255. Telegram From the Embassy in Panama to the Department of State1
4963. From Ambassador Bowdler. Subject: Nicaragua.
1. (Secret-Entire text).
2. Marv Weissman and I had a wide ranging, tough but friendly exchange with the FSLN–PG tonight. No converts emerged but the discussion got things on the table and fully discussed. The meeting took place in the rented home of Dona Violeta Barrios de Chamorro. She was there together with Ramirez, Robelo, Father Descoto and one of Mrs. Chamorro’s daughters. This time Ramirez emerged clearly as the spokesman, although all participated. Robelo looked uncomfortable and fidgetted a good deal. Descoto was pontifical, particularly on the scope and meaning of the OAS resolution.
3. I led off the conversation by saying that I wanted the opportunity to have a further exchange of views with them. When I had asked for the appointment, I had not been aware that I would be returning to Washington on consultation. The exchange therefore would be additionally useful because of this coincidence.
4. Wrapping myself again in the OAS resolution, I explained that the talks in Managua between Ambassador Pezzullo and Somoza were proceeding at an encouraging pace. I was hopeful that the first step of the OAS resolution could be achieved soon. This would open the way to proceed with the others. I repeated that we sought a “durable and peaceful resolution” and to achieve this a broad based provisional government is necessary and a clear understanding reached on the mechanics of the transition in order to avoid further strife and suffering. Among the issues that needed to be resolved by representative Nicaraguans are: cease fire, stand still, no reprisals, merger of FSLN and GN forces into a new military establishment and composition of the PG. I would welcome their views on these points.
5. Ramirez, echoed by the others, took the stand initally that all that is required under the OAS resolution is for OAS countries to break with Somoza and the solution would be at hand. The GN, particularly with a USG break, would crumble, the FSLN forces would take over, and they would proceed to Managua to form the government. Any [Page 633] other action was interventionist, contrary to the spirit and letter of the OAS resolution, and would contribute to the prolongation of the Somoza regime with a lot more blood shed.
6. I asked them to join me in examining these conclusions. I said our action was not interventionist because we were operating under declarative para one of the OAS resolution. This called on OAS member governments to take steps within their reach to bring about a solution that is peaceful and durable. What we are doing in trying to persuade Somoza to leave is fully consistent with the resolution. In fact to break relations, as they wanted, would not repeat not contribute to a peaceful and durable solution since there is a good possibility Somoza under those circumstances might not leave. The fighting would continue with the danger that it might increase, with internationalization of the conflict. Robelo retorted that the logic of the resolution in declaring Somozo inhumane and calling for the replacement of the Somoza regime was that all states should break with Somoza and accept the FSLN–PG which represents all the important opposition groups. I told him one could not stop reading the resolution at the end of the first of the four bases but had to go on to the operative part. Descoto chimed in to say that operative para one did not contemplate what we were doing in Managua. I replied that is simply not so. We must be realistic and practical. We all want Somoza to go, but how could this be accomplished peacefully without talking to him. Descoto interrupted to say that the “steps” contemplated were to break relations and not to bargain. I reminded him of the legislative history of the paragraph in which the U.S. had suggested adding the illustrative phrase about good offices which had been dropped because of general agreement that the concept was already included in “steps”. He nodded that was the case.
7. They then shifted arguments and accused the USG of trying to set up a rival group in Managua. They knew of our conversations with the FAO and COSEP and our efforts to get them to form a transitional government. They regarded this as unfriendly and unhelpful. They referred to the FAO and COSEP declarations as evidence of the solid support they enjoyed. I again assured them we were not seeking to establish a rival government in order to keep them out of the settlement. Again we must be realistic and practical. The departure of Somoza needed to be done in an orderly fashion. Authority had to flow to avoid dangerous vacuums. Furthermore, tough issues had to be addressed to facilitate as peaceful a transition as possible. I invited them to give me their views on these issues. The ensuing discussion produced these views:
—Cease fire: This would be possible following Somoza’s departure but cannot be a substitute for an FSLN victory. It is to be achieved either by the GN laying down their arms or as a result of the GN [Page 634] disintegration which is the more likely after their chief departs. I told them that neither assumption is necessarily correct. The FSLN has not defeated the GN which remains a perhaps weakened but nevertheless effective fighting force. There is no convincing evidence I have seen yet that the GN has suffered any serious defections or is about to collapse. There is a possibility if not probability that neither side can defeat the other militarily. Thus a cease fire will be necessary to avoid further bloodshed. They held to their view that only a FSLN military victory is acceptable but I thought their arguments lacked conviction. During this discussion Ramirez said the FSLN had been offered surface-to-air missiles but had declined because it would have represented an escalation in the fighting that could well internationalize the conflict. He indicated that he had personally opposed this, showing how closely associated he is to the FSLN. I congratulated him on the decision.
—Stand still: here again they advanced their theories on total victory and GN disintegration, hence they did not see stand still as a practical problem. They as the new government would handle any confrontations arising from force dispositions. I stressed that this is a serious problem and as an example referred to the GN in the Fortin outside Leon. Ramirez, looking at his watch, said that the Fortin was at that moment under FSLN attack and he expected it to fall shortly. I commented that loss of the Fortin would not resolve problem since it was a countrywide problem.
—No reprisals: They agreed this needed to be avoided but was really not a problem. While isolated cases of retribution could not be avoided, the PG was prepared to make an international commitment in the form of a communication to the OAS that there would be no indiscriminate shootings or executions. They referred to their good record. I said I recalled their assurances on this score at our first meeting, but I had also heard from a well placed church source who merits my full confidence that there had been numerous summary executions in Matagalpa and this was very disturbing.
—Merger of forces: They did not rule out the merger of “clean” GN forces in a restructured military establishment but they saw the reorganization and new command as falling to the FSLN leadership. They clearly did not look upon this question as one to be negotiated between FSLN and GN representatives. Rather the FSLN would determine what was “clean” and how it was to be incorporated with the revolutionary armed forces. Ramirez thought that many GN officers and men who had other skills would want out.
8. As the meeting came to a close, I observed that all these issues need further examination. I looked forward to seeing them on my return from Washington on Tuesday or Wednesday.2 I would get in [Page 635] touch with them. They expressed a willingness to continue the dialogue. Ramirez asked me how optimistic I was about Somoza’s departure. I told him I thought it was feasible and I was encouraged. He did not think Somoza would leave by persuasion. I told him not to be so confident. It was the possibility of that departure that made it so important to think and plan in terms of a peaceful transition in which all representative groups could participate. As a parting shot they said his departure would be on conditions set by him. I reassured them that there would be no conditions. They obviously were not convinced.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840140–2664. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Niact Immediate to Caracas, Managua, and San José. On another copy of the telegram Pastor wrote: “Only FSLN military victory is possible.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 36, Nicaragua: 7/1–4/79)↩
- July 3 and 4.↩