Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

226. Minutes of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, June 25, 1979, 10–11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Nicaragua

PARTICIPANTS

• The Vice President
• Mr. John Matheny

• State

  • Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher
  • Ambassador Viron Vaky
  • Ambassador Lawrence Pezzullo
  • Mr. William Bowdler

• OSD

  • Secretary Harold Brown
  • Deputy Secretary Charles Duncan
  • Mr. David McGiffert

• JCS

  • General David Jones
  • Lt. General John Pustay

• DCI

  • Admiral Stansfield Turner
  • [name not declassified]

• White House

  • Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • Mr. David Aaron

• NSC

  • Mr. Robert Pastor

MINUTES

Dr. Brzezinski opened the meeting by describing the agenda (attached).² Since Admiral Turner had not yet arrived, he asked Warren Christopher to begin by discussing the diplomatic situation. (S)

DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES

Christopher summarized the debate at the OAS. The Andean countries had negotiated a resolution with Mexico without informing us; they then backed away and accepted many of our suggestions. One thing he had learned from the debate was that anything the U.S. does with regard to Nicaragua would be viewed with great skepticism by the Latins. (S)

Vaky said that the passage of the resolution had helped our position in the hemisphere and that negotiations may have improved their attitudes of our position. He said that today the Venezuelan Foreign Minister is going to Caracas, and the Venezuela OAS Ambassador will accompany the Peruvian Ambassador to San Jose, probably for discussions with the junta. Then the two Ambassadors will return to the Andean capitals to report to the Foreign Ministers. Venezuelan Ambassador Cardozo told Vaky that he should not doubt the degree of commitment Venezuela had to avoid a Communist victory in Nicaragua. Cardozo reminded Vaky that he was an adviser on Communist insurgency to Foreign Minister Calvani, and for that reason, he was being sent to Nicaragua. (S)

Vaky said that the Andean countries were playing their cards very close to their chest. Apparently, they had no inclination or desire to have us join them, although they will probably make their demarches parallel to our own. He said he does not expect the Venezuelans to recognize the Sandinista junta soon, but he does expect that Peru could break relations soon. At the moment, both Venezuela and Peru have their Ambassadors there. (S)

Christopher summarized by saying that the Sandinista junta is gaining greater international recognition and more authenticity. (S)

Ambassador Pezzullo reviewed his contacts with the many groups of Nicaraguan exiles in Washington. There is one group, which includes large cotton farmers and financiers, whom he met with last night, and also a group from the FAO, whose leader, Javier Zavala, is returning to San Jose soon for a meeting of the FAO. The FAO group recently issued a declaration which suggested that it would keep its door open to the junta.³ Arturo Cruz recently went to San Jose, and Robelo offered him the Central Bank presidency of the new government. Cruz attached three conditions to his acceptance: (1) That the junta be broadened; (2) that the junta commit itself to a democratic process and not rely solely on an armed militia; and (3) that he would have full control over his team at the Central Bank. (S)

Pezzullo summarized by saying that the moderate opposition group had not solidified in any way as of yet. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski summarized the Secretary’s meeting with General Gutierrez.⁴ Gutierrez denied any political ambitions, and said he would not do anything until Somoza left the country. He did say, if asked, he would agree to serve on a reconstituted National Guard, but in that case, he also wanted simultaneously to be on the junta. He is not interested in any rapid move, however, and he does not intend to go to Nicaragua until Somoza leaves. (S)

Christopher summarized the responses to the letters which the President sent to Carrazo and Torrijos.⁵ We had anticipated argumentative responses, and that’s what we got. He also said that both Pallais and Quintana had indicated to officials in Washington that Somoza might be open to the idea of leaving Nicaragua under certain conditions. (S)

MILITARY SITUATION

Turner then gave a summary of the internal military situation. He said that the FSLN were increasingly concerned about the possibility of US intervention, and were therefore moving toward beginning a major new offensive in the South. The National Guard still is clearing Managua. Fighting is continuing in the city as well as in rural areas. We have contacted through our channels, moderate leaders, and asked if they would be prepared to form a group. They said only under the guarantee of stability, which they viewed as requiring some sort of international presence other than the National Guard. Also, the FSLN would have to participate in such a framework. (S)

