259. Telegram From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State and the Embassies in Venezuela and Costa Rica1
2990. Am Embassy Caracas for Assistant Secretary Vaky; San Jose for Ambassador Bowdler. Subject: (S) Somoza/ The Fourth Meeting.
1. S-Entire text.
2. The Somoza group was the same as at our last meeting: Somoza, his son Tachito, ForMin Quintana, MinFin Genie and Luis Pallais. I began by asking Somoza for his assessment of the situation on the ground. He said the military situation was deteriorating because the Sandinistas had an open supply line while he has been cut off. He said this solemnly but with no evidence of panic. His son Tachito added that the morale of the middle-grade Guard officers was still good but they were becoming more anxious every day. He said they face continuous pressure from the FSLN with no evidence that conditions will improve for the GN. What bothers them most is the lack of any apparent solution to the problem. He said they were prepared to face the transition period and the removal of the Somozas and the top generals, but urged that any gap in command between the time the old commanders were relieved and the new took over would lead to fractionalization within the officer corps.
3. Somoza was very anxious about the delay in the timing of his departure from power. At one point in his review of the military he said an early political solution was necessary or the guard would not be able to defend itself, and that he would be driven to act on his own to save the people closest to him. I assured him that we were very conscious of how time-sensitive the situation was and were hopeful the conditions would jell within the next few days to permit us to set a departure date and begin precise planning. Luis Pallais interjected that he was having difficulty keeping a quorum because the Congressmen feared for their lives and saw little purpose in remaining in session. He said it would be hard to hold them beyond Saturday. (Comment: We have heard from some conservatives who have boycotted the sessions that they would be delighted to attend the session which accepts Somoza’s resignation.) Pallais complained that I was not very illuminating as to how things will work out. He said, “I heard that President Carter met with Torrijos2 to work out a democratic solution and that [Page 649] Ambassador Bowdler was meeting with representatives of the Andean countries and with the Junta, but you give us no details, and you ask us to wait.” I said I realized these were trying times but that I could say only that we were hopeful that we would be able to move forward in a few days. Somoza interjected “I hope so.”
4. Somoza said, “I realize I am a captive and am willing to go along with your plans, but I want the opportunity to express my views.” I said I was willing to listen and pass them along to my government. He then asked me to meet with him privately tomorrow at 3:00 p.m.3
5. Comment: Our estimation of the fighting and the stains within the GN [less than 1 line not declassified] account in large part for the growing anxiety within the Somoza inner circle. It is an important factor to contend with and will grow every day we are unable to set a date and agree on a countdown plan. The TCP formula must become operational very quickly.
6. The earlier we can get agreement on a new GN Commander the better. Once that occurs, he can set in motion certain essential confidence-building actions which will help allay the fears of the middle and lower grade Guard officers, who are the ones who command the troops and will form the nucleus of the GN after Somoza. I am more concerned about their anxiety than that of the Somoza inner circle at this point. We can live with the latter’s uneasiness; indeed, it probably is essential to ensure that we can dictate the timing of his departure, whereas the GN officers will have to remain to prevent an FSLN sweep.4
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850036–1841. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Panama City.↩
- See Document 258.↩
- Pezzullo reported to Bowdler and Vaky about his July 5 meeting with Somoza in telegram 3009 from Managua, July 6. Somoza pressed for details about the plan for his departure and his possible status as a resident of the United States. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850036–1848)↩
- In telegram 3032 from Managua, July 6, Pezzullo wrote to Vaky noting the “danger that the FSLN may drag out the negotiations in the knowledge that time is on their side,” and he endorsed a new scenario based on the “one move we can take on our own: get Somoza to resign” in the case that “we see the negotiations drag on and threaten to erode whatever GN strength remains.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850036–1853)↩