Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

258. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 3, 1979, 9 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• General Omar Torrijos, Panama
• The President
• Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant for National Security Affairs
• Warren Christopher, Acting Secretary of State
• Viron P. Vaky, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs
• Robert Pastor, Staff Member, NSC
• Mrs. van Reigersberg, Interpreter

The President: (after a warm embrace and exchange of greetings) Your new President is doing a very good job. He was a very good choice. (U)

Torrijos: Yes, he is a fine fellow. (U)

The President: How is your daughter? (U)

Torrijos: She went to Walter Reed for a checkup yesterday afternoon—she is fine and is on her way home. (U)

The President: I think you know everybody here. I would like to talk to you about Nicaragua. Our nation, both our nations, are greatly interested in having stability in Central America and in the enhancement of democratic principles there. I am aware that you have taken a great interest in Nicaragua (laughter from Torrijos), and we share your conviction that Somoza must leave and that the people should choose their own leader. I am also aware that you have been working and consulting with former President Perez of Venezuela and President Carazo. We have recently heard that Perez and Carazo have suggested additional names for the interim government.² I assume you are familiar with this process, are you not? (S)

Torrijos: Please go on, I will comment later. (U)

The President: The names suggested are: Mariano Fiallos, Ernesto Fernandez Holman, Emilio Alvarez Montalban, and Julio Gutierrez. (U)

Torrijos: I only know Fiallos. Which Gutierrez is that? (U)

The President: He is a General who is Nicaragua’s Ambassador to Tokyo. He has been out of the country for 15 years. Another name is Ismael Reyes who is head of the Red Cross. (S)

Torrijos: He is a good man. I think he is the one whose sister is married to Colonel Mendieta. He has national prestige. (U)

The President: Fiallos is the Rector of the University. Now two or three other names have been put forward as possible leaders of the military—perhaps the National Guard. The Costa Ricans and the Venezuelans favor Gutierrez—he has been in exile for 15 years and enjoys the respect of the other leaders. (S)

The reason I wanted to talk to you is that I know you better than I do the other leaders. For us, the names suggested by Carazo and Perez are satisfactory as additions to the present members of the Provisional Government. Now let me outline to you what we would see as a satisfactory procedure for the future. Please respond and give me your views, then perhaps you could meet with Mr. Brzezinski, Mr. Christopher and Mr. Vaky, and give them your advice on what we should do from here on. Please speak frankly if you have any differing opinions—our time is short and I want to be sure that I understand your views fully. (S)

—First, I would hope that there could be an agreement between the U.S., Panama, Costa Rica, Venezuela, and perhaps others, that the present interim government should be expanded by adding the names suggested by Carazo and Perez which are satisfactory to us. (S)

—Second, I would hope that there could be general agreement on who would head the military forces during the transitional period. Two names have been suggested, those of General Gutierrez and General Guerrero.

—Third, if Gutierrez is satisfactory, then he should be made a member of the governing body, perhaps as Secretary of Defense or as head of the military. (S)

—Fourth, if there is general agreement, then the Provisional Government should commit itself to establishing a ceasefire, to a maintenance of the status quo as far as military actions is concerned, to a promise of no reprisals against any of the combatants, and, later, to a merger of the military forces to protect Nicaragua in time of peace. (S)

—Fifth, I also want your full support, in addition to that of Carazo and the Venezuelans, to stop any military assistance to the FSLN during this period. On our side, we will prevent any aid from reaching Somoza and his forces. (S)

—We will take the responsibility for Somoza’s leaving Nicaragua, and we will help organize humanitarian and economic assistance to support the country during the transition. (S)

—The Congress would then be convoked to name a President who would serve very briefly, perhaps only a day or two or even less. This President would be someone who is respected by all, such as Reyes or Fiallo. The President would call for a ceasefire, and proceed to name the persons who would be in charge of the military—Gutierrez or Guerrero, or, perhaps one of three colonels whose names have been mentioned: Miguel Blessing, Nicolas Valle, or Isaias Cuadra. (S)

Torrijos: Do you mean Valle Salinas? He is a good man. He is Chief of Police in Managua, but has talked with the Sandinistas. (S)