Ambassador Vaky said that he had met with former Costa Rican President Oduber, who Turner’s people know very well. Oduber has a ranch near Liberia in northern Costa Rica, and is well-acquainted and well plugged into the Sandinistas in that area. When Vaky told Oduber that we had received a few reports about the possibility of Cuban personnel in the area, Oduber said: “That cannot be. I have my people out. If Carrazo ever knew about that and ever permitted it, it would be a political bombshell.” Oduber said that he knows the area in the north very, very well—even where Pastora spends the night. He feels that he would know if there were any Cubans present. If there were even just one, Oduber said that would be enough. But he doesn’t think that even Lopez Portillo knows about that. However, he is going to Mexico over the weekend, and from there to San Jose [1 line not declassified] Vaky insisted that we should be very careful and check the reports about Cuban personnel in the area. In addition, we should follow up the demarches to Carrazo and Torrijos with messages providing as much information as possible on this. (S)

In answer to a question from Dr. Brzezinski about whether this could be done, [name not declassified] said that virtually all the reports on Cuban advisers are coming from a single source. This source is very reliable, but new. Other information he has given has been substantiated. (S)

Vaky interjected by saying that it has not been corraborated yet. Because of Oduber’s strong views and knowledge of the area, we should be very careful about putting it out. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski summed up by saying then we do not want to go ahead with this information at this time. On the equipment, there is no question that they are transferring large amounts to the Sandinistas. Nor is there any question that the Cubans are deeply involved in the training. (S)

Vaky agreed with that. He said that the only question was about Cuban personnel. (S)

Harold Brown said that was the only point in his recent Issues and Answers press conference where he said he did not have confirming evidence. (S)

Turner said that the military situation is fairly stable. There are indications that the FSLN feel a great sense of urgency, however, to start an offensive in the southwest. (S)

In answer to a question from the Vice President about whether Somoza is finished, Turner said he was. The question really is when. The economic situation is also very bad, with very little food or water available. (S)

With regard to the question of how long Somoza can last, [name not declassified] said that he has at least another week. If everything goes against him, then at most a week. If not, perhaps another few weeks. What is less clear is that he will get through this week. However, there is no evidence yet that he is willing to leave except under certain conditions. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski introduced the question of what U.S. policy objectives should be at this time. Do we want to try to widen the junta, or create an alternative to the junta, or seek a fusion between an alternative and the junta? Do we try to forestall recognition of the junta by others? Or do we let others join and recognize the junta? (S)

Vaky said that it is important for everyone to recognize one thing: and that is that no negotiation is possible with Somoza. That time has passed. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski agreed with that statement, as did everyone else. He said that we are now publicly committed to Somoza’s departure; the only question is how do we arrange it. If perhaps we cannot put together a pastiche or a negotiated solution, perhaps maybe the best alternative for U.S. policy would be to lay low and concentrate on the northern tier military countries like Honduras and El Salvador. We could say that it is a Latin American problem, of no consequence to us. This is not an attractive option, but perhaps this is something we should consider. (S)

Harold Brown said that whatever we say, it will still look as if it is a political defeat for us. (S)

Duncan said that if the Sandinistas win, there will be a very small difference in the political implications between walking away from it and trying to find a political solution. (S)

Vaky said that he wouldn’t give up in trying to influence the provisional junta. We should work through our friends. Our main card is that we could assure Somoza’s departure, and that is not insignificant. (S)

Christopher reinforced that point by saying that what we can bring to this situation at this time is that we can help get Somoza out. But in exchange, we want to assure that there will not be a vacuum so we need to do it in a way that doesn’t look like we have chosen up sides with Somoza. We can do this by encouraging the establishment of an Executive Committee along the lines sketched in the political scenario.⁶ However, he recognized that that strategy had less than a 50–50 chance. Christopher suggested that we could do this strategy in one of two ways: (1) We could do it quietly without staking all our prestige on this (Executive Committee) strategy; or (2) we could simultaneously get in touch with the provisional junta and try to influence it. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski repeated that Somoza’s departure is our biggest point of leverage, and we should use it well. (S)

Harold Brown asked how we should handle the National Guard and the security situation when the Executive Committee is set up. (S)

Christopher said that according to the first strategy—doing it quietly without staking our prestige—we could help establish an executive committee, which would be broadly based, and could transform the National Guard into an effective counter-force. Then we could seek a cease-fire. He asked whether the junta would accept a reformed Guard, and Vaky said that he thought they might accept it, and that possibly Torrijos would concur. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski asked whether we should talk to Somoza at this time about the modalities of stepping down. (S)

