Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

233. Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to the to President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, June 28, 1979, 0200Z

Pass to Warren Christopher

1. To avoid possible embarrassment through highly visible contacts, I choose to speak to general Gutierrez by phone this morning, Tokyo time. We had a conversation of approximately twenty or so minutes.

2. He impressed me most favorably. He is sober, serious, thinks in concrete practical terms, and is prepared to be engaged.

3. He expressed the view that the situation is very grave and that it is essential that Nicaragua not go Communist. Somoza has spoken to him once, and will be speaking to him shortly again, but Gutierrez does not wish to be identified with Somoza as such. He told me he would call me back to let me know what transpires if the new conversation with Somoza actually takes place.

4. Gutierrez indicated that he would be willing to proceed to Washington within a day or as necessary. I indicated to him that in my view it would be unwise for him to go to Washington because the symbolism of such a visit might be counterproductive. He asked me whether we could provide assistance for his travel.

5. I responded that we would help him in any way we can, but for politically symbolic reasons it might be better if he travelled under his own auspices, perhaps transiting through the United States but terminating in a neighboring Latin country. He thought that perhaps it would be best for him to go to Panama. You might consider that at your end and give me any advice for him that you deem appropriate.

6. I explained to him in some detail our concept of the Executive Committee, of his cooption into it, and went through the names. He did not comment negatively on any of the names but expressed concern whether a body so collective could act effectively. I pointed out to him that it is almost inevitable that an individual would emerge as a dominant force within such a body, depending particularly on what resources he may have at his command. In this connection, I referred to the importance of the National Guard staying cohesive and under effective control. I think he took the hint because he agreed rather eagerly.

7. Immediately thereafter, he inquired about U.S. willingness to resupply the National Guard, and expressed concern that during the critical transitional phase the Sandinistas may launch an all-out attack and the Guard may disintegrate. I did not commit the United States but said that we would seek a cease fire, during which the Executive Committee and the Sandinistas would try to negotiate a joint government of national conciliation, and that our attitude toward the National Guard would be very much guided by the degree to which the new Executive Committee had gained legitimacy and genuine support of the moderate elements.

8. We finally talked about the National Guard itself. He spoke extremely well of General Fernandez, the current Chief of Staff, and expressed the view that he could hold the National Guard together. Moreover, he could work under Gutierrez, having done so in the past and being a personal friend. He then mentioned three other senior officers as individuals that could be helpful in preventing disintegration: Brigadier General Orlando Guerrero; Brigadier General Everto Sanchez, who has important contacts with Condeca; and Major General Cesar Suazo.

9. Please provide me with guidance on how next to proceed with Gutierrez. Should I explicitly urge him to return? Cy has been somewhat non-committal, and I have avoided pressing him directly, though I did convey to him that the situation was becoming more urgent. My feeling is that unless I urge him explicitly to return, he will simply wait for a “call” from the successor regime, and that “call” might not come in time or at all. If we need him to help stabilize things, we should not be shy in so telling him, but I need your judgment on this in the light of the rapidly unfolding circumstances on the spot. Finally, if you do want me to get him to move rapidly, provide me with details regarding his desired intinerary, where he would be met by our people for more thorough debriefing, and what his destination would be. In addition, I may need details regarding logistics and other support.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 35, Nicaragua: 6/26–28/79. Top Secret; Eyes Only.