235. Telegram From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State1
2857. Special encryption. Dept also pass to Am Embassy Caracas, Am Embassy Panama, and Am Embassy San Jose. San Jose for Ambassador Bowdler. Subject: (S) Somoza—The First Visit.
1. S-Entire text.
2. I called on Somoza this afternoon. He was accompanied by ForMin Quintana and Congressman Murphy. After pleasantries, I asked if he had any comments to make on the message we passed to ForMin Quintana and Luis Pallais. He asked that I go over the points again.
3. In very dramatic fashion he then said he had to meet with “his associates” and left the room with Quintana and Murphy. When he returned he said he was prepared to resign but that he wanted “guarantees” that the Guardia Nacional (GN) would not be destroyed. He said it was essential that the GN received USG assistance to fight the Communists as soon as he turned power over to a successor regime. I made it clear that a change would be viable only if it was viewed as a clean break with his government. Some cosmetic constitutional [Page 598] successor government or military coup would carry the stigma of Somocismo without Somoza and would not change the current balance. I indicated that we were equally concerned that the Guardia not collapse and welcomed his thoughts as to how this could be accomplished. He said he would offer some thoughts.
4. Somoza then asked how the political succession would work. He smiled and said “I recognize that you won’t negotiate on this point but I am interested in your thoughts.” I said we were convinced that his departure and the formation of an independent successor body offered the only opportunity to form a new government of reconciliation, stop bloodshed and begin a political dialog. We recognized the risks but saw no other alternatives. Continuation of the fighting would continue to erode his position and open the door to an extreme leftist takeover. His departure opened up the possibility of putting some moderate forces into play and in the process perhaps breaking the cycle of political confrontation and violence.
5. He said this was poor payment for the loyalty and services he had given to the USG: The Arbenz overthrow and the Bay of Pigs invasion. He could not help feeling he was being victimized. I said the most dignified capstone of a long relationship would be to work together to engineer a graceful exit which gave support to moderate forces. He smiled and said he was a realist and a politician and recognized that he had to go. “I cannot hold out much longer anyway”, he confessed. He promised to cooperate in working out the scenario of his departure. I observed that the final days of departure had to be tailored with great precision to bolster moderate forces, preserve the institutional integrity of the GN and stop the bloodshed. He agreed and said he would offer some suggestions on how the Guardia could be reorganized. We will continue the conversation tomorrow.
6. Comment: We were at it for over three hours. Murphy sat through all of it without making one comment. His presence may prove useful; he was a party to this understanding. Although Somoza promised to plan the final days together, his character and past performance leaves much doubt. At least he got the message that there are no easy ways out. He clearly wants safehaven in the United States. He roared with laughter when he learned that his priority status for an immigrant visa derives from his relationship to his U.S. citizen estranged wife, Hope.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 35, Nicaragua: 6/26–28/79. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Pastor wrote at the top of the first page: “Conversation with Somoza.”↩
- Pastor added the following handwritten notation: “Real issue has changed. Not whether we pushed Somoza out, but did we hand it over to the Sandinistas.”↩