Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

177. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, December 26, 1978

SUBJECT

• PRC Meeting on Nicaragua—Today at 3 P.M.

The main purposes of the meeting this afternoon are: (1) to hear Bowdler’s report on the status of the negotiations on the plebiscite; and (2) to decide on ways to bring the negotiations on the plebiscite and on the transitional government to a conclusion by the end of this week. (S)

Somoza has managed to string out the negotiations, but whenever Bowdler was instructed to make a strong demarche on a particular issue, Somoza backed off. That is the way I interpret Somoza’s reaction to the latest demarche. (Tab A),² he recognizes that we are serious, and I believe that when Bowdler returns tomorrow, Somoza will make some concessions, and perhaps make a counter-proposal. This won’t be enough, however, to conclude an agreement. (S)

I should point out that Bowdler thinks we have come to the end of the line, and that Somoza will stonewall him when he returns. I respect Bill’s judgment, but on this question—are we at the end of the line? Will Somoza accept a plebiscite?—I disagree with him. Provided we are firm and press Somoza by giving Bowdler sufficient bargaining room, I believe we can get Somoza to accept a plebiscite and the Negotiating Group (NG)’s proposal for a transition government. (S)

But clearly we are running out of time, and for three reasons, this PRC meeting must find a way to expedite the process so that we can keep to the NG’s timetable of beginning the plebiscite on January 5. First, with Guadeloupe,³ the Middle East, China, etc., coming up, we cannot expect to continually engage your attention or that of the President or the Secretary’s. We have to make a package of decisions today. Second, members of the FAO are increasing their contacts with the Sandinistas, at least in part because they are losing faith in the mediation effort. Third, we cannot let Somoza jerk us back and forth on each and every item on the NG proposal. We have to give Bowdler some arrows to keep in his quiver (or to use, if necessary) and some guidance on where he should be tough and where he can negotiate. (S)

These are the kind of instructions which I hope will emerge from the PRC meeting:

1. Scenario. After full consultations in Washington, Bowdler should see Somoza tomorrow with the purpose of trying to get Somoza’s agreement in principle on the plebiscite and the NG proposal (Tab B).⁴ If successful, Somoza and the FAO would sign the Acta-Compromiso (compromise plan) before Friday,⁵ and then the mediators would submit a report to the O.A.S. on January 2, summarizing their efforts and making recommendations for O.A.S. supervision of the plebiscite. (S)

2. Guidance on Principal Issues. Somoza’s party (PLN) had seven objections (Tab C)⁶ to the NG proposal; I believe the PRC should focus on two of them: (1) On the issue of whether the plebiscite should be supervised by Nicaragua or by an international authority (the O.A.S.), we have to be very tough on insisting that it be international. (2) The NG has accepted the FAO’s demand that Somoza’s half-brother and his son be dismissed from the National Guard and sent abroad during the plebiscite (January 5–February 28, 1979), and if Somoza loses the plebiscite, he will “voluntarily depart” from Nicaragua. It seems to me to be fair and important to try to get Somoza’s son and half-brother out of the Guard during the plebiscite period, but I don’t see how we can insist that they should be exiled when we have asked Somoza to let opposition exiles back in the country. Bowdler should be told to be soft on this issue. (S)

3. Arrows for His Quiver. If Somoza is unreasonable in his conversation with Bowdler tomorrow, Bowdler needs to be able to tell Somoza that the President regrets Somoza’s lack of faith in the plebiscite proposal, and he has been instructed to inform Somoza of the President’s intention to withdraw half of the MIL group and to reduce the AID mission and U.S. Embassy personnel. He should also tell Somoza that he will fly from Managua to Santo Domingo to prepare a report with his NG colleagues which will be submitted to the O.A.S. In the light of the O.A.S. debate on this report and on the report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the USG will re-evaluate our entire relationship with Somoza. (S)

4. Additional Items. The PRC should also decide to be a little more explicit with the Israelis on our concerns about arms sales. (S)

David requested an up-date from the C.I.A., and that is at Tab D. (S)

Tab D

Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency⁷

Washington, December 24, 1978

SUBJECT

• Review of Judgments from IIM 78-1002IC, 15 September 1978, Situation in Nicaragua [classification not declassified]