The President: Yes, perhaps he could be commander of the military and Gutierrez, Secretary of Defense. Carazo and Perez seem to favor Gutierrez on the grounds that he has always been anti-Somoza, has spent the last 15 years in exile, and is a respected senior general. I do not know him myself. (S)

The President would then convoke this larger group of 10 men who would go to Managua. The President would proceed to resign, leaving that group as the recognized Provisional Government responsible for Nicaragua’s affairs. It would arrange for elections, confirm the actions already taken, and establish a democratic government with the complete exclusion of Somoza and his people. (S)

I would like to have your opinion of these general arrangements, on the understanding that these names suggested by Carazo and Perez are fine with us—if there is any possibility of a change in these names, we would like to be involved in their approval—but let me ask you, how do you feel about this process as a way of getting rid of Somoza, ending the bloodshed and bringing about a new stable government? I presume it is satisfactory with you if Somoza leaves Nicaragua. (S)

Torrijos: Well, getting rid of Somoza is the best thing that could happen to America, to the whole world for that matter. (S)

The plan is good. But it is also important that a plan exists, that we have a plan. I must say that the names don’t mean much to me, but what is very meaningful is the attitude of the Sandinistas and the Government of Reconciliation, and their attitude is a very forthcoming (amplio) one. (S)

If we start to work well together, in coordination, with Carazo and Perez, we can establish a government which has the capacity to respond to unforeseen events. That is what worries me the most. (S)

The intention is good. The direction is great. Everything is fine that far, but it is very, very important that the plan not fail. If we take these things which you suggest and suggest them as a possible solution, we will try to sell them, to see how acceptable they are. Now the U.S. should take a back seat—if it is in the front row there will not be much of an inclination to accept the plan. The U.S. should not be the first face they see. (S)

The course of action to be followed should also be planned in advance. Somoza is like the screw in the DC–10—when he goes everything is going to blow—he operates on the “apres moi le deluge” theory. There is also the possibility of a collective popular euphoria following his departure. This euphoria can be in our favor but might also be bad. There is likewise a good chance that there will be one or several attempts by the military to organize counter-coups. (S)

In all this there is one thing of which I am very, very certain—that is, that when all is said and done, when the clouds have cleared, when there is less distrust than now, we will all be surprised, amazed, at how close we are together. Here I am talking about the Sandinistas, the U.S., Venezuela, and Panama. (S)

The U.S. has got to do something spectacular—well, we are doing it now, even though it is rather a deterrent—because at the present time the Nicaraguans have a worse image of the U.S. than anyone else in the entire world. We are all Latins, though. Today, we hate you; tomorrow, we love you. That is the way I am too—you scold me quite frequently and sometimes I even think you are right, and in the end I am not as bad as I look! (S)

President Carter, it is very important also for you to continue contacts with these governments and that you praise their role. We, ourselves, do not seek honors; we prefer results. But such distinctions are very important to Latin Americans. You should refer to the “miraculous formula” put forward by the Andean Pact, and give the impression that the solution is theirs. Otherwise, I am afraid that others will become jealous of me. (S)

Also, let us not stand on principle as far as names are concerned. Someone from the U.S. asked me for a statement calling for moderation on the part of the Sandinistas. Well, such a statement has no substance, means nothing. What is much more important and substantive is that the Sandinistas have accepted the idea of establishing a sanctuary of 500 hectares at Montelimar so that everyone who wishes to do so can leave. They have also agreed to joint patrols of the road from Managua to the Montelimar Airport which is 50 km. long. This would allow any criminal who wants to leave to go. The Sandinistas told me that this was a brillant idea and would eliminate the need for so many military trials. This is more important than a statement. (S)

Now, let me summarize my main points:

1) I agree with the plan.

2) The need to provide for a capacity for the Provisional Government to respond to unforeseen events.

3) The importance of the U.S. speaking emphatically and favorably about the “extremely valuable cooperation of these countries in seeking a solution.”

