304. Memorandum From Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1
SUBJECT
- PRC on Pakistan (Continued) (U)
I was rather bemused by Muskie’s performance at the first session of the PRC last Thursday, including his coy disclaimer at the end.2 One observer suggested that he was demonstrating his doubts about “your” policy of bolstering the rebels. He continually returned to the question of whether we were not, in effect, helping create precisely the situation we are worried about (i.e. a Soviet attack on Pakistan). (S)
There is of course considerable truth in this but it is not much use for policy planning. First of all, there doesn’t seem to be much of any alternative that promises success for our policies. Also, we are not the only ones stoking the fire; the Arabs, Chinese and, of course, many Paks themselves are enthusiastically involved. Finally, the Afghans are going to carry on, and as long as they do the Soviets psychologically have to believe that foreign assistance is the reason for the insurgency no matter what the truth. (S)
In the area of difficult questions, let me commend one more to your conscience. At what point does our rhetoric and covert assistance to the Afghans simply encourage them to get themselves killed uselessly? I don’t think we have reached the point yet and may not for quite a while. Perhaps never. It is something we have to keep in mind and review periodically, however, since a policy of using Afghans “to make the Soviets pay” is morally defensible only as long as it does not lead to avoidable and unnecessary bloodshed. (S)
The second broad question that Muskie raised is how far do we want to go in committing ourselves to Pakistan? Would we commit military forces? Are we whistling in the dark? Do we risk misleading the Pakistanis to their great detriment? These questions make me extremely uneasy. I am not convinced that the American people and Congress have had their consciousness raised to the point where we would really [Page 812] stand behind Pakistan. There will be too many “good reasons” to renege on whatever commitments we make. (S)
This is related to an issue that Muskie did not directly raise: How much effort do we want to put into our relationship with Pakistan? This is something that the PRC should address, especially as regards economic assistance. You probably have a greater sense of urgency in this matter than anybody else around the table and will have to articulate it if the message is to be gotten through. (The issue is not so much substantive as overcoming bureaucratic inertia.)3 (C)
The following are some more specific questions that arose from the Thursday meeting and will probably recur. (The list draws, in part, on the internal State briefing memo for this meeting.) (U)
1. What steps can we take to signal our concern to the Soviets and encourage Pakistani support of the insurgents? (Arms sales is the only item on the horizon.) (S)
2. Should the US be more openly involved with the insurgents? (Muskie asked this several times; the answer is that our role is limited by Pakistani sensitivities.) (S)
3. How can we ensure that we do not get out front too far and that we keep the Muslims in the lead? (Or, put another way, how do we keep this in the East-South, rather than East-West context?) (C)
4. When (and how) will we know that the Soviets have overstepped acceptable bounds in their dealings with Pakistan? (S)
5. How can we best consult on these matters with the Paks? Agha Shahi-Muskie this week? Hummel-Zia while Shahi is out of the country? Intelligence channels? (Probably all three in varying degrees but I like the Hummel-Zia channel best if Zia is willing to commit himself without Shahi. This also raises the question of what Hummel is supposed to tell Zia. You should urge State to produce some instructions to Hummel for our clearance.) (C)
6. Related to this, what should Muskie tell Agha Shahi when they meet?4 State will probably brief him to stick to Afghanistan and third country issues; should he raise the bilateral relationship? If so, in what terms? (C)
7. If Muskie consults with Byrd, what should he say? State will point out to Muskie that the conversations could soon get off into War Powers considerations and the like. I am concerned that this is likely to scare off any but the most intrepid supporter of Pakistan. If it is the case, however, we had better face it now. Incidentally, in the Thursday [Page 813] meeting you indicated that it didn’t matter whether the Paks would like the idea of our consulting with Congress with the attendant leaks. It could matter very much if the Paks found it necessary to repudiate the position that we had taken with the Congress. We don’t need another affair like that. (C)
8. DOD is supposed to come in with a pricing for the military equipment package that State postulated. (See my comment on the general pricing question, below.) Press State on the question of rapid funding in an emergency—especially if the Saudis are uncooperative. (C)
9. Make sure that contingency planning proceeds apace between State and DOD—chaired, if necessary, by Odom.5 (S)
10. Perhaps the single most important specific thing you can do for US-Pakistani relations at this meeting is to raise the issue of price quotations on F–15s.6 (You will have to raise it; State won’t.) The Paks have asked us how much 40 or so F–15s would cost. State is unwilling to tell them (or if so, to tell them in a negative way) on the grounds that by quoting prices we are conveying a willingness to sell. That is nonsense, if we make ourselves clear to the Paks. They need data for planning purposes and if we want to be seen as a credible friend to them, this is the minimum we can do. The country director, just returned from a trip to Pakistan, underscores this as the most important single item pending with Pakistan. (S)
11. Further to the question of whether to tell Zia where the Persian Gulf is: According to a CIA report, Zia told the Chinese that “The US appeared to be interested in the security of the Persian Gulf but not of Pakistan.” This reflects his apparent assumption that Pakistan is not included in the US security perimeter. (S)
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Council Institutional Files, 1977–1981, Box 80, PRC 144, 7/17/80, Pakistan. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Odom and Owen. In the upper right corner, Thornton wrote: “Note particularly the starred items.” A stamped note at the top of the memorandum reads: “ZB has seen.”↩
- See Document 303. Reference is apparently to something Muskie said off the record.↩
- Thornton placed a star in the left margin beside this paragraph.↩
- Thornton placed a star in the left margin beside this sentence.↩
- Thornton placed a star in the left margin beside this paragraph.↩
- Thornton placed a star in the left margin beside this sentence.↩
- No classification marking.↩
- Brzezinski drew an arrow in the right margin beside this sentence. He crossed out “intermediate level contingencies,” and wrote several words above the phrase, but the text is illegible. Muskie and Shahi met on July 23. For their remarks to reporters after the meeting, see the Department of State Bulletin, October 1980, pp. 74–75.↩
- At the bottom of the list, Brzezinski wrote: “indicate willingness to expedite [illegible].”↩