231. Telegram From the Embassy in Panama to the Department of State and the Embassies in Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica1
4860. For Acting Secretary Christopher From Bowdler. Subj: Meeting with General Torrijos—June 27.
1. Accompanied by Amb Moss, I met with Gen Torrijos for an hour and a quarter at his Panama City residence. Marcel Salamin, at the Gen’s request, was also present.
2. I opened the discussion by contrasting the situation we face in Nicaragua today with that at the outset of the mediation last October. I described the two essential differences as: (a) the different military situation; and (b) the changed attitude of the hemisphere as reflected in the OAS resolution. Both of these worked to enhance the possibility of persuading Somoza to leave.
3. Against the backdrop of the resolution, I explained Amb Pezzullo’s going to Managua and my plans to proceed to San Jose. I stated that Amb Pezzullo’s mission is to achieve the first of the four bases of the OAS resolution. In the process, he might touch on aspects of the second point of the resolution but I wanted to make clear that this did not involve the setting up of a rival group to the provisional government in San Jose. We wanted a clear break with the past and are not considering Somocismo without Somoza. I made clear that Amb Pezzullo would not be presenting credentials to the Somoza govt and that my mission in San Jose would be to maintain contact with the provisional government and other opposition leaders in the Costa Rican capital.
4. I told Gen Torrijos that in the transition process we were concerned with two key aspects. One is to avoid a collapse of the institutional framework which could create a vacuum leading to a blood bath of retribution. Second, we wanted to make sure that the provisional govt which finally emerges is fully consonant with the second paragraph of the bases in the OAS resolution and thereby avoid political extremism.
5. After this initial presentation during which Torrijos listened without interruption, he advanced his own concept of the transition scenario. He strongly advocated using the existing junta and stated emphatically that, in his view, the junta would be willing to broaden its base, including specifically elements of the GN which had clearly [Page 589] broken with Somoza before his departure. With respect to the latter, he could not be sure whether these could be included at the junta level but was certain they could be incorporated at a reasonably high level in the transition structure. He spoke of recent meetings which had taken place by the ex-GN officers (he mentioned Mendieta and Larios) and FSLN leaders and said that he felt these had been successful. He believed that a fusion could take place between “untainted” National Guard and especially the more numerous tercerarios. He said that he, Carazo and Carlos Andres Perez were prepared to assist in this process.
6. In outlining the scenario, he was critical of how we were using our bargaining chips in persuading the FSLN provisional government to accept the balance that he knew we desired. He thought that our support of the “radical” OAS resolution might have been used to better advantage. He also thought that we now had three cards which we should skillfully play with the provisional government:
—The fact that Amb Pezzullo will not be presenting credentials;
—The anticipated departure of Somoza; and
—Our intention not to press reconciliation to the point of including persons closely identified with Somoza, such as Luis Pallais.
He thought that we could use these points to extract from the provisional government an expansion of its membership, a halt to the fighting and a pledge against retributions, points which he was prepared to support in gaining frente acceptance.
7. I told him that my role was not one of bargaining with the provisional government over the composition of the new government. We wish to use our influence to obtain the departure of Somoza and his family. At the same time we want to see a climate established in which, to use the language of the OAS resolution, a democratic government comprising the important opposition groups can be installed. In other words, we wished to make the conditions where a Nicaraguan solution arrived at by Nicaraguans could emerge. Torrijos quipped that it was important that the U.S. not stipulate to the transition government what it should do, but what we wanted it not to do.
8. The rest of the conversation centered around this basic difference of approach to the problem. I did not rule out the Torrijos approach but made clear that Amb Pezzullo’s conversations in Managua would have an important bearing on the avenues to be explored for a solution. I repeated the need to find practical ways to avoid further bloodshed and political extremism so that there would be no misunderstanding on this score. From this exchange, there emerged a series of suggestions which might prove useful as we explore possibilities. These can be summarized as follows:
—1) A ceasefire and standstill could be immediately arranged once the provisional government took over. He, CAP and Carazo would [Page 590] fully support these measures while the merger is worked out and the pacification process initiated. (In this context, Torrijos volunteered that Panamanian troops might help keep peace during the transition.)
—2) A merger of elements of the National Guard with the FSLN into a restructured military organization could proceed once an expanded junta is established.
—3) In order to reassure against a blood bath, an understanding might be reached on one or more sanctuaries in which people on either side who might consider themselves threatened could go for protection and/or staging for departure from the country. He referred to Montelimar as a natural location for Somocistas who fall into this category.
—4) Regarding the expansion of the junta, it would be best if specific names were suggested by the junta itself.
9. Assessment: The conversation was frank and useful. The atmospherics were good. Torrijos seemed eager to work with us. While making clear our approach to the transitional process, we avoided arousing his fears that we might be in the business of establishing a rival govt. The basic difference in our approach to the transition process remains but at least we have a better understanding of each other’s views. He is fully aware of our concerns over a vacuum both in terms of its invitation to a blood bath as well as an opportunity for extremist takeover. In this connection, one of the interesting things to emerge from the conversation was a frank admission on the part of Torrijos that the strongest military leader in the ranks of the frente is Ortega Saavedra. He left no doubt in our minds that he ranks him clearly above Eden Pastora in the power structure.
10. Recommendation: Our ability to proceed with our scenario will, of course, depend upon what Amb Pezzullo finds from his conversations with Somoza, opposition leaders in Managua, and the rate of deterioration in the cohesion of the National Guard. We may find that our approach is no longer viable, in which case we may have to consider the Torrijos approach. The conversation with Torrijos leads us to suggest that we start thinking about a scenario built on these elements:
—1) Negotiate with the provisional government for an expansion of its membership and a clear understanding regarding a ceasefire/standstill, no retributions, and how the merger of the armed forces is to proceed.
—2) Try to keep Somoza in place until we work out an acceptable alternative with the provisional government.
—3) Once that agreement is reached, coordinate Somoza’s departure with a transfer of power to the expanded provisional government.
—4) Attempt to have Gutierrez incorporated into the expanded provisional government with a view to his playing a key role in the [Page 591] restructuring of the armed forces so as to ensure an adequate counterbalance to FSLN elements. (Until I can size up the GN defectors in San Jose, we will have no idea whether any of them have the strength to serve as a counterweight to the Sandinistas.)
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840150–1968. Secret; Flash; Nodis.↩