176. Telegram From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State1
6775. Mil addee handle as Specat Exclusive. For Christopher and Vaky from Bowdler. Caracas, Panama, San Jose, US SouthCom for Ambassadors and General McAuliffe only. Subject: Nicaraguan Mediation No. 272: Meeting with Somoza.2
1. (S-Entire text)
2. I have just come back from two-hour and 40 minute conversation with Somoza during which he declined to make any commitment to accept the Negotiating Group proposal. He claimed that he personally [Page 449] thought it was a workable plan but that there was strong opposition to it in the ranks of the Liberal Party. The Guardia Nacional had misgivings about the plan but the main resistance was from the PLN which saw itself threatened. I asked him specifically what the difficulty was since the NG had purposely built into the proposal active participation of the Liberal Party throughout the entire process. Somoza said that there were two basic problems. One was what he described as the question of “sovereignty.” By this he was referring to the role of the international authority in organizing, controlling, and supervising the plebiscite. The second had to do with “assurances” of continuing US support of Nicaragua publicly stated regardless of the outcome of the plebiscite. He also referred in a minor key to the question to be posed in the plebiscite and the “cumbersome” procedures for moving from his resignation to the establishment of the provisional government.
3. I reviewed the NG proposal at great length to meet the arguments that he had raised. I emphasized that while the international authority would have the role which he described, he should keep in mind three factors: (a) this was a very special procedure to deal with a very special situation and not an electoral plan that would be built into the Nicaraguan electoral code; (b) Nicaraguans of both sides would participate in the plebiscite supervision process in the mesas electorales up through the vote count at the national level, and (c) the proposal was not an imposed solution but one which Nicaraguans represented by the FAO and by the PLN would agree to in advance. Somoza acknowledged these points and said perhaps the undesirable appearances could be taken care of by “cosmetic changes.” I tried to get him to define what he meant by “cosmetics” but I could not get him to be specific. I told him that this is an aspect which the NG could look at provided what he had in mind by “cosmetic change” did not repeat not affect the fundamentals of the plebiscite as contemplated in the NG proposal.
4. On the question of “assurances” I also tried to get him to be specific. He claimed that the PLN leaders were all scared of how the working out of the plan would affect their future. To be frank, he went on, they fear a US double cross. To guard against this they would like to have a specific USG public statement indicating that the United States would continue its traditional friendship and economic support regardless of how the plebiscite came out. I reminded Somoza of what I had told Luis Pallais when he had raised this question with me. Somoza said that that response was not enough. I told him that this is a matter I was prepared to take up in Washington if he were to agree in principle to the NG proposal and promptly negotiate its final terms with the FAO. He claimed that he was unable to give me that commitment without further consultations with his cabinet and party leaders.
[Page 450]5. I asked Somoza by when he could complete this consultation and give us the response requested in the demarche. He replied that he would have it by Dec 26 and he would like for me to return to discuss it with him. In saying this, he noted that the PLN was on the public record as saying that it was going to prepare a counter proposal for the NG. I reminded him that the USG very strongly believes that the time has passed for counter proposals and delaying tactics. I told him that if what he had in mind by way of a response was only the PLN counter proposal, I doubted the utility of my returning to Managua. Again, without making a specific commitment to accept the NG proposal, he urged that I return to have a private conversation with him after his consultations. I agreed to do this, leaving the day vague as to whether it would be the 26th or the 27th.
6. Comment: I was not reassured by Somoza’s unwillingness to accept the plan in principle. On several occasions he spoke favorably of the proposal’s workability, even if—as he put it—it represents a clever scheme to get rid of the Somozas. Despite my misgivings I recommend that I be allowed to follow through with Somoza’s request to return to Managua to speak to him. I suggest that we go ahead with the programmed PRC meeting on Dec 26 in order to review the situation in depth and consider the options that we have. I can catch the 10 p.m. Eastern flight to Miami that night and take the early Lanica flight the following morning which will put me in Managua by 10:15 a.m. Arrangements might be made for me to see him immediately and either fly back to Washington for further consultations that evening or catch the Iberia flight to Santo Domingo. From there I can report back to the Department what Somoza had to say and at the same time follow through with my commitment to work with my NG colleagues in preparing our status report.
7. I will be departing Managua tonight on the Lanica flight going straight to Miami where I will overnight at the airport hotel continue to Washington on first available flight Sunday morning.3 On arrival in Washington I will be in touch with Pete Vaky to see how the Department wants me to handle the steps described in the previous paragraph.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 34, Nicaragua: 12/23–31/78. Secret; Flash; Exdis Handle as Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Panama City, San José, and USSOUTHCOM Quarry Heights. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.↩
- In telegram 322490 to Managua, December 23, the Department informed Bowdler of the result of the December 22 mini-SCC meeting (see Document 175) and instructed him meet with Somoza and deliver talking points that described the U.S. Government’s “view of the situation” in Nicaragua. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 34, Nicaragua: 12/23–31/78)↩
- December 24.↩