4) The need for the United States not to appear to be linked to the plan in any way. Let us take it and see how acceptable it is. (S)

The President: First, this meeting is being kept confidential. Second, in our public statements we will endorse the proposal made by the Andean States, Costa Rica, and perhaps by you. (S)

Third, we have a great interest in Nicaragua being a stable country, in an end to the bloodshed, and in a democratic government being freely chosen by the people of Nicaragua. Although we acknowledge the leadership of Carazo, Perez, and of you, yourself, we must be involved in determining what happens in Nicaragua. All the names I mentioned were suggested by Carazo and Perez with the exception of Reyes. We will act, not as leaders, but in support of the solution, and can give military aid to the future government once stability returns, and can supply economic and humanitarian aid as well. (S)

Let me ask you two questions: First of all, if you, Carazo, and Perez—and the U.S. also—publicly support this list of names for the Provisional Government, do you think the Sandinistas can be induced to agree? (S)

Torrijos: Yes, but I will need a few hours—a few hours to speak to them and to sell them the list. (S)

The President: Secondly, during the transitional period, can you assure that military weapons will not be sent into Nicaragua? (S)

Torrijos: To the Sandinistas? I can give assurances with a high percentage of certainty, to the extent that the Salvadoreans and Guatemalans do not send arms either and that the black market is brought under some kind of control. (S)

The President: We will use our influence on Guatemala and El Salvador. I think it is important for us to act quickly. (S)

Torrijos: Very important. (U)

The President: I would like to ask you to stay in contact with me, perhaps through Ambassador Vaky, in case any question arises or if you have any suggestions as to what we should do. For example, I would like to have your advice, together with that of President Carazo, on the timing and context of any public statement from Washington. I would also like to have information on the attitude of the Sandinistas and news of the approval by them of the names proposed by Carazo. If you would like to take some time to discuss the entire process with Pete Vaky, he is available, now,³ and if you need our communications facilities, perhaps to call Costa Rica, Ambassador Vaky can make the necessary arrangements. Thank you very much for coming. (All rise.) (S)

Even if we sometimes disagree on the details, we still agree on principles, on achievements—you are a good partner and a good friend. (S)

Torrijos: We each have our part to do.⁴ (U)

The President: Yes, we have the responsibility for getting rid of Somoza. (S)

Torrijos: Not the responsibility, the honor!⁵

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 37, Memcons: President: 7/79–9/79. Secret; Outside the System. The meeting took place in the White House Oval Office. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting took place from 9:02 to 9:53 a.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) Drafted by Pastor on August 15.
2. In telegram 2812 from San José, July 2, the Embassy reported that Carazo had spoken with Perez by telephone on July 2 and Perez had proposed Mariano Fiallos, Julio Gutierrez, Ernest Fernandez Holman, Jaime Chamorro, and Alvarez Montenegro as “candidates for possible expansion of the Junta.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840133–2002) In telegram 6050 from Caracas, July 3, Luers noted “with some pleasure and amusement,” that he had provided Perez with the suggested names aside from Jaime Chamorro. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840140–1660)
3. According to a July 3 memorandum of conversation, Torrijos, Lewis, Gonzalez, and Salamin met with Christopher, Brzezinski, Vaky, Moss, Bowdler, Pastor, and Hervas from 9:45 to 10:40 a.m. in the Old Executive Office Building. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 34, Memcons: Brzezinski: 7–8/79)
4. In telegram 173633 to multiple posts, July 4, the Department noted that Torrijos had telephoned Pastor to report that he was “attempting to bring Junta of PG together with its military leadership to Panama” for a secret discussion on July 4. The Department also commented that Torrijos was “trying to impress us that he [is] moving actively and rapidly.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 36, Nicaragua: 7/1–4/79)
5. Pastor sent the memorandum of conversation to Brzezinski under an August 20 covering memorandum explaining that he had reviewed his notes and the interpreter’s in order to produce a “combined Memcon.” Pastor also commented: “As I read through the Memcon, I was struck by how long ago that conversation seemed. Despite innumerable high level meetings to agree on a ‛plan’ for the transition in Nicaragua, and despite Torrijo’s virtually complete acceptance of that plan, not a single element of that plan was ever put into effect. That is really a sobering thought. Essentially what occurred was that we facilitated the inevitable—the departure of Somoza, the arrival of the Sandinistas. All attempts to fine-tune that transition were for naught.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 36, Nicaragua: 7/1–4/79)