Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

260. Telegram From the Embassy in Panama to the Department of State and the Embassies in Venezuela, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic¹

Panama City, July 6, 1979, 0118Z

5118. For Deputy Secretary from Moss; Santo Domingo for Assistant Vaky only. Subj: Problem in Negotiations with FSLN. Ref: Panama 5094.²

1. Bowdler and I met with Torrijos, Escobar and Salamin from 3:15 to about 4:15 this afternoon.³ Bowdler left and I returned immediately to continue the discussion with Escobar, then joined by Salamin, occasionally Torrijos, and at last by a whole roomful of participants, including all the above-mentioned, Gabriel Lewis, PRD SecGen Nicolas Gonzalez-Revilla, long-time crony Rory Gonzalez (who had been present at our most recent meetings) and Costa Rican Interior Minister Johnny Echevarria. Meeting went until 6:30 pm.

2. The upshot of all these conversations was that Torrijos et al claim simple inability to get the Junta to increase its membership, and they state that it would be virtually unthinkable to include a military officer in the Junta. Salamin recalled that Panama had, in fact, counseled the Junta at the time of its formation to include a GN officer who had defected, Mendieta Chavez, but the Junta had refused because of the bad image of the GN.

3. The same reasoning expressed in reftel was reiterated to us in various different ways with the additional political explanation that the Junta was the product of a very difficult compromise among different FSLN factions and that it was just politically impossible to reopen that whole negotiation at this stage in the game. Torrijos became somewhat angry and upset during the latter portion of the meeting that the United States did not place confidence in him to steer the FSLN/GP in a direction of moderation, which he said he had the ability to do unless they lost confidence in him, which he said would happen if he forced something on them which they could not accept.

4. Urgent query for San Jose and Caracas: Torrijos claims that Carazo and CAP agree with him, and I think he was in touch with them by phone during my talk with Escobar and Salamin. Is he being accurate?

5. Bowdler and I recommend at this point that we fall back to a formula whereby the Junta is broadened by two acceptable civilians (Bowdler suggests Reyes and Calero) and the FSLN/GP accept a new GN director (outside of the Junta) who would meet our approval.⁴ Comment: The degree of strength we have in this negotiation will depend very much on answers from Caracas and San Jose.

6. On the question of a cut-off of arms to FSLN, we were met with the same old story that arms continued to flow to the GN from El Salvador and Guatemala, and that it would be unrealistic to think of allowing the GN to gain an advantage. In other words, although delicately stated, we should not count on them to cut off the arms supply. Nevertheless, Salamin stated that he found himself in the ironic position of hoping the FSLN did not gain too much military advantage, even though he had spent many months wanting them to achieve a military victory. He now realized, however, he said, that a military victory would not be conducive to a durable peace.

7. Torrijos emphasized that all other elements of our plan were acceptable, and he stuck to this view under specific questioning.

8. Am attempting to put the problem into a holding pattern until receipt of further instructions. We must move quickly, however, as FSLN leaders (who include Borge) are anxious to return to front.⁵

Moss

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 36, Nicaragua: 7/5–8/79. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.
2. In telegram 5094 from Panama City, July 5, Bowdler and Moss reported that Salamin had telephoned them during his second meeting that morning with FSLN military leaders. Salamin said that “the transition plan as worked out in Washington was acceptable to the group with the exception that the Panamanians were not able to achieve agreement on the broadening of the Junta of the provisional government.” He also noted a “sense of ‛victoriousness’ which increasingly affected the thinking of the FSLN.” Moss and Bowdler recommended that the United States Government “should go back to the Panamanians with a forceful position” regarding the expansion of the Junta. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840140–2656) In telegram 3002 from Managua, July 5, Pezzullo commented: “We should make clear to the Panamanians that the FSLN sense of ‛victoriousness’ results from the continued flow of arms to them while the GN has had its supply line cut off. Unless the Panamanians are willing to threaten the cut off of the pipeline the FSLN can continue to negotiate in Panama with the knowledge that the situation on the ground here is working in their favor.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 36, Nicaragua: 7/5–8/79)
3. In telegram 174365 to Caracas, July 5, the Department endorsed the recommendation given by Moss and Bowdler in telegram 5094 (see footnote 2, above) noting: “We agree you should take strongest possible position that it imperative to broaden Junta.” The Department also reported that Christopher had informed Torrijos that “the Junta must be acceptably broadened, or reformulated in an acceptable manner.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840140–1647)
4. Pastor underlined this sentence and wrote the word “fair” in the right-hand margin. In telegram 5121 from Panama City, July 6, Moss reported that Escobar had informed him about the Panamanian negotiations with the FSLN. Regarding the expansion of the Junta, Escobar “queried whether or not the inclusion of one military man would be sufficient by way of broadening the Junta.” Moss replied that “the understanding was that there should be two new members, a military man and a civilian.” Escobar also noted that Mojica “might not be the satisfactory addition to the Junta and queried whether Lt. Col. Bernardo Larios would meet with our approval.” Brzezinski wrote at the top of the first page of the telegram: “RP. Larios doubtful—an effort to split the GN command. Gutierrez and Mojica = our position.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 36, Nicaragua: 7/5–8/79)
5. In telegram 5139 from Panama City, July 6, the Embassy reported that Escobar had endured a “stormy and violent” debate with the FSLN leadership, who “agreed to broaden the Junta of the provisional government, but subject to confirmation after further consultations which they must have with other commanders in the field.” They also noted that a suspension of the aerial bombardments would “facilitate the process of bringing the commanders together to reach agreement.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 36, Nicaragua: 7/5–8/79) In telegram 3033 from Managua, July 6, Pezzullo advised against asking Somoza to halt bombing because “air power is the only effective force the GN has to combat the FSLN force which is capturing more towns daily and clearly has the momentum.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850036–1851)