Christopher said that we should. On Saturday,⁷ he thought that perhaps he should go down to speak to Somoza, but after reflection, he was concerned that this might lead to too much publicity. As an alternative, he suggested that they send Pezzullo. If Christopher went, it might look like the United States is working with Somoza. There is less risk if we do it with Pezzullo. He will raise this with Foreign Minister Quintana in his meeting that afternoon. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski confirmed that Pezzullo would be delivering the same message to Somoza as Christopher would to Quintana. Also, they would lay out the same scenario. (S)

Christopher agreed, saying that they would make these points bluntly, and they won’t negotiate. They won’t take “no” for an answer, although they will take suggestions. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski suggested that Gutierrez should also be on the Executive Committee, as he expressed some concern about being on the junta as well as in the National Guard. (S)

Vaky said that Somoza hates Gutierrez so much that suggesting Gutierrez should be on the Executive Committee, could possibly wreck the whole idea. (S)

The Vice President said that he thought the Sandinistas probably would reject the Executive Committee idea, but perhaps they could negotiate with it. He asked whether the Executive Committee would also call for a cease-fire. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said that it would. He said that the Sandinistas are likely to see the Executive Committee as an alternative, especially if we recognize it. The National Guard could be reformed with the obvious purpose of trying to prevent added disruption. The point, of course, is that we need to have a mechanism in place that will assure a stable transition. (S)

Vaky said that we should put parallel pressure on Torrijos and Carrazo at the same time that we call for a cease-fire, and all agreed to that point. The Executive Committee would move immediately on the same day to reorganize the National Guard. (S)

Ambassador Pezzullo said that we ought to bring General Gutierrez back to Washington immediately. (S)

In answer to a question from the Vice President about where Somoza would go, Dr. Brzezinski said that we promised him that he could come to the U.S. He suggested perhaps that we send him to Minnesota. (S)

Harold Brown said that in order to insure the integrity of the National Guard, we need to develop some plans for resupplying it. Whether this could be done in 6 months, or 90 days, we will need to develop some plans right away. (S)

In answer to a question from the Vice President about whether the Latin American and Andean countries would get behind this program, Christopher said that he didn’t think they would. We will have to just reassure them. We can tell them that we intend to get rid of Somoza, but not how we will do this. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski then opened up a discussion of point #3 in the paper—how the U.S. would deal with the question of recognition of the Executive Committee. He said that perhaps we should suspend recognition of the new government, pending reconciliation between that committee and the junta. We could just try to bring both sides together. (S)

Harold Brown asked whether this wouldn’t lose us more with the Executive Committee, than it would gain us with the junta. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski focused attention on the importance of getting the new Commander of the National Guard in place. He suggested that when the Executive Committee is set up, the U.S. could announce suspension of relations with the Nicaraguan government pending reconciliation between both sides. He said that the U.S. could maintain a political relationship with both groups, and that we should deal with both groups. (S)

Christopher recommended that we not make any announcement, but work with both sides. He said that there were a lot of advantages of beginning contacts with the Sandinistas. (S)

Pezzullo said that everyone was being drawn to the provisional junta. The minute that we start approaching the junta, this will accelerate. He recommended strongly that we make an open public statement that we are moving to facilitate Somoza’s departure, and Dr. Brzezinski agreed that would be a good idea. (S)

Mr. Christopher said that we should make clear that we are getting Somoza out, and that we are not in favor of his lackeys moving in his stead, but we are in favor of a provisional government. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski suggested that we play both sides. (S)

Pastor asked what would be the incentives for the moderate leaders to join the Executive Committee. What are they likely to ask of us? What are they likely to ask of themselves in terms of what’s in it for them? Aren’t they merely exposing themselves? (S)

Vaky answered that we can at least offer them a stalemate and the possibility of participating in a future government. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said that he is pessimistic, but he thinks that this route deserves a good try. (S)

The Vice President agreed that it was a long shot. (S)

General Jones said the important point is that the National Guard has to hold together and have the morale and the wherewithal during this difficult period. When Somoza leaves, the National Guard is likely to disintegrate. Unless we are committed to make the National Guard work, by supplying logistic support and instilling in them the confidence to succeed, we are not likely to be able to succeed. (S)

The Vice President recalled the issue of sending General Huyser to Iran. (S)

Vaky said that there is obviously a great risk in this transition, but he urged that we accept it. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said that General Gutierrez should probably come here to talk to Harold Brown and David Jones, and get an idea of what could be expected of us to help him. From here, he should go to Managua or San Jose. (S)

Vaky warned that if Gutierrez came to the U.S. it will look too much as if he is our man, and we are setting up his government. (S)

