a possible future danger. We would keep the consultations limited (they would leak anyway). This will of course prompt the Congressmen to ask the very kinds of difficult questions that we are asking around this table here today. We will have to have our responses worked out in advance. They, too, will leak. It is hard to decide now but at some point we are going to have to determine what our future responses would be. Would a major invasion of Pakistan call for a US military response? The 1959 Agreement does not of course force us to make an automatic response.

Brzezinski: If they ask that kind of a question, remind them of the trouble that Dean Acheson got into on Korea by answering that kind of a question.

Muskie: Of course, but you should have the answer formulated in your own mind.

Brzezinski: I think it would be good to make Congress think this issue through, just as we are doing today.

Muskie: Also, let us consider that the assistance that we have provided to the insurgents has helped generate the very problem we are facing. If we provide more help, it will lead to more tension. Thus, our own actions are moving us along towards the ultimate question. I wonder if Pakistani steadfastness would warrant such action on our part? We have not faced this question in any serious discussions since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Turner: We have to ask ourselves how important it is for us to frustrate what the Soviets are trying to do in Afghanistan.

Christopher: Having consulted with Congress often before, I am not sure it is in our interest to raise this question with them before an election. We would have to talk to people such as Church, Javits, and Lugar as well as Howard Baker. Congress is getting very gun-shy on the question of Pakistan; they note our general lack of money and the great distance that Pakistan is from us. We should do our full contingency planning before we go to Congress. The non-proliferation question also is going to be a difficult one as we know from our current experience on Tarapur. I am very skeptical about conditional consultations unless there is a new threat and we have a program that we want to sell.

Jones: Pakistan’s military deficiencies are so glaring that only a large input of Saudi funds could provide them with a military capability to withstand Soviet pressures.

Komer: We have never really explored the option of going to India to ask them to provide assurances that they will not attack Pakistan. This would enable the Pakistanis to move any of their forces from the border with India to the Afghanistan side.

Muskie: What kind of leverage do we have with India?

Komer: The Indians are very nervous about our military assistance to Pakistan. We could point out to them that the level of our assistance to Pakistan will to a considerable extent depend on how much the Pakistanis need. That in turn could be affected by Indian behavior. The Indians giving assurances to us might not do much for the Pakistanis. Assurances to third parties such as the Saudis and others might be more credible.

Thornton: I am dubious about this sort of an approach; it has never been helpful before when we tried it.

Brzezinski: In any case it doesn’t get to the gut issue—how do we warn the Soviets and reassure the Pakistanis? Precisely at the time of an election we might be forced into doing more than we expect. Therefore there may be some utility in showing now that we are concerned and thereby heading off the danger.

Christopher: Shouldn’t we ask the Pakistanis what they want?

Brzezinski: No, we would probably get the wrong answer. We want to convey our own level of concern. Congressional consultations would be useful; preliminary discussion is better than waiting and having to respond quickly to a rapidly evolving crisis.

Aaron: We have up until now tried to keep ourselves in the background of this effort. The discussion today doesn’t seem to reflect that fact. We are trying to keep the Muslims in front. The Soviets have not been able to make us the issue and we don’t want them to. We are talking today too much about US involvement.

Muskie: Perhaps, but this group should discuss these issues in order to keep precisely that from happening.

Brzezinski: David Aaron may be correct in the present context but this would not be true in face of a Soviet threat of the kind discussed in the cable from Ambassador Hummel which triggered this meeting.⁵

Aaron: I just want to emphasize that we may not have to be in the front line of response. We should certainly try to keep out of it.

Brzezinski: We need to give a signal to everybody that it would be unwise to internationalize the conflict.

Newsom: I think it might be better if we entered our consultations with the Pakistanis through intelligence channels rather than directly with Zia or Agha Shahi. Can we do this?

Turner: Yes.

Muskie: Given the most probable scenario as described by CIA, do we have a clear idea of what Pakistani requirements would be? Could we meet these requirements without taking the matter up with Congress? Is there a scenario that we should discuss with Congress?

Turner: The Pakistanis have told us what their needs are in terms especially of man-held anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons. They have not however defined their own requirements precisely. They do not want to make a request to us on an overt basis because of the past bad experience they had with the $400 million offer.

Muskie: We have to understand the full impact of their requirements.

Jones: The basic level of assistance needed for correcting the most glaring deficiencies is about $600 million. If you add fighter aircraft to this the figure goes up to $1.3 billion and there are incremental packages that would increase it $2.1 and $6 billion depending on the level that you wanted to reach.

Brzezinski: The State Department paper lists various kinds and types of equipment. Would that represent the $600 million package? Would that not be the kind of package to talk to Congress about as the requirement if there were a Soviet military threat?

Christopher: The Senators we would have to talk to would respond poorly to such a suggestion.

Newsom: But if we were to decide that we had to respond we will have to get a 36B waiver if we are to respond quickly, even using Saudi money.⁶ Therefore we should forewarn Congress.

Muskie: But deterrent action vis-a-vis the Soviets raises the risk of escalation. Congress will automatically assume that you are underestimating the dangers.

Aaron: If a major contingency were to come about could we deter it? What should we do best to strengthen the response?

Turner: The likelihood of intense Soviet pressure on Pakistan is very high; a major ground force attack is not a very likely case. The main deterrent is the Pakistani will to resist. Therefore our help to Pakistan will be the main deterrent to Soviet action.

Owen: We will have to be very careful that the Congress does not say the wrong thing about Pakistan and thereby weaken, rather than strengthen, its resolve.

Muskie: At very most I think I would talk to the Majority leader by himself. But I will want to consider doing even that. We have explored all the points so far. I’d like to meet again on the basis of this discussion and continue on. In the interim we can crystallize our thinking. Let us meet next week on Monday or Tuesday.⁷

Newsom: Could the military contingency package be better refined?

Jones: We have it in hand. We can reduce our paper to something specifically related to State’s options.

Brzezinski: Yes, let us cost out the military package that State has suggested.

Muskie: At our next meeting, let us try to reach a consensus on these issues.

The meeting concluded at 12:20 p.m.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton, Country File, Box 103, Policy Review Committee (PRC): Pakistan, 12/27/79: 7/80. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.
2. The briefing package for the meeting was not attached and not found.
3. See Document 151.
4. The State Department paper was not found.
5. A possible reference to telegram 6618 from Islamabad, July 7, in which the Embassy reported on a meeting between Peck and MFA Director General Khan. The discussion centered on the acute food shortages faced by the Afghan insurgents, and the possibility of Soviet forces escalating their military campaign against the rebels. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800325–0321)
6. Under Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, Congress must receive 30 days advance notice prior to a Presidential administration concluding a government-to-government sale of military equipment valued at $14 million or more, defense articles or services valued at $50 million or more, or design and construction services valued at $200 million or more.
7. The following Monday was July 21. A PRC meeting took place July 22.