Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

178. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, December 26, 1978

SUBJECT

• United States Policy to Nicaragua

Cy chaired a PRC meeting to hear Ambassador Bowdler’s report on the state of the mediation effort, and to formulate some recommendations on next steps.² (S)

Last Saturday,³ Bowdler met with Somoza to underline the seriousness with which we view the mediation effort and our great disappointment with his response to the mediators’ proposal.⁴ Bowdler told Somoza that he had been recalled to Washington for consultations and to consider the following options because Somoza’s response was unsatisfactory: withdrawal of the US Milgroup, reduction of the U.S. AID mission, and reduction of our diplomatic mission. Informed of this, Somoza asked Bowdler for another meeting, and Bill plans to meet with him at 10:30 A.M. tomorrow. (S)

The PRC believes that we have reached a critical stage in the mediation. We question Somoza’s seriousness in wanting a plebiscite. We believe that he has been stalling and our intelligence confirms this. We suspect that he may respond with a counter-proposal tomorrow to slow the process even more. We have already postponed the beginning date of the plebiscite till January 5; if we postpone it again, the credibility of the mediation will be seriously jeopardized. The other two mediators are thinking of abandoning the effort, and our intelligence suggests that the opposition has begun private talks with the Sandinistas. We believe the time has arrived for us to demonstrate our seriousness with Somoza. (S)

The PRC agreed that Bowdler would meet with Somoza to reiterate our seriousness, and to hear Somoza’s response. Our objective is to try to secure his agreement in principle to a plebiscite and a transition government based on the mediators’ proposal, with the understanding that the details will be negotiated. If Somoza’s response is not satisfactory, Bowdler would tell him that he intends to report to Washington, and to proceed to Santo Domingo to consult with his colleagues and write their report to the O.A.S. This report will indicate clearly Somoza’s responsibility in rejecting the plebiscite and the mediators’ good offices. (S)

In addition, Bowdler would inform Somoza that the U.S. Government is reviewing the options he mentioned on Saturday and will make a decision based on his conversation with Somoza, Bowdler’s recommendations and the mediators’ report. (S)

The PRC also discussed the three options we should consider if Somoza’s answer is unsatisfactory:

Option 1. Phased Withdrawal

—Withdraw the Milgroup. (General McAuliffe of SOUTHCOM supports this as does Cy, Harold Brown and the JCS.) The DAO would stay.

—Reduce our AID mission substantially.⁵

—Withdraw Peace Corps for security reasons.

—Reduce our Embassy staff somewhat. (S)

Option 2. Total Approach

—Same as Option 1 only all of AID mission would be withdrawn, our Embassy staff would be reduced significantly and our Ambassador would be recalled. (S)

Option 3. Total Plus

—Same as Option 2 only all of our AID loans would be phased out. (S)

The presumption is that if option #1 does not result in obtaining Somoza’s cooperation after an appropriate interval—a week or so—we would then move to Option #2, i.e., withdraw the rest of our AID mission, recall our Ambassador, (and phase out AID). (S)

These options represent the conclusion of the PRC principals that Somoza will only take the plebiscite proposal seriously if we are prepared to make some hard decisions. Cy favors option #2. The other PRC members recognized the necessity of selecting one of the options, but did not indicate their preferences. I favor option #1. (S)

Cy and I believe that you don’t have to make a decision until we have received Bowdler’s report on his conversation with Somoza tomorrow.⁶ When we do, we will speak to you. (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 25, Meetings—PRC 84: 12/26/1978. Secret. Brzezinski did not initial the memorandum. Carter wrote at the top of the page: “Zbig— Option 1 looks better as first move. J.” A notation on another copy of the memorandum indicates that it was sent via LDX to the President at Camp David on December 17. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 34, Nicaragua: 12/23–31/78)
2. No minutes for this meeting were found.
3. December 23.
4. See Document 176.
5. An unknown hand crossed out the phrase “Reduce our AID” and underlined the point.
6. See Document 179.