1. President Somoza appears more confident of his ability to retain power than at any time in recent months. His dilatory tactics in the mediation—making concessions in order to buy time and to challenge his opponents to follow suit—have been reasonably successful. Because the opposition has neither the cohesive strength nor the flexibility of Somoza’s power structure, continued concessions over time will likely further splinter the Broad Opposition Front (FAO). Consequently, he will not reject outright the mediators’ general proposals, for this would place on him the onus of destroying the mediation. [classification and handling restriction not declassified]

2. As long as the mediation continues, Somoza appears likely to strengthen his position further. He has increased the size of the National Guard from 8,200 to roughly 10,000, an effective increase in combat forces of more than 30 percent. These forces are now well armed and facing no critical munitions shortages, save perhaps field rations. Guard loyalty to Somoza still appears solid. He evidently believes that only mass civil uprisings, direct foreign intervention, or guerrilla neutralization of his air power—none of which seems likely at the moment—would pose a critical military threat to his government. [classification and handling restriction not declassified]

3. Somoza’s confidence is also likely bolstered by his perceptions that: the Broad Opposition Front is headed for collapse; international pressures from Venezuela, Panama, and Costa Rica have lessened; and completion of the coffee and cotton harvests in a few months will ease Nicaragua’s financial crisis. [classification and handling restriction not declassified]

4. The Sandinista guerrillas are well armed and number roughly 2,000. They have not, however, staged the long expected all-out offensive, and currently they seem inclined to restrict their activities to hit and run strikes. The reasons for this are: continuing factionalism, counsel from such foreign backers as Fidel Castro and Venezuelan President Perez, the lure of the recently granted amnesty, the military imbalance in favor of the Guard, and, for some, the hope that the mediation and plebiscite might remove Somoza peacefully. [classification and handling restrictions not declassified]

5. Over the longer term, however, if the mediation effort fails, some of these factors will change. The current low level of violence and polarization is due to guerrilla inactivity and the anticipation of peaceful change through a plebiscite, not resolution of the fundamental issues. Collapse of the hope for peaceful change—and presuming the US disassociates itself from the Somoza government will serve to galvanize anti-Somoza efforts inside Nicaragua as well as abroad. This would not remove all the causes of factionalism within the FSLN, but it would boost public support for the guerrillas as they would increasingly be seen as the only means to oust Somoza. [classification and handling restriction not declassified]

6. Foreign support for the guerrillas and for the anti-Somoza movement in general would likely increase. Regardless of how technically sound Somoza’s case might be on the question of whose intransigence killed the mediation, international opinion will simply become more polarized, with the bulk of it against Somoza. [classification and handling restriction not declassified]

7. Under these circumstances, Panama’s General Torrijos would probably step up the level of arms support to the FSLN, and, particularly if mass civil war were to ensue, might well go beyond that. Venezuelan President Perez has retreated from his previous policy of providing arms to the guerrillas. Because he would like desperately to see Somoza ousted before his own term ends in March, however, his greater involvement cannot be ruled out. Costa Rica would probably continue to provide the guerrillas their critical sanctuary as well as more concrete forms of support. Cuban backing has been cautious but increasing, and as the level of violence grew, Castro would be tempted to up the ante. [classification and handling restriction not declassified]

8. All of this would exacerbate polarization, and while Somoza might be able to retain power through draconian measures, the only two choices would be a police state or a downward spiral of violence ending in the ascendancy of the radical left. There are no assurances, on the other hand, that should Somoza depart peacefully, the relatively untested opposition would be able to govern effectively enough to win the confidence of the Guard, while at the same time thwarting encroachment from the radical left. But the radical outcome seems less certain if the Somoza dynasty is dismantled systematically and with a measure of control than if it is put to the violent test in which only one extreme can prevail. [classification and handling restriction not declassified]

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 34, Nicaragua: 12/23–31/78. Secret. Pastor did not initial the memorandum.
2. Not attached. See Document 176.
3. Carter travelled to Guadeloupe, France, January 4–9, 1979, to meet informally with French President Giscard d’Estaing, German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, and British Prime Minister James Callaghan.
4. Not attached. In telegram 6687 from Managua, December 20, the Embassy sent for an English-language translation of the draft compromise agreement. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780527–1200)
5. December 29.
6. See footnote 3, Document 172.
7. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Prepared in the Latin American Division of the Office of Regional and Political Analysis.