Christopher said that the Executive Committee must invite him to come to Nicaragua. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said that he must be in the area soon. He said that McGiffert could go down there and talk to him once he is in the area about what we would be prepared to do for him. (S)

Christopher recommended that perhaps Gutierrez should come back to Honduras, which is relatively neutral in these issues. (S)

Turner repeated what he had said earlier, [1 line not declassified]. He doubted that the moderates will view the National Guard as adequate to restore order. In the crunch, they wanted an international presence or at least some support for the National Guard. Specifically, the National Guard had told [less than 1 line not declassified] that they needed three things: (1) Aircraft; (2) armored vehicles; and (3) medium sized weapons, like rockets, mortars, recoilless rifles. (S)

Christopher said that he did not disagree with that point, but we cannot move too fast in resupplying the National Guard. Perhaps, we should work through Robelo at this time. (S)

Vaky said that after trying this long-shot, we must be prepared to work the other side of the street by trying to co-opt the Sandinistas. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski agreed it was a long-shot, but felt that we should try, and he agreed that we must be prepared to work the other side. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski asked some questions about the seven people designated to be on the Executive Committee, and Ambassador Bowdler said that he had spoken with most of them, that they were very important leaders with some credibility in the community. (S)

Vaky interjected that no one had as of yet laid out the entire scenario for this group. (S)

Bowdler reported that Newsom had just had a conversation with Representative Murphy, where he outlined in very general terms the kind of scenario that was being discussed. Murphy said that a constitutional formula needs to be maintained. It was important to have some liberal party representation on the transitional junta. However, he found this was helpful. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said that Deshon did provide that liberal party representation. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski summarized the discussion:

—First, Christopher will meet with Quintana, and outline the broad approach. (S)

—Next, Pezzullo would go to Managua to make the same pitch to Somoza. (S)

—Next, Bowdler would go to San Jose to meet with the moderate leaders and help put together the Executive Committee. (S)

—Next, Brzezinski, himself, would meet with Gutierrez, and urge him to return to the Western Hemisphere. If asked where he should go, Brzezinski would recommend Costa Rica. Warren Christopher said that if necessary, the State Department would pay for it, but it should be on a commercial flight for symbolic reasons. (S)

General Jones wondered whether Colonel Swett, who is an old friend of General Somoza’s, and who is about to retire in about five days, shouldn’t accompany Pezzullo to Managua. Warren Christopher said that it would be a good idea provided that Swett knew what the purpose of his mission was; he is not going down to shore up Somoza, but to tell him to depart. General Jones agreed to talk to Colonel Swett, and if everything turned out allright, then Swett would accompany Pezzullo. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski asked whether a two-step process was necessary, and Pezzullo and Christopher both agreed that it would help. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said that the U.S. should maintain contact with the Executive Committee, while at the same time opening up contact with the junta. (S)

Pezzullo recommended that our position should be very visible and public. We should say that as the first step, two groups have been formed, and we encourage them to get together, and will offer them assistance in that regard. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said that perhaps we could issue a statement after the emergence of the Executive Committee and say that the USG publicly welcomes this development and sees this as the first step towards a government of national conciliation. It could then announce its call for a ceasefire, an arms embargo, and prompt negotiations between both groups, as well as humanitarian assistance. We should also go to the Andean group to try to line them up behind us. He asked what we should do with regard to resupplying the National Guard. (S)

Christopher said that a reconstituted Guard under General Gutierrez should be reconsidered for a resupply relationship on their request. (S)

Harold Brown said that would require Congressional consultations, and we should make sure about the diplomatic implications as well—how it would be viewed by other countries. (S)

McGiffert said that the Defense Department should see what is needed, and the State Department should look into the diplomatic implications of a resupply relationship. (S)

General Jones said that if we play a position of neutrality, it will be a high-risk strategy. (S)

Harold Brown asked who would stand up to the Sandinistas without some clear commitment from the United States. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said that we have got to give them some support. (S)

Harold Brown reminded the group that the people who had negotiated the departure of the Shah were shot. (S)

Robert Pastor said that it was very important that everything be coordinated so that it could occur in the same day. We do not want to see the political scenario go forward unless the Guard was going to be reformed simultaneously. Similarly, we should try at the same time to turn off Torrijos and Carrazo from giving arms to the Sandinistas. (S)

Vaky said that he thought they stood a good chance of turning off the supply of arms to the Sandinistas if this worked. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski raised again the question of supporting the National Guard under Gutierrez. He said that we should indicate support in general terms to maintain security in the event that an embargo would not work. We should try to seek a ceasefire and a standstill, and the talks ought to begin immediately. However, if the civil war goes on, there is very little that we can promise him. (S)

