225. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance in Tokyo to the Department of State and the White House1
Secto 6003. For Acting Secretary and Dr. Brzezinski. Subject: Meeting with General Gutierrez.
1. Secret entire text.
2. I have just finished meeting for about one-half hour with General Gutierrez. After reviewing the current situation in some detail, he remarked that he was saddened that our proposal had not carried the day in the OAS because he thought it was sound. I then went directly to the point and asked General Gutierrez whether he would be willing to consider participating in helping to establish a broadly-based provisional government, and to a restructuring of the National Guard so that the latter could be a strong, honest, and democratic force in the country. He said it should be very clear at the outset that he could not return to Nicaragua until President Somoza and his family had left the country. He said that he was a patriot with great affection for his country, even though he had spent the last 15 years out of the country, and that he would be prepared to help and participate if he believed such participation would be useful to his country.
3. He asked how the provisional government would be established and who the members of the provisional government would be. I told him that this would have to be worked out on the ground in Managua, and that there was at this point no consensus as to what individuals or elements would be in a provisional government. I told him that it was our position, as he undoubtedly knew, that the provisional government must be broadly-based and represent the major democratic elements in the country. He asked if it would include any Sandinistas and I replied affirmatively. He said he agreed with the concept of a broadly-based provisional government. He added that he was fearful that unless the provisional government contained strong people the Sandanistas would end up dominating it and, therefore, it was very important to select the right people for such a government.
4. I told him that I expected that efforts would be started very soon to see whether this was possible. I indicated that I anticipated this would be done by a mission from one or more OAS countries who [Page 568] would seek to facilitate the process. I further told him that Somoza had reportedly said that he would step down, but only if he were assured that there would not be a vacuum which could lead to a radical take-over. I said I felt time was very short because the fighting would probably continue. Even though we have asked the Panamanians and the Costa Ricans to halt the shipment of arms to the Sandanistas, and that, therefore, time was of the essence.
5. I then told General Gutierrez that he had a reputation for complete integrity and that from all that we had heard he was highly respected by his fellow countrymen. I asked him whether he would be willing to help in the restructuring of the National Guard if asked to do so by the provisional government. He said that he would, that he had given a great deal of thought to this subject over the years. He said he has very definite ideas about how the guard and the police can be cleansed and made more effective, and that he would be prepared to give two or three years of his life to seeing this carried out so that strong, honest, and democratic military and police institutions could be established under civilian control. He emphasized that obviously the Somozas currently in the Guard would have to go before he could take any part. He also emphasized that he had no political ambitions.
6. I told him that I must be totally frank and could not guarantee him that it would be possible to establish a broadly-based and democratic provisional government. I added, however, that such a course seemed to be the only way to prevent a continuing bloodbath and a slide into an increasingly chaotic situation.
7. He repeated again that he was a patriot and that he would be prepared to serve his country and work with us or others along the lines discussed, if he should be asked to do so and it seemed possible to accomplish something.
8. He closed by asking whether or not he would be a member of the provisional government, should he be asked to take over the command of the National Guard. He said he believed this was necessary in order to give him the kind of authority which would be required to cope with the more radical elements of the Sandanistas who might be members of the provisional government. I said I understood his point and the importance he attached to it. I indicated that the US would be following up on the situation in Nicaragua and that we could be back in touch with him within the near future.
9. I recognized General Gutierrez the minute he came in the room, as he was the number three man in the peacekeeping force in the Dominican Republic, where he did an excellent job. He was also in Washington for a considerable period of time, and I also remember him from his days there. He has a deep affection and respect for the United States, having spent 10 years of his life in the US.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 35, Nicaragua: 6/21–24/79. Secret; Niact Immediate; Cherokee; Nodis; Eyes Only. Drafted and approved by Vance. Carter initialed the top of the page. Vance was accompanying Carter on a State visit to Japan and to the G–7 Economic Summit Meeting.↩