Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

227. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, June 25, 1979

SUBJECT

• SCC Meeting on Nicaragua—June 25, 1979

I chaired an SCC meeting on Nicaragua today, and the Vice President, Harold, Stan, General Jones, Warren Christopher, and others attended.² Recent reports suggest that the Sandinistas are increasingly concerned about the possibility of US intervention and may be planning a major new offensive in the south within a few days to grab some territory and set up their provisional government there. At the same time, their junta is gaining greater recognition and authenticity, and people such as Royo, Carazo, and former Costa Rican President Oduber are counselling us to open up lines of communication to it. We have received reports that the provisional junta will be received in Panama this Wednesday³ in a major demonstration of support, and the Andean countries might participate in some way.

In keeping with the approach approved by you on Saturday,⁴ the issue the SCC addressed was not just how to assure a peaceful and orderly transition from Somoza to a moderate government but how to do so in a way which will not antagonize the Sandinistas, since we may ultimately have to deal with them. Accordingly, we will try to obtain the acquiescence of Somoza and the support of moderate leaders in Managua to set up an Executive Committee, supported by a reconstituted National Guard. As envisaged, this Executive Committee would represent a clear break with the past. It would negotiate with the Sandinista junta to establish a government of national reconciliation, and would thus provide for a peaceful transition from Somoza.

To implement your guidance, our course of action will be as follows:

1. Pursuant to the OAS resolution, the USG should mount a program to get Somoza to leave without creating a vacuum. We would do this quietly, making every effort to avoid the impression that we are trying to allow Somoza to dictate, or to preserve his regime. We must also make clear that we are not setting up competing forces but creating a mechanism for removing Somoza peacefully, and starting a dialogue leading to a negotiated settlement that stops the bloodshed.

—Christopher will make a proposal to Foreign Minister Quintana here indicating that Somoza’s commitment to leave office offers the only possibility of resolving his personal future and facilitating negotiations to preserve the institutional structure, including elements of the National Guard. Plan outlined in paragraphs 2 and 3 would be described to Somoza.

—Pezzullo would go to Managua and begin conversations with Somoza along same lines. (Depending on General Jones’ conversation with Colonel Swett, an old friend of Somoza’s, Colonel Swett might accompany Pezzullo to reinforce the point that Somoza must depart.)

—Bowdler would go to San Jose to talk to Robello and other Opposition leaders who are not part of the FSLN Provisional Government (see Point 5) to explain our position and maintain contact during the evolution of the scenario.

—Dr. Brzezinski will outline our approach more fully to General Gutierrez and ask if he is willing to return to the Western Hemisphere to start planning GN reorganization. (If asked where he would go, Dr. Brzezinski would suggest San Jose.)

—Pezzullo contacts persons in Nicaragua who might comprise a transitional government in order to obtain their agreement to serve. This would include persons who would make up a 7-man Executive Committee. In approaching the following possible candidates he will stress the points contained in paragraph 1:

Dr. Francisco FIALLOS—	Rector of National University respected by both left and right
Alfonso CALLEJAS Deshon—	former Liberal Party leader who broke with Somoza several years ago; retains personal links with disaffected Party leaders
Sr. Jaime CHAMORRO—	Owner-editor of La Prensa; brother of Pedro Joaquin, FAO leader
Sr. Luis SANCHEZ Sancho—	FAO leader and member of National Socialist Party (Moscow-oriented)
Ernesto FERNANDEZ Holman—	Manager of Banco de America; progressive, young businessman
Lic. Rafael CORDOVA RIVAS—	FAO leader; Conservative Party Member
Sr. Mariano MENDOZA—	Labor leader; head of CUS, an ORIT affiliated labor organization

2. Once Somoza’s commitment to leave is obtained and the agreement of representatives to serve on the Executive Committee is achieved, Somoza resigns and he and his entourage leave the country. The Congress meets immediately in joint session to elect a successor from the Liberal Party. (Deputy David Zamora would be a logical candidate.)

3. Almost simultaneously, Zamora dissolves the Congress and appoints a broadly based Executive Committee and then himself resigns. The Executive Committee is installed and immediately announces the following:

—They have achieved the departure of Somoza and family from the country.

—Appeal for ceasefire and cooperation in forming a Government of National Reconciliation composed of all important representation groups.

—Program of government.

—Reformation of the National Guard under new leadership (hopefully under General Gutierrez, who is then brought on the Executive Committee).

—Appeal for international humanitarian assistance.

4. U.S. publicly welcomes this development and sees it as an important first step toward national reconciliation as contemplated in the OAS resolution. We encourage other nations to join us in:

—offering humanitarian assistance;

—fostering a climate within which a new government can prosper by supporting a ceasefire and arms embargo; and

—encouraging all important representative groups to initiate promptly discussions on the establishment of a government of national reconciliation.

(We will avoid addressing the question of recognition until a government of national reconciliation is established, and during the interim, we will maintain contact with all groups.)

5. Simultaneously we will be working with the Andean countries and others to broaden the base of the FSLN Provisional Government and get a commitment from it to: (a) preserve the institutional integrity of the National Guard; (b) call on the OAS to provide resources and experts to reform the electoral machinery; and (c) call for elections in the shortest time possible to form a constituent assembly and general election.

If the above strategy works, our public position will be clear: we would welcome the Committee as a first step toward an enduring solution; and without openly positioning ourselves behind either the Sandinistas or the Executive Committee, we will quietly try to help the Committee survive the difficult days after Somoza’s departure. (In the meantime, DOD will quietly review the state of the National Guard, and State will examine the diplomatic and political implications of providing some supplies to the GN under a transitional regime.)

I should add that while the SCC felt this strategy was the correct one at this time, it was also the unanimous view of the SCC that it only stands at best a 50% chance of success. However, if it fails and the Sandinistas prevail, we will still be free to go the route of recognizing the Sandinistas. In the interim, Ambassador Moss (and perhaps Bowdler or Pezzullo) will begin quiet contacts and discussions with the Sandinista junta.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 56, Nicaragua: 12/78–6/79. Secret. Sent for action.
2. See Document 226.
3. June 27.
4. June 23. See Document 223.