Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

232. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Vance in Tokyo¹

Washington, June 27, 1979, 2312Z

Tosec 60081/166142. For the Secretary from Christopher. Subject: Nicaragua.

1. Following is a summary of the principal developments today on Nicaragua:

2. Torrijos told Bowdler that the United States should work with the provisional government and seek to broaden it.² He said that he, Cap, and Carazo would help us, and would help arrange a ceasefire after the departure of Somoza. Bowdler is meeting in Panama tonight to meet with the “provisional” government. I am repeating Bowdler’s cable in full.

3. Our Ambassador to Honduras reports that Somoza has asked for military help from Condeca, the Central American defense organization. The Ambassador reports that President Paz of Honduras is unwilling to join such efforts.³ We have instructed her to urge President Paz to try to persuade his colleagues from El Salvador and Guatemala not to fuel the fighting at this stage.⁴

4. Somoza has been promoting a wide variety of rumors whose common thread is that the United States has agreed to resupply and prop up the guard in return for his willingness to step down. We have corrected this misapprehension in official circles in Managua. Because the rumors had reached the press, it was necessary for us to do some backgrounding to try to avoid the United States suffering a black eye here and in Latin America.

5. In my opinion the chances of our successfully pursuing path no. 1 (i.e. Somoza stepping down in favor of a transitional executive committee, with a reformation of the guard) are increasingly remote. Reports of the identification of the guard with Somoza, from top to bottom, make it unlikely that it would be acceptable even with a major transfusion of leadership. Moreover, the provisional government is gaining increasing acceptance and legitimacy. We need to handle our diplomatic efforts very carefully so as to preserve what chance we have to work with the “provisional” government. In this setting, we have turned down a DOD proposal to move a destroyer, a communications ship, and two aircraft carriers into waters off Nicaragua.

6. We do not yet have a report from Pezzullo on his conversation with Somoza.⁵

7. I briefed the Vice President at mid-day.

8. There will be an SCC meeting at 8:00 a.m. Washington time Thursday morning⁶ and we would appreciate any comments that you may have on the situation by that time.

Christopher

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 35, Nicaragua: 6/26–28/79. Secret; Niact Immediate; Cherokee; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to the White House. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Tarnoff; approved by Christopher. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840126–2414) Vance was accompanying Carter on a state visit to Japan and to the G–7 Economic Summit Meeting.
2. See Document 231.
3. Jaramillo reported this information to Vaky in telegram 3438 from Tegucigalpa, June 27. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850040–2425)
4. Telegram 166074 to Tegucigalpa, June 27, instructed Jaramillo to inform Paz that “it would be tragic if Condeca countries intervened” in Nicaragua and “merely prolong the civil war.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 35, Nicaragua: 6/26–28/79)
5. See Document 235.
6. June 28. See Document 236.