Vaky said that we should be very wary of getting into a Spanish civil war-type dilemma in which we are supporting one side and Latin America and Cuba are on the other. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski asked whether this stood a good chance of succeeding after Somoza goes, and Vaky said that he thought it did. (S)

Harold Brown expressed concern that the military situation could tilt and end in a week. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said that the critical moment would be the two to three days immediately after the transfer of power, when we don’t have very much influence. (S)

Harold Brown said it is possible we cannot even deliver equipment in that time. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski acknowledged that it would be hard to do it politically anyway, but we have no choice but to try. (S)

Vaky again suggested that we should do what we can down this road, but if we take it, we should be prepared to drop back and support, if possible, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador to help out this new government. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski agreed that the strategy was worth pursuing, that the chances of success were about 50–50, and then we may have to face some tough decisions down the road. He said we should make these points in the cover memo to the President.⁸ (S)

Vaky said that we should be wary of the slippery slope of supporting this Executive Committee. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski asked whether it wouldn’t make sense to support Gutierrez if this works. (S)

Vaky said that it would be difficult, since we may have to abandon him. We have to be prepared to pull back on the chain if the Executive Committee strategy doesn’t work. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said that we may have to let these people go over the cliff if necessary. (S)

Pezzullo said that the other choice for us is to play the route of the junta. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said that this route of setting up the Executive Committee should not be seen as an anti-junta maneuver. We are just trying to implement the OAS resolution and looking towards a political reconciliation. (S)

Vaky raised the question of the request by Royo⁹ that we begin talks with the junta. (S)

Bowdler said that it would be better to have these talks in San Jose when he is there on Wednesday,¹⁰ and see them on Thursday. (S)

Vaky said that Ambler Moss could talk to the junta. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said that we should talk to them as a major political force. It should be clear that our talks do not constitute recognition of them as a government. As for the people in Managua, they should see this maneuver as an attempt to jell a negotiated exit of Somoza rather than as a way to try to exclude the Sandinistas. What we are trying to do is create a framework in which the Sandinistas will fit. So therefore we should talk to the Sandinistas as a political force rather than to recognize them. (S)

Pastor said that we ought to be careful in our approaches to the Sandinistas that we are not implicitly inviting moderate leaders—for example, those we want to join the Executive Committee—to sign on to the provisional junta rather than the Executive Committee. The maneuver will be a delicate one. We want to keep a channel of communication open to the Sandinistas, but we don’t want to do so in a way that legitimizes them because that will defeat the Executive Committee idea even before it is born. (S)

Pezzullo said that the people in Managua could be interested in working on the Executive Committee because it could be perceived as giving them a leg up in their negotiations with the provisional junta. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski then suggested that we revise the political scenario and send it to the President. We need to suggest parallel talks in Managua, and also with the Sandinista provisional junta. Our purpose needs to be stated clearly; it is not to set up an alternative group to contest power with the Sandinistas, but rather a mechanism that will bring together all the various groups in the country at the same time that it assures the peaceful departure of Somoza. This then will be the U.S. contribution. (S)

In response to a question from David Aaron, Vaky said that as soon as this works, we should go back immediately to Torrijos and Carrazo with Presidential messages urging them to cease their support for the Sandinistas. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski asked whether we should send messages to both soon, stating our strategy in very general terms. Later, we can follow up. (S)

Vaky thought that that would be possible, and also suggested that we may want to do the same thing for other OAS countries. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski stressed that this group of the Executive Committee should not be viewed as one of two groups, but rather as one of two pillars under a new government of national reconciliation. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski asked whether or not this represented the unanimous recommendation of the SCC, and all concurred. (S)

Harold Brown concurred, but said that we should also make clear to the President, that we didn’t think it would be likely to work. The real question he had is whether by adopting this strategy we will make it more difficult to pursue the other path towards the provisional junta. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said that he didn’t think it would, but agreed we should open up a channel to the Sandinistas now in order to assure that eventuality. (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 33, Nicaragua: 6/25/79. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.
2. Attached but not printed.
3. See Document 224.
4. See Document 225.
5. See footnotes 4 and 5, Document 223.
6. Attached but not printed is an unsigned memorandum dated June 25 entitled “Nicaragua, Political Scenario for the Transitional Process.” For additional information concerning the course of action, see Document 223.
7. June 23.
8. See Document 227.
9. Ibid.
10. June 27.