Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

256. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, July 1, 1979

SUBJECT

• Nicaragua: Planning for the SCC and for the Torrijos Meeting (S)

Rather than suggest a strategy for the three meetings (although I have drafted an agenda at Tab A for the SCC meeting),² let me focus this memo on three subjects: (1) the optimal political scenario in Nicaragua and what it will take by the US to make it work; (2) what Torrijos could contribute to this strategy; and (3) how the President should structure his meeting with Torrijos to accomplish (1) and (2). (S)

1. The Optimal Political Scenario

There is a fundamental difference between Vaky and Christopher on the one hand and NSC on the other on how we should approach the transitional problem. David and I have described that difference in great detail, and I therefore won’t repeat the arguments again; but it is imperative that the SCC address this issue head-on, and the President needs to resolve this split early on Monday.³ If we approach the meeting with Torrijos and the next few days unfocused without having reached a clear decision on this issue, we will have thrown away our last opportunity to influence events. (S)

The scenario described below presumes that the NSC strategy has prevailed. Every piece of this scenario should be in place before D-Day (departure day for the Somozas), and to accomplish that, we will have to risk describing all of these pieces to all of the actors. Timing must be precise. (S)

On D-Day, events should transpire according to the following sequence:

1. Somoza and his entourage should depart. (S)

2. Simultaneously, the National Assembly should elect David Zamora or someone else as Provisional President. (To obtain a quorum, we will need to actively encourage many members to attend. We should inform them that a meeting is necessary to plan for the transitional phase. We should inform as few as possible that Somoza will depart simultaneously.) (S)

3. The Provisional President should then appoint a Committee to Oversee Negotiations for a New Government (CONNG) and transfer formal responsibilities over the government and the National Guard (GN) to this committee. (The Committee should be composed of moderate leaders who opposed Somoza.) (S)

4. The CONNG should announce the departure of Somoza and the appointment of a new Guard Commander and the immediate reconstitution of the GN (including the purge of those involved in flagrant corruption and repression). It should call for a ceasefire, request international humanitarian assistance, and call for immediate negotiations with the FSLN/Provisional Government (PG) to establish a new government with early, free, and fair elections. (S)

5. A massive international humanitarian assistance effort should begin, including as many Latin American countries we can find to support it. Simultaneously, Panama and Costa Rica have to stop the arms flow to the Sandinistas and seal the border. (S)

6. Torrijos, CAP, Herrera, and Carazo should encourage the moderate elements of the FSLN to begin negotiations with the CONNG. (The FSLN will find itself in a very difficult position at this moment. The leadership knows that the base of its support will melt with the departure of Somoza, provided that the departure and the establishment of the CONNG is credibly a break with the past. The FSLN/PG will try to argue that nothing has changed; it is just “Somocizsmo without Somoza,” but if the new leadership of the GN and the CONNG are credibly independent of Somoza and if they fill the National Radio with appropriate anti-Somoza propaganda (stealing the lines of the FSLN), the FSLN/PG will find itself on the defensive. The FSLN/PG will probably announce its total unwillingness to negotiate with this new “Yankee convention.” The following two weeks will be critical. Our objective should be to bring maximum pressure on Torrijos and others to get parts of the FSLN to negotiate. If we can succeed, the FSLN will split between the moderates and the extremists, and the moderates can then join the CONNG and, if necessary, fight the extremists.) (S)

7. The US should coordinate its statement with selected Latin American countries, welcoming the CONNG as a first step to a free government in Nicaragua. We should say that we have permitted Somoza to come to the US in order to contribute to an enduring democratic solution in Nicaragua, and we will not permit him to [plot his] return to Nicaragua. (S)

8. It is possible that the CONNG can begin to evolve into a government, but we should make clear at the beginning that is not our intention. Our ability to make this scenario work will rest at least in part on our ability to persuade the moderates and other Latin Americans that we are not trying to set up a competing force to the FSLN/PG. My guess is that if the CONNG lasts two weeks and the process gains some international support as we hope, that the CONNG will become the pivot if not the nucleus for a new government. (S)

The question which you need to get the SCC to focus on is not whether this can work, but how can we make it work. What do we need to do between now and D-Day (which should be Thursday⁴ at the latest) to make this scenario happen? (S)

As Pezzullo points out in his scenario (attached at Tab B),⁵ the only way we will get anyone to stick their necks out at this time is to give firm, unequivocal assurances of US and international support. That means political statements, a humanitarian aid airlift, assistance for economic reconstruction, and perhaps military aid as well. These are the decisions that need to be made tomorrow. (S)

2. Torrijos’ Contribution

Torrijos is not only orchestrating the supply of arms to the Sandinistas, he is also putting a lot of pressure on Carazo to allow the Sandinistas continued use of Costa Rica as their principal staging area for the war in Nicaragua. If Torrijos were to stop the flow of arms, the Sandinistas would probably be hard pressed to continue the war for very long. If Torrijos were to bless the CONNG, and join with us to provide humanitarian assistance and perhaps contribute troops to a peace-keeping force, that would probably assure the success of our strategy. Since he is the most radical of our “friends,” Torrijos’ commitment to our strategy would probably assure the commitment of the Venezuelans, the Costa Ricans, and the Andean Pact countries. (S)

3. A Strategy for the President’s Meeting with Torrijos

Torrijos is approaching this issue from such a different direction than we are, that Ambler for one does not believe it is possible for the President to persuade Torrijos to make the contributions listed above to our plan. He may be right, but we also acknowledge this is a long shot. Here is my suggestion on how the President should proceed. First of all, it is vitally important for the President to know exactly where Torrijos is coming from on this issue. Torrijos hates Somoza with a passion, and sees the Sandinistas as “his kids.” He has worked with them for a long time, and he sees them as nationalists and populists, possibly not very different from the way he sees himself. He believes that our information on the Communist tendencies of the Sandinistas reflects our historical obsession with Cuba and Communism, and is simply inaccurate. He acknowledges that there are differences within the Sandinistas, but he thinks that “his” Sandinistas will ultimately prevail. He has come to Washington to try to convince Carter to trust him and support “his” Sandinistas. With Carter’s support, Torrijos probably believes he can influence the Sandinistas in a way which will serve both of our interests. (S)

The President should play to Torrijos’ penchant for conspiracy, and ask Torrijos to come into the Oval Office for a one-on-one.⁶ He should begin by telling Torrijos that he has always opposed Somoza and Somocizsmo, and is willing to bring his power to bear to see Somoza’s departure soon. The problem is how to assure that democracy will prevail in a post-Somoza period. Then he should restate his understanding of Torrijos’ attitudes (paragraph above), but then bluntly say that Torrijos should be the first one to know that while Torrijos has a lot of influence over the Sandinistas now, this will change as soon as they sieze power. Torrijos will have to acknowledge this, and then the President should proceed to a more detailed description of our plan and how Torrijos should work with us to implement it. If this is acceptable to you, I will prepare detailed talking points, with the thrust being to try to get Torrijos to lead the moderates of the FSLN into a new governmental structure. (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 30, Meetings—SCC 175: 7/10/1979. Secret. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that Brzezinski saw it. Brackets are in the original.
2. Tab A is attached but not printed.
3. July 2.
4. July 5.
5. Tab B, attached but not printed, is telegram 2930 from Managua, July 1, in which Pezzullo endorsed selecting as quickly as possible a “senior GN officer to take over the GN upon Somoza’s departure,” and stressed that international support would be “a sine qua non for the successful creation and survival” of a “caretaker regime.”
6. See Document 258.