257. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter1
SUBJECT
- Meeting with General Torrijos on Nicaragua
The purpose of your meeting is to enlist General Torrijos’ help in putting into effect the Transition Formula for Nicaragua, described at Tab A.2 If you can persuade General Torrijos to agree to the formula, you should encourage him to go immediately to San Jose, meet with Carazo and Carlos Andres Perez. The three of them would then negotiate the formula with the Provisional Government. Ambassador Bowdler would be pleased to accompany him.
The underlying idea is that Torrijos, Carazo and Perez would become our partners in working out a peaceful, democratic solution for Nicaragua in keeping with the spirit of the OAS Resolution. At the same time, it should be made clear that the United States is not dealing itself out of the Nicaragua problem, that we have clear interests in Central America and cannot remain indifferent to events there.
It is important that you understand where Torrijos is coming from. Torrijos hates Somoza with a passion, and sees the Sandinistas as “his kids.” He has worked with them for a long time, and he sees them as nationalists and populists, possibly not very different from the way [Page 640] he sees himself. He believes that our information on the Communist tendencies of the Sandinistas is simply inaccurate. He acknowledges that there are differences within the Sandinistas, but he thinks that “his” Sandinistas will ultimately prevail. He has come to Washington at your invitation, but he probably intends to seek your support for the Provisional Government or for some plan built around it.
I recommend that you make the following points and then ask Christopher and I3 to negotiate the details of an agreement. After a suitable period, I recommend that you return and seal the agreement.
—We are both vitally concerned that a peaceful and democratic solution emerge from the tragic Nicaraguan crisis, and that solution should be consistent with the spirit of the OAS Resolution.
—We are convinced we can get Somoza to resign.
—We clearly share the same interests and should logically work together as partners, together with President Carazo and ex-President Perez in bringing about a desirable solution.
—I want to describe in some detail to you what we believe would be a durable formula which would bring peace to Nicaragua through a transition government leading eventually to free elections.
—In our view you, Carazo and Perez are uniquely qualified to work out this solution with the Provisional Government in San Jose.
—There is also need for international support for such a solution within the Hemisphere and we would look to you to help obtain it.
—At the same time, however, I must stress that the United States has vital interests in this part of the world. You should not confuse our adherence to non-intervention with passivity or an indifference to political outcomes, or an unwillingness to take concrete actions to protect our vital interests.
—Let me describe the general points of the transitional plan which I think will save Nicaragua further bloodshed and provide for a democratic and enduring solution.
• First, Somoza will resign, and the Congress will appoint an interim President who will then immediately appoint a new Director of the National Guard. We should try to reach agreement among ourselves on who that person would be.
• Secondly, the interim President will proclaim a ceasefire and standstill and will transfer power to a Junta. I know that you and President Carazo share my belief that the current Junta is too narrowly based. What is needed is additional members, and these should include moderates and also the new Director of the National Guard. This can [Page 641] be done in several ways. An expanded Junta could be the Executive Body, or a smaller three-man group (composed of Ramirez; the National Guard Director, and a moderate like Fiallos), or by selecting one man as the executive, preferably a neutral figure such as the Rector of the University in Leon (Fiallos) or the head of the Red Cross (Reyes).
• This Junta would be the executive body of a new government of national reconciliation, which would enforce the ceasefire, prevent reprisals and begin the task of reconstruction.
• I will rely on you to enforce the total cessation of all military assistance to the FSLN.
—I would like Warren Christopher and Dr. Brzezinski to discuss the proposal in detail and try to reach an agreement with you. I hope that when you leave today, we are proceeding down the same track.
In the background of this discussion, there looms the larger question: who decides the future of Central America? It is essential that our new policy of non-intervention not be interpreted as a political vacuum, which can be filled by forces hostile to us. The United States would be seen as genuinely impotent if events in Central America were to be shaped by a Castro or even a Torrijos—and the domestic political consequences of such a perception could be extraordinarily costly.
This is why it is essential to impress upon Torrijos that the United States is absolutely firm in its determination to create in a post-Somoza Nicaragua the preconditions for a genuinely democratic political process, and that we expect Torrijos to cooperate with us. Moreover, if Torrijos is not prepared to cooperate with us or intends to deceive us, we should make it clear to him that we are prepared to use our resources to create conditions more to our own liking—and our support for the National Guard is a central source of leverage in that respect.
The above should not be conveyed in a threatening fashion; in fact, you should try to enlist Torrijos as a partner, and he has great faith and trust in you. The point is that he should understand that he is your junior partner, and that the United States has very definite notions as to the outcome that we desire.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 57, Nicaragua: Current Crisis: 1–7/79. Secret. Carter initialed the top of the document.↩
- Tab A, attached but not printed, is a July 2 paper entitled “Nicaragua: Transition Formula.” An undated memorandum entitled “Nicaragua: Political Scenario for the Transitional Process,” includes a handwritten note which reads: “Discussed with the President on July 2 before July 3, 1979 meeting with Torrijos.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 36, Nicaragua: 7/1–4/79)↩
- Carter deleted the word “I” and replaced it with the word “me.”↩