Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

179. Telegram From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State¹

Managua, December 27, 1978, 1813Z

6804. For Christopher and Vaky from Ambassador Bowdler. Caracas, Panama, San Jose for Ambassadors only. Subject: Nicaraguan Mediation No. 273: Meeting with Somoza.

1. (S-Entire text)

2. I saw Somoza at the bunker immediately after arriving in Managua. The session lasted 30 minutes. No one else was present.

2. He opened the conversation by asking me what I had brought from Washington. I told him that there was keen disappointment and concern with his failure to accept the NG proposal in principle. I then asked him what he had for me in the light of our conversation last Saturday.² He handed me the PLN counterproposal.

3. After reading through the lengthy document (septel), I commented that there was a fundamental change in who was going to run the plebiscite.³ I noted that the OAS role had been relegated to one of observer rather than controller. He said that “sovereignty” made it impossible to accept what the NG proposed. I also pointed out the several aspects of the conditions prescribed by the NG had been left out to which he made no comment.

4. At this point I went through the speaking points prepared in Washington yesterday, at the end of which I asked him whether this proposal was the bottom line.⁴ He indicated that it was. I commented that I doubted that this afforded a solution to the Nicaraguan problem. As I left I told him that I would be in Managua until 1 p.m. and thereafter in the Dominican Republic for 2 or 3 days in case he wished to get in touch with me.

5. Comment: As we had anticipated the PLN counterproposal is a very cleverly drafted document which incorporates to a considerable degree the concepts of the NG proposal and on the face of it looks very reasonable. The way the OAS has been built into the supervision and certification of the process is particularly skillful.

6. The principal difficulty I see is the psychological one involving FAO acceptance and voter confidence in the process. While a special electoral authority would be established for the plebiscite, it is a national authority. Registration of all voters is contemplated in advance of the plebiscite which will greatly inhibit the willingness of fearful or suspicious voters to take part. The question to be put to the voter may be comprehensible to the politically sophisticated voter but not the majority of illiterate voters. In other words, while the process outlined is logical and on the face of it reasonable to other governments and to the American public, in the Nicaraguan context it will be very difficult to sell to the FAO and does not draw a sharp enough distinction between elections of the past and this plebiscite to give the voter the impression that this “consulta popular” is indeed a break with the past.

7. Another significant difference is in the selection of the provisional President. We had contemplated a President chosen from the Congress for a two-month period to do the partial revision of the Constitution, often which a President chosen by the FAO, with PLN concurrence, would govern for the remainder of the term. The PLN counterproposal would have only one President chosen from the present Congress to govern during the entire period.

8. My belief that Somoza is drafting this document was looking to debates in the OAS, and the US Congress, and with the American public at large was confirmed by two statements: (a) his comment that the US quarrel with Nicaragua comes from “an administration” and not from the American public; and (b) his comment that he doubted that the MFM would support measures infringing upon the sovereignty of a member state.

9. The PLN counter proposal will be a very difficult document to deal with. Since I am drafting this in such haste, I have not had the time to think through all of the implications. When I arrive in Miami this afternoon I will comment further to Pete Vaky.

Tucker

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780187–2283. Secret; Flash; Exdis Handle as Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Caracas, Panama City, and San José.
2. December 23.
3. In telegram 6812 from Managua, December 27, the Embassy included a translation of the December 26 PLN counterproposal, which Bowdler had received that morning. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780535–0924) In a December 28 briefing memorandum to Vance, Vaky reported: “I have been informed by one of my Nicaraguan sources resident in the United States (and a very reliable and knowledgeable one) that Somoza’s counterproposal for a plebiscite was written with the help of Congressman Murphy. According to the source, what Congressman Murphy would like to see happen is string out the negotiations until the U.S. Congress reconvenes and then use the Panama Treaty implementation legislation to frustrate any actions against Somoza by the USG.” (Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Nicaragua/El Salvador Working Files, Lot 81D64, Nicaragua—Misc. Memoranda, August–September)
4. Possible reference to a document prepared in ARA entitled “Statement to Somoza in the Event that his Response is not Satisfactory,” which Vaky sent via LDX to Pastor on December 26. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 34, Nicaragua: 12/23–31/78)