175. Memorandum for the Record1
SUBJECT
- SCC Meeting on Nicaragua, 22 December 1978
PARTICIPANTS
- Warren Christopher, Viron Vaky, Brandon Grove, State Department; David Aaron, Robert Pastor, NSC; Robert Bowie, [name not declassified], CIA; William Smith, JCS; David McGiffert, Defense; three others unknown to me
1. Christopher summarized the current status of the US-sponsored mediation effort in Nicaragua as follows: the mediators tabled a proposal for a national plebiscite on whether Somoza should leave office and on the nature of the succeeding transition government if he should either win or lose the plebiscite. The Broad Opposition Front (FAO) agreed to negotiate directly with President Somoza’s representatives providing three steps were taken to establish an atmosphere conducive to negotiation, i.e. lifting the state of siege to restore constitutional guarantees, granting an amnesty for political prisoners, and revision of the radio-TV censorship code. With this done, direct talks began last week, but quickly reached an impasse on the question of compulsory participation by the FAO in the government if Somoza should win the plebiscite. The mediators drafted a revised overall proposal, which the FAO accepted, but to which Somoza’s side raised numerous objections.
[Page 447]2. Ambassador Bowdler, the US mediator, believes that Somoza’s response is a tacit rejection of the proposal and the concept of a plebiscite on his tenure. Bowdler, according to Vaky, believes Somoza has fought a delaying action in the talks and now believes he has won through attrition in the FAO.
3. Christopher recommended that Bowdler be instructed that before he leaves Nicaragua on 23 December he is to tell Somoza that the US believes he has been unreasonable and dilatory, and if he is not more forthcoming after Xmas, the US will be considering certain actions to disassociate itself from his government. Christopher believed that the decision on what those actions will be can wait until another SCC meeting on 26 December, which could be attended by Ambassadors Bowdler and Solaun and perhaps General McAuliffe of Southcom.
4. Vaky explained that Bowdler believes the mediation is lost. Bowdler is to join his colleagues in the Dominican Republic on 27 and 28 December to draft their report on the mediation to the MFM of the OAS. Christopher questioned whether the report should be delayed, lest it signal finality, but it was decided to let it go forward as a status report.
5. Christopher was not convinced that the mediation effort was lost. Aaron recommended that before leaving, Bowdler advise Somoza that the US believes he has employed dilatory tactics; that Bowdler is returning to the US for consultation on our options, which will include withdrawing the Milgroup, AID mission, Peace Corps, ICA, and the Ambassador. The US wants a clear answer by a particular deadline on whether Somoza is prepared to work out the details of a plebiscite on the issue of his continuation in office. This recommendation was adopted.
6. A representative from State explained in detail the problem with Congress, and with particular Congressmen, on the suspension of AID disbursements. The Nicaraguan government has met all its obligations, but many US contractors will be in dire straits unless US funds are released.
7. Returning to the question of Somoza’s response to the mediators’ proposal, [name not declassified] pointed out that it would be exceedingly difficult to extract a clear yes or no from Somoza; his strategy is to delay and to avoid shouldering the blame for the collapse of the mediation. He will continue to focus on those points where the opposition’s case is weakest in order to divide them and to give his own case the best public image. Aaron responded that the US must demand of Somoza a clear acceptance or rejection in principle of the mediators’ proposal.
8. McGiffert suggested that an update of the September IIM on Nicaragua would be useful to have before the 26 December SCC meeting, particularly the judgment that if Somoza stays in office, a down [Page 448] ward spiral of violence is likely over time, with increasing polarization leading eventually to the ascendancy of the radical left or right. There was no time available to discuss precise terms of reference, but Bowie said this could be done.
9. Vaky said the US could not at this point go back to “business as usual” with Somoza, particularly in view of the Carter administration’s policies on human rights and the fact that the mediation had exposed the moderates to possible reprisals.
10. No terms of reference for the 26 December SCC meeting were spelled out, but it was apparent that Ambassadors Bowdler and Solaun and General McAuliffe would be present to brief the SCC on their efforts and to make recommendations on where the US goes from here. Likely to be considered are the specific pressures to be employed to induce Somoza to negotiate in good faith the plebiscite and transition, or if this is deemed unworkable, a scenario for disassociation with Somoza’s government.
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00112R: Subject Files, Box 16, Folder 36: (SCC) Nicaragua. Secret; Sensitive. No drafting information appears on the memorandum, which was drafted on December 23. No official record of this mini-SCC meeting was found. In a December 22 memorandum to Brzezinski, Pastor summarized the results of the meeting. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 34, Nicaragua: 12/21–22/78)↩